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INTRODUCTION 
The emergence of the internet as a prominent communications medium 
was welcomed with excited declarations of the new technology's power to 
transform democracy and society. It was exalted as "the most transforming 
technological event since the capture of fire"' and "the most participatory 
form of mass speech yet deve~o~ed ."~  More recently, observers credited it 
with ushering in "the most profound change since the advent of literacy'" 
1. Forum, What Are We Doing Online?, HARPER'S MAG., Aug. 1995, at 35, 36 
(quoting John Perry Barlow). 
2.  ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824,883 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
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and "a new renaissan~e."~ ~ o t  since the dawn of broadcasting has a new 
technology generated such hopefkl predictions. Radio was touted as a 
"new miracle,""nd television was the "great radiance in the sky,"' 
expected to catalyze political engagement and enrich American democracy 
if put to good use. Like broadcasting before it, the Internet was expected to 
deliver a renewed and vibrant democratic culture to the n a t i ~ n . ~  
The United States government played an instmmental role in the early 
development of both broadcasting and the Internet-incubating early forms 
of both technologies, partly for purposes of national defense, and then 
privatizing much of the control of each mediums7 Although broadcasting 
and the Internet were exalted as essential-new instruments for enhancing 
democratic engagement and enriching the marketplace of ideas-the 
government took two very different approaches in orienting itself to 
broadcasting and to the Internet, approaches rooted in divergent free speech 
traditions. 
In devising a licensing and regulatory regime for broadcasting, Congress 
and the early Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) 
appealed to a communitarjan, civic republican, and ultimately 
instrumentalist conception of the First Amendment that values public 
deliberation as the highest form of democratic engagement."he purpose 
of broadcasting regulation was to generate programming that elevates 
American democracy and cultivates localized civic engagement. But the 
3. Tim O'Reilly, Lumtnurres Look to the F~trure f ib ,  BBC NEWT, Apr. 30, 2008, 
http:/, news.bbc.co.uki2ihiitechnoIogyi73737 17.stm. 
4. ROBERT W. DESMOND, THE INFORMATION PROCESS: WORLD NEWS REPORTING TO 
THE TLVFNTIETH CENTURY 370 ( 1978). 
5. LAWRENCE K. GROSSMAN, THE ELECTRONIC REPIJBLIC: RESNAPINODEMOOUCY IN 
THE INFORMATION AGE 167 (1 995) (quoting Edward R. Murrow); Fee ulso d at 166 ("Radio 
was to serve as a masslve force for pol~tical enlightenment in our democratlc society."); 
RICHARD DAVIS, THE WFB OF POLITICS: THE IYTFRNFT"; IMPAGT ON THE AMERICAN 
P n ~ r r r c . ~ ~  SYSTEM 29 (1999) (quoting broadcastrng proneer Dav~d Sarnoff as toutlng 
televtslon as a "torch of hope In a troubled world"'). A local broadcaster extolled that "the 
most ourstand~ng of the contr~butions that televlslon can be expected to make to further 
tlemocracy . . . wtll be its ilnlque usetitlness as a means of publ~c infomatlon." Id. (c~ting 
JFFF KISSELOFF, THE BOX: AN ORAL HISTORY OF TFLEVIYION, 1920- I96 1, at 17 1 (1  995)). 
6 GROSSMAN, rupru note 5 ,  at 166-69; see u l ~ o  D ~ V I S ,  rzrpru note 5, at 27-32, and 
MARK LLOYD, P R O L ~ U F  TO 2 FARCE 107-10 (21106) (describ~ng the democratlc aspirations 
undergirding the broadcast regulatory regime). 
7 .Tee PAUL STARR, THE C R E A ~ I O N  OF THE MFDI ,~ :  POLIT~CAL ORIC;INS OF MODERN 
CO~MMUNICATIONS 333 -38 (20041; Anthony E. Varona. Changing Chnnnels (2nd Bri~Igrng 
Divrdes. The Fullzire und Reden~ption of 'Imerrcun Broadcast Telev~sron ReGqu/ution, 
6 MINN. .I. L. Scr. & TECH. 1, 10-12 (2004). 
8. See Ellen P. Goodman. iMecliu Pol~.v Oztt o/ the Bo-r. Content .4hund~ince, 
;Ittmtzon Scurcltv, and the Fulltires of Digrfal xbfurket.s, 19 B F R ~ F I  EY TECH. L.J. 1389, 
1394-95 (2004); Jonarhan Welnberg, Broudcc~.'itig ittld Speech, 8 1 CAL. L. R e v  1 10 1, 
1204-06 (1993); C. Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcast~ng. Content-Bused Regz~lutlon o f  
Pertons clnd Pterses, 1994 SLJP. CT. REV. 57, i 00-0 1 ( 1994). 
commercial marketplace was not certain to provide such a forum.9 
Although the cadre of broadcast licensees was to be comprised almost 
entirely of private entities, their licenses carne with affirmative duties to 
operate stations "as if owned by the publ ic ." '~ongress  charged the FCC 
with regulating broadcasting in the furtherance of "the public interest, 
convenience, and necessity,"" delegating to the agency itself the task of 
defining what those terms meant as the broadcast industry matured. 
The FCC has struggled to articulate a durable and coherent set of public 
interest requirements since its creation. Recognizing, and perhaps even 
cowed by, the power of broadcasting to assume an unprecedented centrality 
in American political and cultural life, the agency set out to ensure that 
broadcast licensees used the public spectrum to create a universally 
accessible electronic free marketplace of ideas-ideas that would inform, 
enlighten, and engage citizens; foster political debate; strengthen local 
communities; and generally deliver a more vibrant and deliberative 
democracy.'2 Broadcast policy assigned to the government a proactive role 
in ensuring that broadcasters not merely satislii, the audience's tastes for 
9, fee CHARTING THE DIGITAL BROADCASTING FUTURE: FINAL REPORT OF THE 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INTEREST OBLICAT~ONS OF DIGITAL TELEVISION 
BROADCASTERS 2 1 (1 998) [hereinaRer DIGITAL BROADCASTING FUTURE], available iit 
http://govinfo.library,unt.eduipiac/piacreport.pdf. Empaneled by President William J. 
Clinton to recommend how the broadcast public interest obligations should evolve with the 
migration of broadcasters to the new lucrative digital format, the Advtsory Committee, also 
known as the ""Core Commission,'koncluded that from trs inception "broadcast regulation 
rn the public interest has sought to meet certain basic needs of American politics and 
culture, over and above what the marketplace may or may not provide." Id.; see also 
Victoria F .  Phtllips, On 1Wedia Consoiidur~rtn, the Ptrhlic Inrerest, and Angels Earning 
Wings, 53 AM. U.  L. REV. 613, 619 (2004) (noting that the broadcast publrc merest standard 
"has been used to serve the needs of American citizens and to cultivate many localized 
public forums with diverse viewpoints facilitating citizen participation In our democracy"). 
10. Schaeffer Radio Go., F.R.C. No. 5228 (June 5, 1930) (unpublished), 
11ttp://www.fcc.gov/fcc-biniassemble?docno=30l201 I ,  rqrinfed in para in John W. Willis, 
The Fedtvral Rudr'o (~ommi.ssrt)n und the Public Service Respcln.~rbility of Broadcast 
Licbensees, I 1  J. FED. COMM. B. AsS'U 5, 14 (1950) (citation omitted). 
1 1. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No, 73-416, 8 3 12(b), 48 Stat. 1064, 1087 
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. $9 151-613 (2000)). The 1934 Communications Act 
alternates the phrase "public interest, convenience, and necessity" \.ttth "public convenience, 
tnterest, or necess~ty" throughout subchapter 111. E.g., 1 7  U.S.C. 8C; 302a(a), 307(a) (2000). 
12. See strpru note 9; ree also LEE G. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF i\ FREE PRESS 63 (1991) 
(positing that the "American system of broadcast regulation bas been bu~lt  on two 
phenomena: a fear of the power of television and radio to control the content of public 
tiiscusslon, and a concomitant belief in the inability of the market to adequately control that 
power"); R. Randall Rainey, The Ptiblic's Interest in Pzrhlic itffuirr Discourse, Dcrmocmrtc 
Governrtnce, trnd Fairne't; in Broadcasting: it Criticul Review elf the Prchlic Interest Dzities 
of the Elechonic iMedia, 82 G E ~ .  L.J. 269, 271 (1993) (descnbing objectives of broadcast 
regulation as promoting "the dissemination of infomation pertinent to democratic 
dec~sionmaking" while "prevent[ing] the political 3buse of the broadcast license" and 
"diminish[ingj rome of the. . . lcss desirable effects of the commercial tnediation of mass 
cloctrontc communications"). 
programming but proactively elevate those tastes by presenting audience 
members with politically and culturally enlightening and enriching fare. 
Broadcasters were to expose viewers and listeners to programming that was 
more democratically and culturally enriching than what they othenvise 
demanded.'; Although the FCC has vacillated in its specific requirements, 
the consistent overarching goals of the broadcast public interest standard 
have been the enhancement of civic life, de~nocratic engagement, and 
citizen self-expression by means of the provision of universally available, 
locally oriented, and topically diverse programming from a multiplicity of 
commercial and noncommercial sources.'" 
As expected, broadcasting assumed a central importance in Anlerican 
political and cultural l i fei5 Even in households with Internet access, 
broadcasting-and especially television+ontinues to serve as a point of 
common f o c u ~ . ' ~  While broadcasting's potential For ubiquity and 
dominance in the nation's infomation ecology was fulfilled, the hopes that 
it would serve as a vehicle for democratic and political engagement, 
exchange, and education have yet to be realized. The broadcast medium, 
both by technological design and commercial imperative, has proved to be 
a flawed instrument for democratic enrichment with a structure incapable 
of supporting the electronic free marketplace of ideas regulatory opti~nists 
had envi~ioned. '~ The broadcast public interest standard itself has fallen far 
short of compensating the American public for the licensees' use of 
l~tcrative and scarce public spectrum. Plagued by an array of vexing 
definitional, constitutional, commercial, and regulatory challenges, the 
broadcast public interest standard has become what fornler FCC 
13 See Goodman. vrpt-u note 8, at 1404-1 5 (descrtb~ng the lrnportanee of "common 
exposure'hnd "publ~c elevatron'7n media kind espectally broadcast poltey); Cass K. 
Sunstem, Te/e.~wlon (2nd the 13zrhlic Intere'rt, X X  GAL. L. RFV. 499, 501 (2000) ("'There is <t 
large difference between the public tnterest dnd what interests the public."). 
14 See rnfru Part I.B. 
15. In 1968, reportedly dtstressed by the deta~ls exposed by C'BS News anchor Walter 
Cronktte about the Arnerlcan rntlitary's troubles In V~etnam, President Lyndon Johnson was 
quoted 11s saylng, "If I've lost Walter. . I've lost tn~ddle Arnerrca." ~ ~ A R B A R A  W 
T~J~F~MAN, THF MARCH OF FC)I LY. FROM TROY m Vl~~"di\h4 352 ( 1(>84), 4 qUartcS-CentUfy 
later, soctal crittc Cdmille Paglla wrote, "Telev~ston IS Atnerica's ktngmakrr." C'A\~ILLF 
P ~ C ~ L I A ,  Televrslon und the Clirtlon~s, In V ~ M P S  & TRAMPS 172, 172 ( 1994). Paglia also 
famously portted, more generally, that -'Telecision i s  America." C ' A ~ H L L E  P \ < J L  14. ,ji)ntuq, 
Bloodv Sontug, in VAMPS & TR,\MPC. \zipra, at 344, 346. 
16 see PFW R ~ S E A R C H  CFNTFR, A L D I ~ . N < F  sf-GMEPUTS IN 2 ( l i l ~ N ( r l % < r  V F ~ V ~ ,  
~ V V I R O N ~ I E ~ T :  K Y NFWS ACDIFNC ES NOW BLEND ONLIVE 2hU TRADE SIONAL SOUR< FS 7, 
39 (2008). http:ii'people-press.org/reportsipdW344.p (reporting results ihowrng that 
t~.levisron "rcmatns the most wtdely used source" for news, wtth 52% of thoie iurveyed 
regularly recetklng news tiom local te1eclc;ion anttons); we NJ\O LL O'YD, PROLO(,I!E so 2 
FAR( F, \upru note 6, at 3 17 (d~scuss~ng how broadcasting has remnlned promlncnt In the 
complex modern rnedta landscape). 
17 See rrrfm Parts I B.3 & 1.C 
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dominance." Today broadcasters, as digital content producers themselves, 
are only one source of content in the broadband realm.25 It is the Internet, 
and not broadcasting, that today is considered the technology that is 
revolutionizing politics, democratic engagement, and society as a wh01e.'~ 
Moreover, the migration of attention from broadcasting to the Internet is 
accelerating with the aging of the populace. In July 2008, the New York 
Times reported that the average age of the American broadcast television 
viewer today is whereas the Internet has become "a leading source 
of campaign news for young people."28 
24. For example, thts year approximately 194 mtlhon Amencans (two-thtrds of the 
nation's population) are online and the online populatton 1s expected to grow to 2 17 mtllion 
(71°/0) by 2012. Llsa E. Phillips, US. Online Population, EMARKETER, Feb. 2008, 
h t t p ~ / / w w w . e m a r k e t e r . c o m f r e p o r t . a s p x ' ~ 2 0 0 0 4 8 6 .  It is expected that by the 
end of 2008, onllne advertising revenue will overtake radio advertising revenue and that by 
201 1, the Internet will supplant the newspaper tndustry as the top recipient of adverttsing 
revenue. I d ;  see uiso CENTER FOR DIGITAL DEMOCRACY. CHANGING DIGITAL MEDIA 
BEHAVIORS, THE GROWTH OF ~NTERACTIVE SERVICES AND TRADITIONAL MEDIA IN 
TRANSITION: A CRITICAL WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST (20081, 
avur/uble crt http://www democraticmedia.org/files/newmediapubinterest.pdf. 
25 See Tom Shales, Transmuston: Imposszble, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2008, at M1 
(observmg that .'[w]e don't watch televiston; ~nstead, we access program matenal through 
content providers" so that "TV now seeps into our Ilves" through a rnyrtad of digltal devices 
not tdentified as television sets). 
26. See itzfra Parts Il.A, 1I.B & II.B.l; see also Internet Now Major Source of 
Cumpazgn ~Vews, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Oct. 31, 2008, 
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1017/1ntemet-now-major-source-of-campatgn-news (noting that 
while "[t]elev~sion remalns the dominant source" of campaign news, the percentage of 
Amertcans "who say they get most of their carnpatgn news horn the internet has trtpled 
clnce October 2004 (from 10% then to 33% now)"). 
27. Virginia Heffernan, Przme Times, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 27,2008, at 22. 
28. PFW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, SOCIAL NETWORKING 
4 V D  OYLINE VIDEOS TAKE OFF: INTERNET'S BROADER OLE Pd G~MFAICN 2008, at 1 (20081, 
http:/lpeople-press.org/reportslpdfi384.pdf; Fee also id. at 1 (documenting how the Internet, 
and espec~ally social networking and online video services avatlable through broadband, 1s 
playing an increasingly dominant role In the provlston of pol~tical content for eighteen- to 
twenty-nine-year-olds while the Influence of broadcasting IS weakening); PEW RESEARCH 
CFIUTFR, AUD~ENCE SEGMENTS M A CHANGING NEWS ENVIRONMENT: KEY NEWS AUDIENCES 
NOW BLEND ONLINE AND TRADITIONAL SOURCES 2 (2008), http://people- 
press.org/reports,pdf/444 pdf (noting that the youngest of the surveyed users (median age of 
thirty-five) "rely prtmanly on the Internet for news" and are nearly twtce as likely to vlew 
onhne news clips than watch ntghtly news broadcasts). Accordtng to Pew Research Center, 
"At a tlme uhen a declining number of young people rely on televis~on for most of thetr 
news about the [presidential] campatgn, a stzable minorlty are gotng online to watch videos 
of campaign debates, speeches and commerc~als." Id. at 2; see also Alex Mindlm, 
Prefernag the Web Over Watching TY, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2008, at C3 (reporting results 
of a study conducted by DoubleClick Performlcs and concludtng that "the computer 1s a 
blgger draw than the TV set for the youngest teenagers"); AARON SMITH & LEE RAINIE, PEW 
IsTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, THE INTERNET 4ND THE 2008 ELECTION, at 11, v (2008), 
littp::/www pewinternet.orgipdfs/PIPP20088elect~on.pdf (reporttng that 46% of surveyed 
Americans are uslng dtgital medla to engage in the 2008 electtons, while adults under thirty 
dre most dependent on the Internet "to get or share information about the candidates and the 
campaign"). 
Much of the public affairs programming that had been traditionally 
available on broadcast media has migrated to online and pay-television 
platforms, For example, during the presidential primary in 2007 and 2008, 
many of the political cognoscenti and regular citizens with broadband 
Internet access, pay-television access, or both, complained that they were 
growing tired of the plethora of candidate  debate^.'^ However, the great 
majority of those debates-roughly three-quarters-were not available at 
all to households solely dependent on free broadcast televi~ion.~' 
Broadcast coverage of public affairs and governance matters also is scarce, 
whereas such material is abundantly available via pay-cable and broadband 
 subscription^.^ 
Citizens with high-speed broadband Internet access live in a 
fundamentally richer, more diverse, and more interactive information 
environment than those dependent primarily on broadcasting for political, 
informational, and other democratic content.32 Broadband households can 
( I )  access an abundance of information concerning government and 
politics; (2) build upon that information by means of commentary in 
personalized blogs, vlogs, or postings to others' websites; (3) pose 
questions and challenges to elected officials or candidates for office; 
(4) disseminate new ideas and calls to action; and (5) form novel, online 
communities of interest-all with little effort and virtually no expense 
beyond the cost of the broadband subscription.33 
29 See, e g ,  Davtd Yepsen, Op-Ed., Stop the R4adnes.s' Change Rules of Electzon 
Grmze-hv 2016, DES MolNES REG, Sept. 23, 2007. at 1 (complatntng that "we are awash in 
prestdent~al debates"), Allan Louden, IJ Anvone Lzstenlng, When Are There Too Warn 
Debcries I ,  DEBATESCOOP, Oct 19, 2007, 
http iiuww debatescoop orglstory12007i 1 01 1912025 19102. 
30 Of the forty-etght Democratic and Repubhcan party pnmary debates, only thirteen 
debates were broadcast on free over-the-a~r televlston stattons, and an dddittonal two were 
broadcast only m New Hfunpsh~re See Memorandum of Karolina Lyzntk Surnmanztng 
Prestdential Debate Televls~on Coverage Research (July 21, 2008) (on file wtth author); see u l ~ o  
Peter Brown, Too itluny Dehate5, Too Llttfe fmp~rct, RFALCLEARPOLITICS COM. Aug. 6, 2007, 
http iiwww reaicIearpoltttcs com/arttcles/2007/08/too-many_debates_tooIttlem html 
(bemoantng the prol~feratlon of debates and acknowledging that "[tlhe myrtad debates are 
belng alred on cable news channels") In add~tion, whereas the free televtsion networks 
traditionally offered gavel-to-gavel coverage of the prestdent~al nomtnattng conventlons, the 
broadcast coverage of the 2004 and 2008 presidentla1 nomtnattng conventtons were at an 
all-t~me low, w~th  each of the major networks devot~ng only one hour of alrttme per n~ght  
for each of the party nominating conventtons See David Zuraw~k, Vetworks Rerhlnk 
Cbnrentionr, BALT SUY, Aug 25, 2008. at I I (stat~ng that the major broadcast networks 
offered "an hour a nlght starting at 10 [p m. E D T ] Monday through Thursday durlng both 
conventlons"), Joanne Ostrow, Party Confahr Fallzng to Cable, DEYVER Po\r, July 22, 
2004, at 3F (nottng that reduced coverage will mean that those wtthout cable will see "more 
canned speeches," "less prlmetime analysis," and "fewer of the odd, defitiing moments that 
~ e t e d l  who the parttes really are") 
3 1 See tnfra Part I B 3 
32 See lnfru Part 11 B 
13 See A Michael Froomkin, Technologzes for Democracy, tn DFMOCRACY O N L I ~ E  3 ,  
In light of how the Internet has begun to displace broadcasting as the 
nation's central media platform, this Article examines why and how the 
federal government should adjust its disposition toward the Internet, and 
particularly broadband, from one of laissez faire nonintervention to one that 
more affirmatively and comprehensively promotes democratic and First 
Amendment values online by means of a broadband public interest 
standard. My central argument is that, although the broadcast public 
interest standard fell far short of its aspirations, the principal goals 
valorized by that standard-universal service, localism, diversity, 
noncommercial content, and the promotion of democratic engagement in a 
competitive marketplace of ideas-should serve as a template for more 
proactive federal interventions into the broadband realm. Such a 
broadband public interest standard would apply the lessons learned by its 
broadcast progenitor in a manner that would more effectively yield the 
democratic, social, and political goals that the broadcast public interest 
standard attempted, but mostly failed to deliver, while helping to mitigate 
some of the Internet's antidemocratic, atomizing tendencies. 
Part I of this Article provides a brief overview of the historical, 
theoretical, and regulatory foundations of the broadcast public interest 
standard, offers an assessment of its current condition, and suggests reasons 
why it has fallen short of its core objectives. Part I1 discusses the Internet's 
past and current regulatory statuses, and examines the ways in which the 
Internet promotes and undermines free speech and democratic values. This 
Part demonstrates how the government's nonintewentionist disposition and 
reliance on the private marketplace alone have failed to realize the 
Internet's potential as an instrument for true deliberative democratic 
engagement and free expression. Part I11 discusses a set of interrelated and 
proactive federal legislative and regulatory interventions that can form the 
foundation of-and operationalize-a new broadband public interest 
standard. Just as the broadcast standard attempted to do in broadcasting, 
this new standard would work to optimize the democracy-enhancing 
qualities of the Internet while helping to mitigate its harms. This Part is 
subdivided into two subparts. The first calls for a much more proactive and 
direct federal role in the proliferation of broadband Internet service, and 
discusses both supply- and demand-side interventions toward broadband 
universality. The second discusses content-neutral initiatives to help 
cultivate digital democracy and expression, such as federal financial and 
technical supports for local public online deliberative spaces and subsidies 
for noncommercial locally oriented online content. This subpart also 
9-17 (Peter M. Shane ed., 2004) (describing the variety of online tools for facilitating 
democratic engagement and participation). 
briefly analyzes the implications of network neutrality on online democracy 
and expression. Finally, Part IV looks at how a broadband public interest 
standard4esigned around the affirmative interventions discussed in Part 
Ill-would avoid some of the constraints and complications that bedeviled 
the broadcast standard, while promoting and at last realizing the broadcast 
standard's important values. 
A. Statutog, and Regulatory Foundations 
The broadcast public interest standard was created as one tnanifestation 
of the public interest theory of administrative governance, which emerged 
as the dominant approach to regulation at the height of the New Deal and 
its immediate aftermath. Its earliest advocates were Louis Brandeis, 
Charles Francis Adarns, and John M.  andi is.;^ Landis's ideas about public 
interest regulation of railroads later were generalized by many scholars35 as 
well as Supreme Court ~ u s t i c e s ~ ~  who promoted public interest 
administrative governance after having contributed to the building of New 
Deal institutions earlier in their  career^.^' 
The public interest approach to regulation was novel in that it construed 
the federal agency's role as "exercis[ing] its discretion in implementing 
statutes with a view to the national interest or general welfare, rather than 
yielding to factional pressure at the behest of one or another powerfbl 
interest group."38 An early and persistent challenge to public interest 
regulatory theorists and adherents was the articulation of a cogent and 
durable definition of the "public interest." Professor Mark Niles notes that 
34 See genercrlh THOMAS K. MGCRAW. PROPHETS OF REGULATION (1984). 
35 See Thomas W. Mernll, Cirptzrre Theov)i and the Cozrrts 1967-lYK3, 
72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1056 (1997) (citing the work of Clark Byse, Kenneth Culp 
Davts, Louis Jaffe, Walter Cellhorn, Nathaniel Nathanson, and Bernard Schwartz). 
36 See ~d dt 1059 (Iistlng Just~ces Frankfurter, Jackson, Reed, Murphy, Douglas, and 
Fortas). 
37. Thomas Merrill posits that this notron of regulat~ng In the publ~c's interest was the 
"mindset of the men (they were almost all men) m their thirttes and forties who had served 
rn the New Deal, and who fanned out to till admtnrstratrve, academic and judlclai posts rn 
the 1950s and early 1960s." Id. at 1048. 
38. Jody Freeman, The Private Role m Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 
558 (2000); Jee also Mark C. Niles, Punctuated Equihbnum: A Model for Administrat~ve 
bvolutlon 15 (Sept. 4, 2007) (~mpubhshed manuscnpt, on tile w ~ t h  author) (positing that 
public interest regulation was rooted in an "endemically positive juzth m the potential of 
government, and particulariy administrative government, to serve the common good).  
According to rhomas Mernll, the theorists and officrals who extolled public Interest 
governance had "faith that complex problems can be mastered by human reason" and that 
the adm~n~strative agency was "spec~fically deslgned to achleve t h ~ s  ]deal" slnce ~t "IS a 
centralized source of governmental authority that can bnng coordinated solutions to soc~al 
dnd economlc problenls throughout its jurlsdictlon." Mernll, szrpra note 35, at 104849  
"the public interest theorists sought not to define the public interest so 
much as to create and protect structures which allowed an organically 
defined version of the public interest to percolate naturally to the top of the 
political arena."j9 
It was in this regulatory milieu that Congress in 1927 created the Federal 
Radio Commission (FRC), the FCC's predecessor-one of many new 
regulatory agencies charged with identifjling and enforcing the public 
interest in a number of burgeoning areas of commerce, including shipping, 
food and drugs, energy, and commodities trading.40 In enacting the 1927 
Radio Act, Congress responded to calls for more federal oversight over a 
radio industry threatened by excessive signal interference by charging the 
new FRC with the authority to regulate broadcasting in furtherance of an 
undefined "public interest, convenience, or necessity."4' 
B. Defining "Pub Eic Interest " in Broadcasting 
The history of the broadcast public interest standard has been called "the 
search for the holy g r a i ~ . " ~ ~  Former FCC Chair Newton Minow has 
suggested that the term was used in the legislation to provide an 
overarching regulatory standard to direct the government's interventions 
into the wholly novel and uncharted territory of br~adcasting.'~ Congress 
39. Niles, supra note 38, at 17. 
40. Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, $4 3, 9, 11, 44 Stat. 1162, 1166-67, 
~epealed by Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, ch. 652, tit. VI, 9 602(a), 48 Stat. 
1064, 1102. The 1927 Radio Act created the Federal Radio Commiss~on (FRC) for an 
initial ma1 period of one year, with the primary purpose of adjudicating broadcast licensing 
and technical permit applications. See ERWN G. KRASNOW ET AL., THE POLITICS OF 
BROADCAST REGULATION 12-1 3 (3d ed. 1982). 
41. See Radio Act of 1927 $5  9, 11 (enunciating the public interest standard as serving 
"public convenience, interest or necessityY'in 9 and articulating the more common, above- 
quoted standard in $ 1 1). 
42. Erwin G. Krasnow & Jack N. Goodman, The "Pzdblic hterest" Standard: The 
Search for the Holy Grail, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 605, 605 (1998). Senator Clarence Dill (D- 
WA), a principal drafter of the Radio Act of 1927, recalled that the source of the "public 
interest, convenience, and necessity'yanguage in the Radio Act was a Senate Commerce 
Committee staffer who previously had worked at the Interstate Commerce Commission 
(ICC), which itself was charged by Congress to fitrther the "public interest, convenience, 
and necessity5' in regulating railroads. PHILIP M. NAPOLI, FOUNDATIONS OF 
COMMUNICATIONS POLICY: PRINCIPLES AND PROCESS IN THE REGULATION OF ELECTRONIC 
MEDIA 67 (2001). Senator Dill recalled that he and his colleagues thought that the language 
"sounded pretty good, so we decided we would use it, too." NEWTON . MINOW & CRAIG L. 
LAMAY, ABANDONED IN THE WASTELAND: CHILDREN, TELEVISION AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 4 (1995). Newton Minow surmises that a junior lawyer from the ICC, loaned 
to the Senate to help draA: the new comunications legislation, had proposed the "public 
interest" term because he had seen it in other federal statutes dealing with regulated 
industries. Krasnow & Goodman, supra, at 610. 
43. See NEWTON N. MMOW, EQUAL TIME 8-9 (1964). Judge Henry Friendly traced the 
origins of "pubiic convenience, interest, and necessity" to the Transportation Act of 1920, 
where it "conveyed a fair degree of meaning" in directing authorizations for new ra~lroad 
incorporated the language again in creating the more powerhl FCC by 
means of the 1934 Communications ~ c t . "  The Supreme Court later 
characterized these terms as "expIicitly and by implication left to the 
Commission's own devising."" According to the Court, they constituted a 
delegation of "expansive powers" by means of a "comprehensive mandate" 
to make the best use of the public a i r~aves . ' '~  
What became known as the broadcast public interest standard, also 
referred to as the "public trustee doctrine," was intended to be a malleable, 
"supple instrument for the exercise of discretion by the expert body which 
Congress has charged to carry out its legislative policy."" Defining and 
pursuing the "public interest" was a challenge across many New Deal 
agencies with specialized "public interest" missions."" In the FCC's case, 
Congress has referred to the public interest in delegating regulatory 
authority to the agency across broadcast as well as nonbroadcast areas." 
But for the agency, fulfilling its public interest mandate in broadcasting has 
proved especially vexing, given the industry's technological, commercial, 
and constitutional peculiarities. 
Analyzed in the broadest terms, the broadcast public interest standard 
has evolved through three eras defined by shifts in the balance between 
predominantly proactive regulation in pursuit of democratic objectives and 
a more reactive, deregulatory posture rooted in neoliberal free-market 
views of government over~ight.~"he FCC's regulatory vacillations 
constructton. I-IEURY J FRIEYDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 54-55 (1  961), 
yrioted In T. B A R ~ O N  CARTER, MARC A. FRAUKLM & JAY B. WRIGHT, THE FIRST 
AMEWDMEWT AND THE FOIJRTH ESTATE: THE LAW OF THE MASS MEDIA (9th ed. 1005). Judge 
Friendly asserts that it conveyed less meanmg when used m the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 
and the Civil Aeronaut~cs Act of 1938, '%ut under those statutes there would usually be 
some demonstrable factors." Id He concludes that "[tlhe standard was almost dra~ned of 
rneanlng" when it was Included In the 1934 Comun~catrons  Act. Id. 
14  See, e g , The 1934 Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 8 201 (2000) (empowering the 
Comm~ssion to prescrrbe rules and regulations "in the publlc interest") 
45. FCC v Pottsvllle Broad. Go., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940). 
46. NBC, Ine. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943); see also Red Llon Broad. 
Co. v. FCC, 395 U S. 367, 380 (1969) (charactenzing Congress's "mandate to the FCC to 
assure that broadcasters operate In the public interest" as "a broad one") 
47 Pott.~vzlEeBroad Co.309U.S.at  138. 
48 Niles, strpra note 38, at 12-14. 
49 See, e g ,  47 U S C .  rj 160(a)(3) (regulatory forbearance duthority tn 
telecornm~n~cations); ~ d .  8 201(a) (services and charges applicable to common caners), 
rd 4 214(e)(2) (designatron of telecommunrcat~ons carrlers ehgible for untversal ienrrce 
support); id Ij 573(a)(1) (open-video-servrce certlficatlons). 
50. For an excellent and much more detalled history of the broadcast publ~c interest 
standard, iee L~l i   lev^, The Four Eras of FCC Public Interest Regulutzon, 60 A D ~ I I N  L
REV. 8 13, 8 2 5 3 7  (2008) See also P~TRICIA UFDERHEIDE, COV~I~TUICATIONS POLK Y i N D  
THE PUBLIC IhTEREST. THE TELECOMM~WICATIONS ACT OF 1996, at 12-21 ( 1999); Howard 
A. S helanskr , Antztrust Law as  Mass ;tfedia Regulutton Can hferger- S t a n d a ~ ~ d ~  Prt tec t the 
Ptiblic lnteve,t', 94 CAL L. REV 371 (2006); Varona, supra note 7, at 18-32 
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notwithstanding, the FCC's overarching objective in administering the 
public interest standard always has been to "meet certain basic needs of 
American politics and culture, over and above what the marketplace may or 
may not provide," in order to "cu'ttivate a more informed citizenry, greater 
democratic dialogue, diversity of expression, a more educated population, 
and more robust, culturally inclusive ~ommunities."~ ' 
1. 1930s Through 1960s-Procrctive Regzilation "to Pi-omote and Realize 
the Vast Potentialities 'bofBroudcusting 
In the first four decades of American broadcast regulation, the FRC and 
then the FCC attempted to define both the government's relationship to 
broadcasters and the content of public interest programming. In 1930, the 
FRC declared that the broadcast public interest standard had at its core the 
democratization of information and the competitive exchange of ideas in a 
broadcast marketplace of ideas.j2 Once in place, the FCC-with 
congressional acquiescence-interpreted its mission in regulating 
broadcasting as ir~vigorating the political life and democratic culture of the 
nation. In a 1949 report, the FCC stated that the goal of broadcast 
regulation "in a democracy is the development of an informed public 
opinion through the public dissemination of news and ideas concerning the 
vital public issues of the day."" Underscoring the importance of localism, 
the FCC dictated that broadcasters must "devote a reasonable percentage of 
their broadcast time to the presentation of news and programs devoted to 
51. DIGITAL BROADCASTING FUTURE, supra note 9, at 21; see also CBS, Inc. v. 
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U S. 94, 117 (1973) tdescnbing government's role as .'an 
'overseer' and ultsrrlate arbiter and guardian of the public interest"); Red Lron, 395 U.S. at 
384-86 (recounting evoiut~on of the fairness doctrine and the public Interest standard); see 
crlso Rasney, supra note 12, at 271 (discussmg the "dsssemmat~on of infomation pertinent to 
democratic decisionmak~ng" as the key purpoqe of public interest broadcast regulation). 
52. Great Lakes Broad. Co., F.R.C. No. 4900 ( 1928), reprznted m 3 FRC A ~ N .  REP. 32, 
33 (1929), uff 'd 112 part and rev 'd In part, Great Lakes Broad. Co. v. Fed. Radso Comm'n, 
37 F 2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1930). The FRC tnterpreted the public interest standard as, inter aha, 
requinng in "all disc~tsslons of ~ssues of importance to the public . . . clmple play for the free 
and fair competttion of opposing views." Id at 33. In another proceedmg, the FRC offered 
the earlsest elucidation of the public trusreeship model in broadcasting regulation directing 
that "the station Itself must be operated as if owned by the publlc. . It is as if people of a 
community should own a station and turn it over to the best man in sight with this 
injunction: 'Manage thls statlon m our interest."' Schaeffer Radlo Go., F.R.C. No. 5225 
(June 5, 1930) (~mpublished), http://www fcc.govifcc-b1niassemble'?docno=29 1101, 
reprinted' in John W Willis, The Federul Radio Commr~~lorz and the Publzc Srwzce 
Rer;aorzL~zblfzhi c?f Broadcast Lzcerzsees, I1 J. FED. COMM. B. ASS'N 5 ,  14 (1950). 
53. Report on Ed~tonalizing, 13 F C.C. 1216, 1249 (1949). In thts Report. the 
Commission formally announced the fairness doctnne by recognizing "the paramount right 
of the public in a free soctety to be informed and to have presented to ~t for acceptance or 
rejectson the different att~tudes and viewpoints concerning these vital and often 
controversial issues," Id. 
the consideration and discussion of public issues of interest in the 
community served by the particular station" to satisfy the "right of the 
public to be inf~rmed."'~ Professor Philip M. Napoli notes that the 
Commission's early commitment to localism was not "an end in and of 
itself' but rather an objective "motivated by both political and cultural 
concerns" and the promotion of "political participation and education 
among the citizenry."ss 
The FCC also gradually articulated a nuanced approach to the diversity 
principle. It justified many of its programming and multiple- and cross- 
ownership regulations by emphasizing the importance of competition 
among providers of broadcast service, as well as the related values of 
diversity in viewpoint, programming sources, formats and content, and the 
racial, ethnic, and gender statuses of  licensee^.'^ Although not often 
discussed in the early years of broadcasting regulation, the notion of 
"exposure diversity" gained preeminence in relation to the marketplace of 
ideas t ~ n c e ~ t . ' ~  It is not enough that a participant in the ideas marketplace 
have access to a diversity of ideas from a plethora of sources since access 
alone does not ensure consumption. For the marketplace of ideas to 
function well as an instrument for democratic self-government, the 
participants actually must be exposed to a diversity of competing ideas.'* 
The Supreme Court generally deferred to the FCC's early interpretations 
of its democracy-enhancing regulatory mission in broadcasting. In its 1943 
NBC, Inc. v. United States decision, the Court upheld the FCC's later- 
repealed "chain broadcasting" rules, which the agency adopted in the 
interest of promoting diversity and lo~alism.'~ Rejecting the broadcast 
54. Id. 
55. Philip M. Napoli, The Localism Principle in Communications Policymaking and 
Policy Anafvsis: Ambiguity. Inconsistency, and Empirical Neglect, 29 POL'Y STUD. J. 372, 
380 (2001) (emphasis omitted). 
56. See 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of the Commission's Broadcast 
Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,620, 13,627-37 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 
Order] (report, order, and notice of proposed rulemaking) (reviewing various forms of 
diversity in broadcast policy). For an excellent and detailed discussion of the FCC's 
varying interpretations of the diversity principle, see Mansfield h ~ r n a l  Co. v. FCC, 180 
F.2d 28, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (recognizing that the national policy that "there be competition 
in the radio broadcasting industry" is closely related to the diversity principle); NAPOLI, 
supra note 42, at 128-57 (discussing variants of diversity principle and competition); 
Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr. & A. Richard M. Blaiklock, Enhancing the Spectrum: Media 
Power, Democracy, and the Marketplace ofldeus, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 8 13. 
57. See NAPOLI, supra note 42, at 146-48. 
58. See C ~ s s  R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0, at 3-18 (2007) (discussing the dangers 
of narrow filtration of media); see also Ellen P. Goodman, Proactive Media Policy in un 
Age of Content Abundance, in MEDIA DIVERS~TY AND LOCALISM: MEANING AND METRICS 
366 (Philip M. Napoli ed., 2007) (discussing the importance of exposure diversity in the 
digital media marketplace). 
59. NBC, Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 198 (1943). 
networks' argument that the rules were an improper restraint on commerce, 
the Court reasoned that the Communications Act "[did] not restrict the 
Commission merely to supervision of the [broadcast] traffic. It put[s] upon 
the Commission the burden of determining the composition of that 
traffic."60 According to the Court, the "avowed aim" of the 1934 
Communications Act was "to secure the maximum benefits of radio to all 
the people of the United States" by "endow[ing] the Communications 
Commission with comprehensive powers to promote and realize the vast 
potentialities of ra~ io . "~ '  
The 1934 Communications Act required the Commission to assign 
broadcasting licenses in such a way as to blanket the nation with 
universally available and locally oriented broadcast service.62 In 
proliferating VHF television service in the 19405, the FCC allocated 
stations even to small towns whose economies were thought too meager to 
support broadcasting service so as many Americans as possible could 
access br~adcast ing.~~ 
a. Attempts at Speci$c Requirements: The "Blue Book" and the 1960 
Programming Statement 
Emboldened by judicial deference and the broad congressional 
delegation of authority," the FCC set out to adopt a detailed and durable 
set of programming requirements. In response to the criticism that its early 
descriptions of public interest programming were too vague,65 the FCC in 
60. Id. at 215-16. 
61. Id. at 217; see also id. ("Section 303(g) [of the 1934 Communications Act] 
provides that the Commission shall 'generally encourage the larger and more effective use 
of radio in the public interest.'"). 
62. See, e.g., Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. i j  307(b) (2000) (requiring that, 
in overseeing commercial broadcasting, "the Commission shall make [the] distribution of 
licenses, frequencies, hours of operation, and of power among the several States and 
communities as to provide a fair, efficient, and equitable distribution of radio service to each 
of the same"); see also id. § 396(a)(5) (addressing public television and declaring that "it 
furthers the general welfare to encourage public telecommunications services which will be 
responsive to the interests of people both in particular localities and throughout the United 
States. . . which will constitute a source of alternative telecornrnunications services for all 
the citizens of the Nation"); Napoli, supra note 55, at 374 (pointing out that the principle of 
locally oriented broadcasting emerged as a national imperative from both the Radio Act of 
1927 and the Comunications Act of 1934). 
63. See Napoli, supra note 55, at 374-75 (arguing that the FCC's distribution 
principles sought to prioritize "the autonomy of local broadcasters, as opposed to 
encouraging the development of national networks"). 
64. See Randolph J. May, The Public Interest Stundard: Is It Too Indeterminate to Be 
Constitutional?, 53 FED. C o r n .  L.J. 427, 428-29 (2001) (arguing that such a broad 
delegation of authority violated the nondelegation doctrine). 
65. See Bill F. Chamberlin, Lessons in Regulating Information Flow: The FCC's Weak 
Tmck Record in Interpreting the Public Interest Standard, 60 N.C. L. REV. 1057, 1061-62 
(1982) (arguicg that it was in part because the FCC was primarily concerned with matters 
1946 issued a list of affirmative programming obligations that became 
popularly known as the "Blue ~ o o k . " ~ ~  The Blue Book required broadcast 
licensees to provide a "reasonable" amount of live and locally originated 
noncommercial programming, to cover issues of local importance, and- 
upon penalty of license nonrenewal-to air programming in certain 
categories, including "discussion," "education," and 4'talks."b7 Faced with 
a loud backlash from the already-potent broadcast lobby that attacked the 
Blue Book as a violation of broadcasters' First Amendment rights, the FCC 
largely ignored the Blue Book and very rarely referred to it in subsequent 
enforcement and rulemaking proceedings.68 
The FCC tried again fourteen years later by adopting the I960 
Programming statement." Unlike the Blue Book, the 1960 Programming 
Statement did not attempt to prescribe a national, one-size-fits-all public 
interest programming menu but instead reminded broadcasters that as 
public trustees they had to ascertain the particular "public interest, needs, 
and desires of the communit[ies]" in which they were licensed and had to 
air programming responsive to those needs." The content of public interest 
programming was dictated less by the FCC than by the public itself. The 1960 
Progaming  Statement provided that such programing could include 
content that provided "'opportunity for local self-expression," "public affjirs 
progams," "political broadcasts," "service to minority groups," and 
"'educational programs.""' This attempt at a comprehensive set of public 
interest requirements was somewhat more effective than its 1946 predecessor, 
other than detailed review of public issue programming during the 1930s and 1940s). 
66. See generully FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, REPORT, PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY 
OF BROADCAST LICENSEES (1946) (outlining the FCC's new policies for more detailed 
review of station performance when examining license renewal applications). 
67. See Chamberlin, supra note 65, at 1063 n.24 (discussing the prograt~ln~ing 
requirements evident in the FCC's new license renewal application after the publication of 
the Blue Book). 
68. See Anthony E. Varona, Out oj. Thin Air: Using First Amendment Public Forum 
'lnalysis to Redeem American Broadcasting Regulation, 39 U .  MICH. J.L. REFORM 149, 156 
(2006) (describing how the FCC gave in to outside pressures and the Blue Book "bombed"). 
An especially telling sign of the FCC's retreat from the Blue Book was its renewal in 1950 
of station WOAX's license despite the station management's explicit refusal to air any of 
the public interest programming required by the Blue Book. Id 
69. Commission Programing [sic] Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303 (1960) (report and statement 
of policy) (en banc). 
70. id. at 156-58. The ascertainment requirements, elaborated upon in a separate 
rulemaking proceeding, provided guidelines for broadcasters on how to execute and 
document ascertainment efforts. See Primer on Ascertainment of Cmty. Problems by Broad. 
Applicants, 27 F.C.C.2d 650, 656-58 (1971) (clarifying the meaning of certain language in 
the FCC's broadcast license application which had been given different meanings by 
different applicants). 
71. Varona, supra note 68, at 157 (quoting Commission Programing Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 
at 23 14). 
but the FCC rarely referred to it in reviewing license renewal applications.72 
h. More Specification, the Fairness Doctrine, clnd Noncommercial 
Broadcasting 
Smaller scale attempts at elucidating the public interest requirements 
came in 1965, when the FCC standardized the 1960 Programming 
Staternent's licensing decision  riter ria,^' and again in 1976, when it 
declared that licensing applications proposing less than 5% "local" or 
"informational" programming would not qualify for streamlined 
consideration.""hen, in 1974, the Commission issued the Fairness Report 
in which it reiterated the importance of uninhibited, "robust, wide open" 
deliberation of public issues on the airwaves, and defended the 
constitutionality of the fairness doctrine, which required broadcasters to 
(1) "devote a reasonable percentage of time to coverage of public issues"; 
and (2) cover these issues fairly by "provid[ing] an opportunity for the 
presentation of contrasting points of view."'j 
Concerned that the broadcast public interest standard still did not 
optimize the democratic, cultural, and educational value of broadcasting, 
Congress enacted the Educational Television Facilities Act of 1962, which 
created a capital grant h n d  for public, noncommercial broadcasting.'"ive 
years later it enacted the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, which created 
the publicly funded Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB) with the 
mission of facilitating "the full development of educational 
broadcasting."77 
72. The FCC, tn fact, continued grant~ng broadcast license renewals m large groups, 
wrthout any reference to the 1960 Programmtng Statement guidelines nor the apparent 
failure of the applicants to provide any public interest programming in satisfaction of the 
bwidelines. See, e g., Renewals of Broad. Licenses for Ind., Ky., & Tern., 42 F.C.C.2d 900, 
900 (1973) (grantmg the license renewal applications of 374 station licensees); see [rho 
Varona, ~2tp-a note 7, at 25 & 11.98 (providing more examples of en masse license renewals). 
73 See Policy Statement on Comparative Broad. Heanngs, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 394 (1 965) 
(noting that the statement was issued for the purposes of "clanty and consistency of 
dccislon" dnd eliminating "time-consummg elements not substantially related to the public 
tnterest"). 
74 See Amendment to Sectson 0.281 of the Comm'n Rules: Delegations of Auth. to 
the Ghlef. Broad. Bureau, 59 F.C.C.2d 491, 492 (1976) (fixtng a low percentage 
rcqulrement for certain programming types rather than leaving the meanlng of the term 
",ubstantial" up to the ~ndivldual dtscretion of the licensee). 
75. Fairness Report of 1974, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 7, 9 (1974) ujf'd sub nom. Nat'l Citlzens 
Comm. for Broad. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denzed, 436 U.S. 926 
( 1978). 
76 See Educatronal Televrston Facilities Act of 1962, 47 U.S.C. C j  390 (2000) 
(declaring that the purposes of the Act were to facilitate diversity in availability, operation, 
and ownership of public broadcast services and to strengthen exlsting servsce to the public). 
77. Publrc Broadcasting Act of 1967, 47 U.S.C. $396(g)fl)(A) (2000) (amended in 
1978 to replace "educational broadcasting" with "publtc telecommunications"); 5ee also 
c.. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC: The Puhlic '.s First z,lr~?cnrl~uzent 
Rights ~w Partrmotrnt 
At the end of this era of proactive FCC engagement in p ~ ~ b l i c  nterest 
programming, the Supreme Court, in 1969, again reaftimcci the 
constitutionality of the broadcast public interest standard with ii strong 
endorse~nent of affinnative government intesventions into the speech market 
to promote democratic values. In the unanimous Red Lion Brotrdizr,st~r?g C'o. 
I: FCC case, the Court upheld the fairness doctrlne and the related 
regulations on political attacks and editorializing.'" Rejecting the 
broadcasters' First Amendment challenge, the Court reasoned that, because 
the radio-frequency spectrum is a scarce national resource, the First 
Amendment would allow the government to condition the use of licensed 
spectrum on compliance with affismatiw pitblic interest programming 
requirements.79 The objective of broadcast regulation, according to the 
Court, was "to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth 
will ultilnately prevail, rather than to counterlance monopoli~ation of that 
market, whether it be by the Government itself or of a private licensee."x0 
This was especially so since broadcasting had "supplant[ed] atomized, 
relatively infosmal communication with inass media as a prime source of 
national cohesion and news."" That power of broadcasting to attract the 
public's attention as a modern, electronic .-1,rg(1~91, by tneans of the public's 
own resource, rendered the speech rights of the licensees subordinate to 
those of the audience members: "It is the right of the vlewers and listeners, 
not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.""" 
But Red Lion did not only make reference to scarcity-dependent 
regulation of broadcasters' speech. 'The Court also reaffirmed the 
~rr-rportance of government's role, inore generally, in endeavoring to present 
the public with democracy-enhancing information, especially given the 
Zzcuracy In iMedia. Inc. v FCC, 521 F 2d 288. 292 (I) C C'rr 1075) (drscuss~ng ltow in 
1970 C PW and a group o f  noncommercial Ircen5ees formed the Public Bro,tdcit\ting Se r~rcc  
(PDS) dnd hational Public Radio (NI'R)) 
78 795 0 S 157, 375 (1069) (~nterpret~ng such regttlations '1s ,in eniiancerncnt ot tlee 
5peech rather than an abridgement) 
79 .\re ic/ at 388 ("Where there 'ire subsranttally more ~ t ~ d i \  tdtials who \tililt t o  
browic'15t than there '>re frrqt~enciei to illlocate, rt 1s idle to posit an unrrhr~cige,ible Exit 
Atnendment right to brorrdcast comparable to the right of eiery lnd~ \~dna l  to t p c ~ k .  &rite. or 
publt\h ") 
SO !il at 390 (ctting Associated Press v I!nited State\, 326 U S I .  20 ( 1945)). ,ecJ 111\o 
!r\oclirred Pre\c. 376 U S ,it 20 (applying the Sherman Act to the neki5prrper ~nd~istry and 
tlecirrnng that the Firit Amendr~lent "rest5 on the as\t~n-tptton thdt the widest possible 
cltsseininrrtion o f  rnfoimation from divei\e ,ind ant'igantstic \ourcc\ 15 csscntrcil to the 
welfare of the public") 
X I  Red Llofz, 395 CJ' S rrt 386 ri 15 
5 2  !(I ~ t t  390 
unique value of broadcasting to serve as a convener and central focus of 
public attention. Quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, the Court noted that 
"[slpeech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the 
essence of self-government."83 The people, the Court reasoned, would 
become better citizens by virtue of government's facilitation of "the 
presentation of vigorous debate of controversial issues of importance and 
concern to the public.y784 
2. 1970s and 1980s-The Taming of Red Lion by the Invisible Hand 
The regulatory tides at the FCC began to turn in the 1970s, with 
mounting public skepticism of government's ability to realize the public 
good. The Vietnam War, the Pentagon Papers controversy, Watergate, and 
especially President Richard Nixon's efforts to strong-arm the FCC into 
penalizing broadcasters that aired programs critical of his Administration 
soured the public on government and specifically its influence on the 
media.85 The nation looked for alternatives to governmental pursuit of the 
public interest and spotted the invisible hand. 
In a law review article coauthored with Daniel L. Brenner, President 
Reagan's FCC Chairman Mark S. Fowler proposed "a new direction for 
governmental regulation of broadcasting" that relied "on the broadcasters' 
ability to determine the wants of their audiences through the normal 
mechanisms of the marketplace."86 Fowler and Brenner insisted that 
Congress and the FCC should regard "broadcasters not as fiduciaries of the 
public, as iheir regulators have historically perceived them, but as 
marketplace competitors."87 Later defending his deregulatory animus, 
Fowler famously quipped that broadcasters should face no particularized 
regulation whatsoever, since "television is just another appliance. It's a 
toaster with pictures."88 Fowler's demand for a more market-driven 
approach to broadcast regulation was manifestly rooted in the then- 
prevailing Chicago School theories of free competition advocating that the 
commercial marketplace was better at delivering the public interest than 
83. Id. (quoting Gamson v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964)). 
84. RedLion, 395 U.S. at 385. 
85. See Owen M. Fiss, The Censorship of Television, 93 NW. U .  L. REV. 1215, 121 8 
(1 999) (discussing the threat to television from censorship both by state actors and by actors 
within the television industry itself). 
86. See Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast 
Regulation, 60 TEX.  L. REV. 207, 209-10 (1982) (arguing that the marketplace approach 
better serves the public in an environment increasingly defined by new media and 
"technological plenty"). 
87. Id at 2 10. 
88. Bernard D. Nossiter, Licenses to Coin Money: The FCC's Big Givecnvay Show, 241 
NATION 402, 402 (1985) (quoting remarks by Mr. Fowler in an address to radio and 
television executives). 
regulatory dictates.89 
The Reagan Era deregulation of broadcasting was swift and 
comprehensive. The FCC eliminated many requirements, including some 
multiple-ownership restrictions, radio programming guidelines, 
requirements for documenting the ascertainment of community 
programming needs, program log requirements, and mandatory minimum 
quantities of public affairs programming.90 11 lengthened the television 
license terms from three to five years and radically streamlined the license 
renewal process so that licenses were conferred under a "postcard renewal" 
mechanism devoid of any meaningful review of a licensee's public interest 
programming." Just a few years before Reagan, in 1974, the FCC 
characterized the fairness doctrine as "the single most important 
requirement of operation in the public interest-the sine qua non for grant 
of a renewal of license."92 But the FCC eliminated the fairness doctrine in 
1987, reasoning that it was having the counterproductive effect of 
inhibiting the speech of broadcasters, who were avoiding the coverage of 
controversial issues of public importance in order to stay clear of the 
fairness doctrine's balancing requirements.93 
3. 1990s to Today: Continued Deregulation and a Modest Revival of 
Public Interest Regulation (Red Lion Roars Again) 
Congress and the FCC continued to eliminate or weaken some broadcast 
public interest regulations throughout the 1990s, while promulgating new 
requirements in the name of the public interest. In 1993, the Commission 
89. See Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J .  LEGAL STUD. 661, 665 
(1998) (explaining Chicago School theorists' preference for rational-choice models over 
regulatory structures); see also Douglas Litowitz, A Critical Tuke on Shusta Cozrnty ilnd the 
"New Chicago School, " 15 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 295 (2003) (discussing the popularity of 
rational-choice models among legal theorists following Robert Ellickson, Of' Coase trnd 
Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta Counw, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623 
(1986), but noting the limits of this perspective and espousing the benefits of critical 
theory). 
90. See Varona, supra note 7, at 27-28 (detailing then-FCC Chairman Mark Fowler's 
deregulatory policies and their effects on the broadcasting market). 
91. Id. at 28. 
92. Fairness Report of 1974, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 10 (1974), cjyd szrb nom. Nat'l Citizens 
Comm. for Broad. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied 436 U.S. 926 
(1 978). 
93. See Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5049-52 (1987) 
(finding that the fairness doctrine inhibits broadcasters' coverage of controversial issues and 
concluding that it should be eliminated), recon. denied, 3 F.C.C.R. 2035 (1988), i?ff"d sub 
nom. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989). In 2000, the D.C. 
Circuit issued a writ of mandamus ordering the FCC to repeal the personal attack and 
political editorializing rules that were closely related to the fairness doctrine and were 
upheld in Red Lion. See Radio-Television News Dirs. Ass'n v. FCC, 229 F.3d 169, 272 
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (issuing the writ). 
announced that home-shopping television stations that air only satellite- 
delivered product advertising and no local public affairs, news, or other 
locally-oriented programming still "are serving the public interest, 
convenience and necessity" and qualify for mandatory carriage on cable 
systems as local stations under the 1992 Cable ~ c t . ' ~  Congress passed the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (1996 Telecom Act), which constituted 
the most sweeping revision of federal communications law since the 1934 
Communications A C ~ . ~ ~  The 1996 Telecom Act eliminated some 
ownership restrictions, including the national cap on AM and FM radio 
station ownership," and increased the national television multiple-station 
ownership limit from a 25% maximum national audience reach (set in 
1985) to a 35% audience reach limit.97 
The significant liberalization of longstanding station ownership 
restrictions enabled broadcast group owners to grow exponentially. Clear 
Channel Communications increased its radio station holdings from forty- 
three stations before passage of the 1996 Telecom Act to 1,200 radio 
stations in 2 0 0 4 . ~ ~  The hazards of the ensuing media consolidation were 
illustrated vividly in January 2002, when a freight train derailed in Minot, 
North Dakota (population 37,000), spilling large quantities of anhydrous 
ammonia fertilizer and creating a lethal and suffocating toxic vapor cloud.09 
94. See Implementation of Section 4(g) of the Cable Television Consumer Protection 
and Competition Act of 1992, 8 F.C.C.R. 5321, 5328-29 (1993) ("[Als long as a home 
shopping broadcast station remains authorized to hold a Commission license, it should be 
qualified for mandatory carriage."). 
95. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, I10 Stat. 56 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. (2000)) (amending the Communications Act of 
1934). 
96. See id. jj 202(a), 110 Stat. at 110 ("The Commission shall modify section 73.3555 
of its regulations (47 C.F.R. 3 73.3555) by eliminating any provisions limiting the number 
of AM or FM broadcast stations which may be owned or controlled by one entity 
nationally."). At the local level, the 1996 Telecom Act allowed same-entity ownership of 
up to eight commercial radio stations in markets with a total of forty-five or more 
commercial radio stations, up to seven commercial radio statlons in markets with thirty to 
forty-four of such stations, up to six in markets with between fifteen and twenty-nine of 
such stations, and up to five In markets with fewer than fifteen of such stations. 
Id. 4 202(b)(l), 110 Stat. at 110; see also Leonard M .  Baynes, Ruce, Media Consolidation, 
and Online Content: The Lack oj.Substitutes Available to Media Consumers of Color, 39 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 199 (2006) (analyzing ef'fects of 2003 media-ownership rulings on 
communities of color); Catherine J.K. Sandoval, Antitnist Law on the Borderland of 
Language and Market DeJinition: Is There a Separate Spanuh-Language Radio Market? A 
Case Sttidy of the Merger of Univision and Hispanic Broadcasting Corporation, 40 U.S.F. 
L. REV. 381, 38689 (2006) (discussing liberalization of the radio ownership rules and its 
deleterious effects on the radio-dependent Latinola community). 
97. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104- 104, 5 202(c)( 1 )(B), 1 10 Stat. 
56, 111. 
98. John Helyar, Radio's Stem Challenge, FORTUNE, Nov. 1,2004, at 123, 124. 
99. Jennlfer S. Lee, On Minat, N.D., Radio: A Single Corporate Voice, N.Y. TIMES,  
Mar. 31, 2003, at C7 (discussing the incident in Minot as an example of the potentially 
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When the emergency responders telephoned the local radio stations, they 
were unable to reach anyone because Clear Channel owned twenty-three of 
the eighty commercial stations in North Dakota, including six stations in 
Minot, all of which were airing satellite feeds from Clear Channel's 
headquarters in San Antonio, T e ~ a s . ' " ~  
Undeterred, the FCC in 2003 decided to increase the national television 
ownership cap to a total national audience reach limit of 45% (up from 
35%).lo1 It did this aAer having received approximately 800,000 public 
comments, 99% of which were in opposition to the proposal.102 The FCC's 
action created so much public protest that Congress responded by rolling 
back the new national ownership rule to 39% of national audience reach."I3 
In addition, the Third Circuit in Prometheus Radio Prqject v. FCC rejected 
the "diversity index" devised by the FCC in justifying a number of its 
changes to the media ownership rules as "arbitrary and capricious" and 
relying on "irrational assumptions and inconsistencies," including that the 
Internet is a fitting substitute for local programming and source diversity in 
local broadcast markets.lo4 
a. The Broadcast Public Interest Standard Survives (Tattered, hut Still 
Alive) 
Despite the aggressive deregulation of broadcasting, the government 
continues to rely on the public interest standard-and its localism, 
diversity, universal service, and democracy-building principles-both in 
enforcing the vestigial public interest regulations and promulgating new 
ones. Congress itself has appealed to these principles in enacting new 
proactive broadcast legislation. For example, in enacting the 1990 
deleterious effects of FCC deregulation). 
100. Id. 
10 1. See 2003 Order, supra note 56, at 1 3 3  14. 
102. See Media Ownership Rules und FCC' Reazrthorization: Hearing Befbre the Senate 
Comm. on Commerce. Science and Tr~msportcction, 198th Cong. 3 (2003) (statement of 
Michael J .  Copps, Comm'r, Federal Communications Commission) ("Of the nearly three 
quarters of a million comments we have received, nearly all oppose increased media 
consolidation--over 99.9 percent."). 
103. See Powell Sees No Fust End to Media Rules Debate, L.A. TLMES, Dec. 3, 2001, at 
C4 (discussing the attempt by the FCC to relax regulations and the subsequent constriction 
of the regulations by Congress). For a detailed survey of the broadcast ownership rules, see 
Robert B. Honvitz, On Media Concentration und the Diversiy Qzrestion, in MEDIit 
DIVERSITY AND LOCALISM 9, 22-23 (Philip M. Napoli ed., 2007) (outlining the ownership 
rules). 
104. 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2004). The Commission's desire to lift ownership 
restrictions has not abated. In June 2008, the FCC lifted the newspaper-broadcast cross- 
ownership rule. See FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, SMALL ENTITY COMPLIANCE GUIDE, MEDIA 
OWNERSHIP, No. 07-216 (2008), http://~jallfoss.fcc.goviedocsqublic/attachmatcWDA-08- 
13 10A l .doc (infonning small businesses of the recently reiaxed broadcast ownership 
requirements). 
Children's Television Act (CTA), Congress declared that "as part of their 
obligation to serve the public interest, television station operators and 
licensees should provide programming that serves the special needs of 
chi~dren." '~~ The CTA requires the FCC to "consider the extent to which 
the licensee. . . has served the educational and informational needs of 
children" in its programming.'06 Citing that authority, the FCC in 1996 
adopted new regulations aimed at enhancing children's educational 
programming, providing certain license renewal benefits to television 
broadcasters demonstrating that they have aired a minimum of three hours 
per week of educational and informational programming for children ages 
sixteen and younger.'07 Broadcasters also are required to comply with 
certain advertising restrictions in programming primarily directed to 
children.'08 In addition, Congress and the FCC have appealed to 
television's effects on children by increasing penalties for the airing of 
indecent material from $27,500 to $325,000 per incident, particularly 
following the 2004 Super Bowl halftime show in which Janet Jackson 
momentarily exposed a breast.'09 
The federal government's interest in universal access for free 
broadcasting also has survived the deregulatory era. In 2006, Congress 
appropriated $990 million for the subsidization of a program to distribute 
up to two $40 discount coupons to low-income households for the purchase 
of digital-to-analog retroconverters for citizens who could not afford a new 
digital television set and would like to use their analog television sets to 
receive free over-the-air broadcast signals after broadcast stations ceased 
transmitting on analog frequencies.' l o  
105. 47 U.S.C. 9 303a (2000). 
106. Id. $303b(a) 
107. See Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Television Programming, Revision 
of Programming Policies for Television Broadcast Stations, 11 F.C.C.R. 10,660 (1996) 
(report and order) (adopting abbreviated renewal application procedures for broadcasters 
who air at least three hours of children's programming per week, reducing the burden of the 
full renewal process on such broadcasters). 
108. Children's Television Act of 1990, 47 U.S.C. $ij 303a, 303b, 394 (2000). For 
example, television licensees are prohibited from incorporating more than twelve minutes of 
advertising per children's programming hour during weekdays and more than ten-and-a-half 
minutes per hour on weekends. Id. ij 303a(b). 
109. CBS's fine was overturned by the Third Circuit in July 2008. CBS Corp. v. FCC, 
535 F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 2008). 
110. See Title 111 of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, $ 3002, 
120 Stat. 4, 21 (2006) (enacting these requirements). Section 3002(a) of this statute 
required anaiog full-power television broadcasting to cease on February 17, 2009, while 
3002(b) requiring the FCC to terminate all full-power analog station licenses on the 
following day. This same statute charged the National Telecomrnunications and 
lnformation Administration (NTIA) with administering the converter program, with part of 
the funding for the discount coupons coming from the forthcoming auction of the analog 
broadcast spectrum returned to the government once the analog-to-digital conversion is 
complete. See id $ 3004 (establishing a fund for this purpose in the Treasury of the United 
In a 2004 Notice of Inquiry on broadcast localism, the Commission 
declared that "[elven as the Commission deregulated many behavioral rules 
for broadcasters in the 1980s, it did not deviate from the notion that 
[broadcasters] must serve their local communities.""' It reaffirmed that 
"[blroadcasters, who are temporary trustees of the public's airwaves, must 
use the medium to serve the public interest, and the Commission has 
consistently interpreted this to mean that licensees must air programming 
that is responsive to the interests and needs of their communities of 
license."l l2  In January 2008, the FCC proposed a number of new measures 
aimed at improving "broadcaster efforts to provide community-responsive 
programming such as news and public affairs, and p rogaming  targeted to 
the particular needs or interests of certain segments of the These 
range from "community advisory boards" to advise the station on the needs 
of local viewing audiences, local audience surveys, and the adoption of 
"public interest minimums7Yor public affairs and political programing. ' l 4  
I Driving the FCC's interest in rejuvenating the broadcast public interest 
standard, no doubt, are recent studies showing that local public affairs and 
political programming on free broadcast television are generally scarce and 
altogether nonexistent on many stations. A study of 285 broadcast 
television stations by Fordham University's McCannon Communications 
Research Center found that 59% of the commercial stations surveyed aired 
no local public affairs program during the two-week survey And 
a 2004 Lear Center study on local news coverage of the 2004 campaign 
found a paucity of broadcast coverage of local political campaigns."6 
Ironically, despite the shortage of political coverage on broadcast 
stations, broadcasters profit enormously from political advertising. As part 
of their public interest duties, broadcast licensees must give "reasonable 
access" for the "purchase of reasonable amounts of time" to "legally 
qualified candidate[s] for Federal elective office"l17 at the "lowest unit 
States); see also NTIA Rules to Implement and Administer a Coupon Program for Digital- 
to-Analog Converter Boxes, 72 Fed. Reg. 12,097 (Mar. 15, 2007) (adopting regulations to 
establish and administer the coupon program). 
1 1 1. Broad. Localism, 19 F.C.C.R. 12,425, 12,425 (2004). 
1 12. Id. 
113. Broad. Localism, 23 F.C.C.R. 1324, 1326 (2008) (notice of proposed rulemaking). 
1 14. Id. at 1343-44. 
115. Id.at 1341-42. 
116. See id. at 1351 (noting that only 8% of news programs surveyed contained any 
local political coverage at all). 
1 17. 47 U.S.C. $§ 3 12a(7), 3 15 (2000); see also 47 C.F.R. $ 73.1941 (2007) (equal 
opportunities). In addition, should a licensee "permit any person who is a legally qualified 
candidate for public oflice to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities 
to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station." 
47 U.S.C. $ 3 15(a) (2000). 
charge.""8During the 2004 campaigns alone, television stations earned 
$1.6 billion in political advertising revenue.'19 For the 2008 election, 
political advertising revenues for broadcasters were expected to exceed 
$3 bi11ion.l~~ 
Although broadcasters must abide by a number of other rules rooted in 
the public interest standard,'" the standard has fallen far short of the 
democracy-affirming goals of Congress and the early regulators. As early 
as 1961, at a time when broadcasters were airing significantly more public 
af'fBirs programming than today, FCC Chairman Newton Minow had 
declared the broadcast standard a failure and the broadcast landscape a 
"vast wasteland" that offered little in the way of cultivating democratic 
engagement in their communities of license."" 
C. Why Did the Broadcast Pzrblic Interest Standard Fall Short? 
Elsewhere I have discussed reasons why the broadcast public interest 
standard has had such a troubled history.'23 Other scholars and media law 
practitioners have offered their own criticisms.'" Aside from receiving 
118. 47 C.F.R. 4 73.1942. 
1 19. Mark Memmott & Jlm Dr~nkard, Election Ad Battle Smashes Record rtz 2004, USA 
TODAY, Nov. 26, 2004, at hA (ctting a report by the nonpartisan Alllance for Better 
Campa~gns, whtch based ~ t s  findings on research conducted by TNS Media 
Inteiitgence/Campatgn Media Analysis Croup). 
120. Mark Preston, Pollt~cal Telev~sron Aclttertrrlng to Reach $3 Blllion, CNN,COM, Oct. 
15, 2007, http:/lwww cnn.comi2007/POLITICS/10/1 S/ad.spendlng/ (cltlng research 
conducted by TNS Media Intell~gence/Campa~gn Medla Analys~s Group). 
12 1. For example, the broadcast publlc Interest standard also is used as justification for 
the Comm~sslon's prohlbttion on obscene broadcast content. Pub. Interest Obligations of 
TV Broad. Licensees, 14 F C C.R. 2 1,633, 2 1,634 (1 999). The public interest standard also 
supports the restnctlon on alrlng "indecent" content between the hot~rs of 6 0 0  a.m. and 
10.00 p.m. 47 C F.R. 4 73.3999 (2007). In addition, the standard serves as the regulatory 
basis for requtrements concerning equal employment opportunity at licensed stations 
(17 C.F.R. 4 73 2080). closed-caption~ng (47 C F.R. 5 79), and the ~dent~fication of 
sponsorsh~p (47 C.F R. rj 73.12 12). 
122 Newton N. Mmow, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Address to the Matlonal 
4ssoclat1on of Broadcasters (May 9, 1961), In MINOW & LAMAY, sapra note 42, at 188 
'Ipp 2. 
123 See Varona, cz~pm note 7, at 52-89 (noting the tenslon between the First 
4mendment and the FCC's regulatory mandate); see tilso Varona, 5tipra note 68. at 162-72 
(arguing that the concept of tclevlslon broadcast~ng as a marketplace of Ideas is not readlly 
applicable to cornmerclal broadcastlng). 
124 See, e g , Leonard M. Baynes, Whrte Ozit The Ahrence und Stereon;p~tzg of People 
of Color hy the Broudccrrf Nefiuorks In Przrne Trme Entert~imment Prrigrumming, 45 ARIZ. 
L. REV 293 (2003) (arguing that the FCC has failed to prevent the negarlve portrayal of 
rninorltles through pejorative stereotypes); Dan~el Patnck Graham, Ptrblic Interest 
Restlution rn the D~gztuf 4ge, 1 1  COMMLAW CON'~PECT!JS 97 (2003) (discusstng the 
application of the public Interest standard to dlgital televis~on broadcastmg); Henry Geller, 
Puhlrc Interest Regzrlutron in the Drgrtal TV Era, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 311 (1998) 
(analyzing how the publlc Interest standard should continue to apply in an era of dig~tal 
television), Ronald J Krotoszynski, Jr , The Inevttahle busteland: Why the Pzihlic Trz~.stee 
very little congressional direction, the FCC was hampered by legislation 
that is internally inconsistent.'" The Communications Act on the one hand 
directs the Commission to regulate broadcasters "consistent with the public 
interest"'lh but on the other hand commands that "no regulation or 
condition shall be promulgated. . . by the Commission which shall 
interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio 
~ommunication."'~~ The Commission has increasingly avoided walking 
this " t i g h t r ~ ~ e ~ ~ ~ l t o ~ e t h e r ,  par icularly in light of the persistent and 
broad-based criticism levied against the scarcity rationale, which-in light 
of digital spectrum management technologies-rests on increasingly weak 
footing. 
Structural impediments also have bedeviled the broadcast public interest 
standard. The aspiration that commercial broadcasting stations serve as 
electronic platforms for a ubiquitous marketplace of ideas ignored both the 
unidirectional, noninteractive structure of the medium as well as its 
economic realities. Viewers, not public interest programs, are the 
commodities that are traded on the commercial broadcast  airwave^.'^' 
Advertisers, not the audience members, are broadcasting's consumers.13' 
And the many broadcast licensees owned by public corporations act as if 
they were more accountable to profit-driven shareholders than to the 
i2.10ciel of Broadcast Televwzon Regulatzon hfz~st Full, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2 101 (1 997) 
(argutng that vested interests of Congress and the FCC prevent mean~ngful reform of the 
ptlbhc Interest standard); Charles W Logan, Jr , Gerrrng Beyond Scarcrw il "Vew Parndlgm 
for A werr lng the Constlhttzonalz~ oj Broadcast Regulatton, 85 C+L. L. REV. 1687 ( 1997) 
(argurilg that regulation requiring broadcasters to provide publsc interest programming 1s 
justttied by the government's grant of spectrum frequencies); Matthew L. Spltzer, The 
Constztut~onuEl~ of Lzcensrng Broadcasterc., 64 N.Y U. L. REV. 990 (1989) (refuting the 
scarclty rationale on grounds that it falls to justify a lower threshold of First Amendment 
protection for broadcasters); Sunstem, supra note 13 (theonz~ng causes of the dysfunctions 
in publlc Interest broadcast~ng regulat~on and proposing a variety of reforms). 
125 See CBS Inc. v. Democrat~c Nat'l Comm., 412 U S. 94, 1 17 ( 1973) (dlscusslng the 
FCC's attempts at balancing the public interest wlth F~rs t  Amendment values). 
126 47 U S.C. 4 302a(a) (2000). 
127 Id 9 326. 
128 CBS,412U.S.at 117 
129 For more deta~led and complete analys~s of the debate concerning the 5carclty 
rationale, see Varona, rzrpra note 68, at 164-68. 
130 See Sunstem, supra note 13, at 514 (d~scuss~sig the relationsh~p between 
broadcasters, vlewers, and advert~sers in the marketplace); see irlso C. EDWIN B ~ K F R ,  
I\D\IERTIC;ING AND A DEMOCRA~IC PRESS 25-87 (1994) (argurng, primarily through an 
economlc analysis, that the med~a's financ~al dependence on advertlslng affects the 
wbstance and distribut~on of nonadvertlslng content and ultimately leads to a less free and 
less dernocratsc press). 
13 1 See BAKFR, supra note 130, at 25-87, see also JEFF CHESTFR, DICIITAL DESTINY 3 
(2007) (noting that a survey of 118 broadcast news directors revealed that more than half 
~cported being pressured by advertisers to run positlve storles or klll negatlve storles for the 
,idvertlsers' benefit). 
viewers and listeners for whom they hold their licenses in trust.132 
Commercial broadcasters have succeeded at keeping this dyshnctional 
regulatory model in place, giving back very little public interest quid for 
the quo of their lucrative licenses, by exercising their unparalleled lobbying 
muscle in Washington. The FCC's "capture"'33 by the broadcast lobby and 
the symbiosis between airtime-dependent members of Congress and the 
local broadcasters back home'" have conspired to keep the broadcast 
public interest standard intact and impervious to meaningful reform. 
Despite the Red Lion Court's characterization of broadcasting as a 
"marketplace of ideas,"'" the metaphor never quite fit the medium. As the 
seminal image in First Amendment philosophy, the marketplace metaphor 
is widely attributed to John Milton, who in his Areopagitica rejected the 
government licensing of publishers in favor of a "free and open encounter" 
of  idea^,"^ and John Stuart Mill, who in On Liberr?/ promoted "the clearer 
perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with 
error.'" 37 
The marketplace of ideas image has long been criticized for its allusion 
to the inapposite analogue of laissez-faire economic markets. Implicit in 
the metaphor is the assumption that a free and full discussion would best 
reveal truth by keeping the marketplace free of government intrusion and 
dependent solely on the trade in ideas by private, rational, autonomous 
132. See Krotoszynskl, ~upva  note 124, at 21 16 ("[A] statlon group or network executtve 
cannot piace the pubhc Interest ahead of the shareholders' Interests wlthout potentially 
v~olatlng a fiductary obligat~on to the corporat~on."). 
133. The agency capture concept, conceived by Marver Bernste~n In 1955, posrts that an 
agency can grow so Interdependent with the industry it regulates that it ultimately is 
captured or controlled by the regulatees themselves. MARVER H. BERNSTEM. REGULATING 
BUSTNE~S BY INDEPENDFNT COMMISSION 79-97 (1955); see also Mernll, rzpw note 35, at 
1043 (descrtbrng agency capture as "meanmg that agenc~es were regarded as being unsquely 
suscept~ble to dom~nat~on by the industry they were charged w ~ t h  regulatmg"). 
134 Professor Ronald J. Krotoszynskl, Jr. makes this point especially well, wrltsng that 
commerctal "broadcasters provide the Incumbent pol~ticians with the med~a exposure they 
need to remaln In office and, in return, the officeholders keep the Commlsslon at bay." 
Krotoszynskl, supra note 124, at 2 1 17. 
135. Red L ~ o n  Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,390 ( 1969). 
136. JOHN MILTON. AREOPAGITICA 58 (Sir Richard C. Jebb ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 
19 18) ( 1644). avmlable ut http://www.uoregon.edu/-rbearlareopagitica.htm1. 
137. JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, m ~TILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, AVD 
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 102, 104 (H.B. Acton ed., E.P. Dutton & Co. 1951) (1863). 
Justtce Oliver Wendell Holn~es is cred~ted with incorporat~ng the marketplace metaphor into 
American free-speech jurisprudence by means of hzs 19 19 Ahmms v United States d~ssent, 
where he wrote that "the ulttmate good des~red IS better reached by free trade In ideas-that 
the best tc5t of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted In the competition of 
the market." 250 U.S. 616, 630 ( 1  9 19). 
actors.13' ,Two years before Red Lion was decided, Professor Jerome 
Barron dismissed the notion as a "romantic view," arguing that "if ever 
there were a self-operating marketplace of ideas, it has long ceased to 
In light of the antipathy of corporate media to unpopular and unorthodox 
ideas, the absence of government from the marketplace of ideas does not 
alone make it free."' ~ n d  in fact economic markets tend to operate more 
efficiently and effectively with some amount of government in ter~ent ion. '~~ 
Other scholars have made similar arguments, criticizing the metaphor for 
assuming equality in access to the marketplace where none exists1" and 
taking for granted the rationality of marketplace actors when in fact they 
are rendered irrational by the manipulation of the commercialized mass 
Professor Ed Baker in particular has argued convincingly that the 
commercially dominated market does not satisfy preferences as much as it 
generates and manipulates them.'j4 ye t  despite the inherent problems with 
the metaphor, it persists as our core rationale for the freedom of speech and 
as the means to the ends of human dignity, autonomy, and effective self- 
governance.145 The FCC continues to declare that "[a] diverse and robust 
marketplace of ideas is the foundation of our democracy."'46 
138. See Weinberg, supra note 8, at 1138-39 (arguing that the marketplace of ideas 
metaphor is flawed because of its inherent generalizations); see ulso ROBERT TSAI, 
ELOQUENCE AND REASON 60-68 (2008) (analyzing the libertarian roots of the marketplace 
of ideas metaphor). 
139. Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. 
L. KEV. 1641, 164143  (1967). 
140. Id. at 1643 (asserting that government "indifference becomes critical when a 
comparatively few private hands are in a position to determine not only the content of 
information but its very availability"). 
141. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 6 (1992) (noting that 
market intervention is a necessary means for counteracting "deficiencies in the real world of 
commerce"). 
142. See, e.g., Weinberg, szrpra note 8, at 1149 (lamenting the fact that "those wtth 
extensive institutional or financial resources" have greater access to "effective mass 
communication"). 
143. See, e.g., rd. at 1 157-64 (bemoaning the tendency of broadcasters to maintain the 
status quo by programming content aimed at "reinforcing people's existlng att~tudes [rather 
than] changing them"); Jason Mazzone, Speech und Reciprocity: A Theon, of the Firsf 
rimendment, 34 CONN. L. REV. 405, 408-09 (2002) (arguing that the "risk of marketplace 
approach is, therefore, to trivialize speech); Herbert Marcuse, Repressive Tolerance, in 
A CRITIQUE OF PURE TOLERANCE 90-97 (1965) ("Universal tolerance becomes questionable 
when its rationale no longer prevails, when tolerance is administered to manipulated and 
indoctrinated individuals who parrot, as their own, the opinion of their masters, for whom 
heteronomy has become autonomy."). 
144. C. ERWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS AND DEMOCRACY 87-95 (2d ed. 2004). 
145. For an excellent history of the marketplace metaphor, see SMOLLA, szrpra note 14 1. 
at 6-17. 
146. 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of the Commission's Broadcast 
Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, I8 F.C.C.R. 13,620, 13,627 (2003) (report, order, and 
As a unidirectional, publicly inaccessible, tightly controlled, and largely 
commercial medium rooted in content-referential regulation, broadcasting 
has never hosted a free marketplace of ideas. But what about the Internet? 
Does it provide the platform for "free and open encounters" that 
broadcasting ultimately failed to deliver'? And what, so far, have been its 
effects on democracy? 
Although the notion is hard to believe, the Internet still is a very young 
popular technology. The term Internet first appeared in the New York 
Times only twenty-one years ago-four years before the Internet was 
privatized-in a 1988 story about looming computer security threats in 
which even the now-commonplace computer term virus appeared in 
quotations.'" Remarkably, in a Harris Poll conducted in 1994-just fifteen 
years ago-two-thirds of respondents said that they had not heard of the 
~nternet."' In light of this youth, the Internet's full effects on our speech 
culture and democracy are just starting to be analyzed. Preliminary 
assessments, however, paint a mixed picture. Whereas the Internet has 
catalyzed speech, democratic action, and democratic engagement in some 
ways, it has undermined them in others. The following Sections discuss 
how. 
A. Autonomy and the Internet 
The Internet attracted great popular attention in the early 1990s, 
emerging from the obscurity of its origins as a little known tool of scientific 
researchers. At that time, the demands of government nonintewentionists- 
those who insisted that the government allow the Internet to develop free of 
regulation, in a private, nongovernmental arena-carried great currency. 
They still do. Many industry advocates, scholars, and other commentators 
argue not only that the Internet should not be regulated, but that it cannot 
be regulated.'49 Nicholas Negroponte famously said that the Internet's 
architecture renders "the nation-state . . . not rele~ant.""~ Distinguishing it 
from the tightly regulated and mediated broadcasting media, Internet 
notice of proposed rulemaking). 
147. John Markoff, Author c)f Co~nputer 'Vir-zrs' Is Son o/ N S.A. E~pert  on Data 
Yeczrrih~, N.Y. TIMES, NOV. 5, 1988, at 1. 
148. DAVIS, cupru note 5, at 168. 
149 See, e g . James B. Speta, FCC Authorrw to Reguiure the internet: Creaflng It and 
Lzrn~trng It, 35 Lou. ti. CHI. L.J. 15, 15 (2004) (c~tmg PETER W. HUBER, LAW AND DISORDER 
I N  CLRFRSPACE: .QBOLISH THE FCC AND LET C O M M O ~  LAW RULE THE TELECOSM 4 ( 1  997)); 
Dan L. Burk, Virtziul Exit m the Global Inbrmatzon Ec+onomy, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 943, 
995 ( 1998). 
150. Andrew Hlggins & Azeern Arhar, China Begins to Erect Second Crent I-Z/nlC in 
Cvberspnce, GUARDFAN (tiK), Feb. 5, 1996. See generullv NIC HOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING 
DIGITAL ( I  995). 
exceptionalists argued that the Internet was a creature of, and instrument 
for, independence from government control and individual self-expression 
and actualization. In his 1996 Declurctlion c$* the Inilependence of' 
Cyberspace, John Perry Barlow touted cyberspace as "the new home of the 
Mind" and issued the following warning to the "Governments of the 
Industrial World"': "'You are not welcome among us. You have no 
sovereignty where we gather. . . . [Lleave us alone."'"' 
When a large segment of the academic community turned its attention to 
the Internet as a fertile subject of study beginning in the mid-1990s, notable 
scholars wrote about how the Internet's decentralized, international (cross- 
border), and open architecture made government regulation impracticable 
and un~ustainab1e.l~~ Some scholars argued that even if modest 
governmental interventions were possible, the government should forbear 
from regulating the new Internet frontier, deferring instead to innovations 
in online self-governance emerging as new social norms and customs,'i3 
and forms of private ~ontracting."~ It was argued that because the Internet 
gave anyone with access to the Web the power to be his or her own editor 
and publisher for little or no cost-what Professor Eugene Volokh called 
151. John Perry Barlow, A Declurutzon of the Independence c?f Cjderspace (Feb. 8, 
1996), uvazlable at http:l/humes.eff.or~-barlow/Declaration-Final.html. 
152. See David R. Johnson & Davld Post, Law and Borders-The Rise r$ Luw in 
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996) (arguing that the lntemet creates a new sphere of 
human actlvity by cutttng across territorial borders, thereby underm~nrng the practicabrlity 
of laws based on geographic boundaries); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyherspuce 2.0, 79 TEX. 
L. REV. 447, 448 (2000) (book rev~ew) ("The first generation of cyberspace scholarship 
~hared the utopianism of the digital vanguard" by arguing that "[bly rts very rudderless, 
decentralized, transnatronai structure. . . . the lnternet must ulttmately elude any attempt at 
government regulation."); see ulso David G. Post, Against "Aguznst Cvbemnurchy," 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1365, 1366 (2002) ("Communication in cyberspace 1s not 
'functronally   den tical' to communication In realspace; [therefore] the jurlsdictional and 
chorce-of-law d~lemmas posed by cyberspace act~vrty cannot be adequately resolved by 
applying the 'settled pnnclpies' and 'traditional legal tools' developed for analogous 
problems tn realspace."). 
153. See, e.g,, David G. Post, Anut-thy, State, und /he Internet: An E~SLIY  on LCIW- 
&laking in Cyherspuce, J. ONLINE L., art. 3, 1995, 
http://web.wm.edwlaw/publ~cattons~~oliarticles/post.shtml (asserttng that govemment 
regulation would interfere w ~ t h  the Internet's -free market of privately developed rule sets); 
I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cj~herspace,'75 U. PITT. L. REV. 093, 
1025-41 (1994) (arguing that Internet rules of conduct should be self-developed and not 
tmposed by govemment); Henry H. Pemtt, Jr., Cvherrpace Self-Government: Town Hall 
Democracy or Redzscovered Royalism J .  12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 41 3, 4 19-26 ( 1997) 
(arguing that a system of self-governance 1s best sulted to devzse specialized rules, promote 
voluntary compliance, and produce efficrent results). 
154. See, e g.. Llewellyn J. Grbbons, ,Vo Regz~lcrtion, Government Regzdlution, or Self- 
Regzklcrtion: Social Enjot.cement or Suci~rl Crrmtructit~g for Grtl,evnance tn cvher~puce, 6 
CORNELL J.L. & PCB. POL'Y 475, 484 (1997) ("Cybenans must reject any attempt to shrink- 
wrap governance rn cyberspace by lmposlng a standard form contract of adheson as the 
model for contracting In cyberspace. . . . [Clontractrng In cyberspace should be the 
quintessential negotruted contract that represents a true meeting of the minds."). 
"cheap speech"'i5-there would be no valid grounds for the government to 
regulate the Internet in favor of increased access, diversity of content 
sources, or other public interest values.'56 The private marketplace would 
deliver those democratic and speech benefits on its own. 
Congress adopted this hands-off, anti-interventionist approach to the 
Internet very clearly in the 1996 Telecom Act, in which it articulated as an 
overarching policy the preservation of a "vibrant and competitive free 
market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer 
services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation."'57 The government has 
stayed true to the 1996 Telecom Act's nonregulatory approach, and with 
few exceptions has ceded the Internet's regulation almost entirely to the 
commercial marketplace.'" 
Of course, the irony of the cyberlibertarianism prevalent in the 1990s 
was that the lnternet owes its existence to government subsidies and the 
strict common-carrier regulation of telecommunications companies 
carrying Internet traffic.'j9 The Internet, in fact, is a creature of regulation. 
The interconnected network that became the Internet originated in 1969 as 
155. Eugene Volokh, Cheup Speech und What Id Will Do, 104 YXE L.J. 1805, I847 
(1995); see rrlso Martin H .  Redish & Kirk J. Kaludis, The Right c?f'Expr-e.vsive Acce.s.s iin 
First rlvzenriment Theory: Redistributive Vcrlues and the Democratic Dilemma, 93 Nw. U .  L. 
REV. 1083, 1129-32 (1999) (describing the Internet as "'a decentralized, global medium of 
communication that links people, institutions, corporations and governments around the 
world,' and that enables communications to take place 'almost instantaneously"' (quoting 
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 83 1 (E.D. Pa. 1996))). 
156. See Netanel, szlpra note 152. at 448 (noting that the lnternet "is at once a distinct, 
self-contained realm and a gauntlet to the inefficient, undemocratic, top-down 
administration of the territorial state"). 
157. 47 U.S.C. 3 230(b)(2) (1996). 
158. The government has, however, imposed regulations on Internet carriers in discrete 
areas, such as Voice over lnternet Protocol (VoIP). See, e.g., Communications Assistance 
for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified 
as amended at 47 U.S.C. $jj 1001-101 0 (1994)) (requiring telecommunications carriers to 
cooperate with law enforcement electronic surveillance activities); Am. Council on Educ. v. 
FCC, 45 1 F.3d 226 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (upholding FCC decision to apply CALEA wiretapping 
requirements to broadband and VolP providers); see crlso Controlling the Assault of Non- 
Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003 (CAN-SPAM Act), Pub. L. No. 108- I 87, 
I I 7 Stat. 3699 (2003) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 9 7701 (2006)) (enacting standards 
against unsolicited commercial e-mail and requiring the Federal Trade Commission to 
promulgate rules against unsolicited messages on mobile networks); Telephone Nuinber 
Requirements for IP-Enabled Services Providers, 22 F.C.C.R. 19,53 1 (2007) (report, order, 
and notice of proposed rulemaking) (extending local number portability to VoIP services); 
1P-Enabled Services, E9 1 1  Requirements for IP-Enabled Service Providers. 20 F.C.C.R. 
10,245 (2005) (report, order, and notice of proposed rulemaking) (imposing 9 1 1 obligations 
on VoIP providers). 
159. See Catherine J.K. Sandovai, Disclosure, Deception and Deep-Packet Lnspection: 
Net Neutrality and the Role and Limits of Federal Trade Commission Act Restraints on 
lnternet Service Providers 12-14 (Jan. 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) 
(detailing the extensive federal regulation that facilitated the early proliferation of the 
commercial Internet). 
part of a military research initiative in search of a resilient "packet- 
switched" commtlnications system capable of instantly surviving the 
destruction of entire sectors of the network.'"() Throughoitt the 1970s and 
1980s, the U.S. Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) developed a 
file transfer protocol (FTP), electronic mail, newsgroup, and other 
information handling protocols.'" It later funded the University of 
California at Berkeley to incorporate what became the "transmission 
control protocol" and "Internet protocol" (TCPi1P)-the language of the 
Internet---into the UNIX operating system upon which the Internet was 
built. I"' These standards and norms operate on the Internet's logic~rl ayer, 
which rests above its phj:ric.nl layer (i.e., the network of computing and 
switching devices, servers, and transmission fiber), and below its 
irpplicutions (e.g., software and end-user devices) and content (e.g., text, 
graphics, and audio) layers.'"' 
In the 1980s, the National Science Foundation devoted over 
$200 million to expand the emerging Internet, interconnecting federal and 
an increasing number of university and other research facilities (through a 
system called NSFN~~) . ' " '  Under contract with the Department of Defense, 
the Stanhrd Research Institute managed the early domain name system, 
which enabled and registered dot-com addresses, functionally policing 
which servers and Internet websites had access to the ~nternet.'"' 
What most set the stage for the Internet's tipping point-from obscure 
communications network connecting a relatively small realm of fedcral- 
gobernlnent and ecfucational servers to the main global colnlnunications 
platfonn it is today-were two sets of relatively low-profile decisions. The 
I hO Ionr\rlr IN E N I I F C  I - I T F K L F I ~  6i PI-III 11' J W F I ~ F R ,  I ) I ( , IT~~ CRO\SRO,\IIS 129-30 
(2005) Because the rn111tar-y long-dlstance communications network depended heavill on 
(lie 4 TS: 1 telephone net~bork. an attack on the AT&T main switches could have prebented 
the Pres~dent or mr l~ tay  brass In Washington from send~ng mrssile-launch messages to iilo 
l~c~i t rons  In Ar~rona, Nebraska, or Montana I d  
I h l Id 'it 130, tcr irlco Edward L Rubin, Chinpirter Lcrngtraqe:i.\ crc iVet5t ot ht  trt7d 
Povt cJr Str trc tzri e\ (iol)t.rt?tng [he I>ct.r/o~~w?etit of .YY2.fla, 53 SMU L Rrv 1447. 1449-52 
(2000) ("The orrgins of the Internet lie in efforts by the Defense Department to establish 
~ommunrcatton I~nkages ;tmong the computers In its 4dvanccd Projects Kem~rch Agency 
(ARPA),  which was sct LIP In the u'tke of the Sputnik launct~ ") 
162 I r  r (trtrr<r F I V  & WFICI-R, cttprcr note 160, at 130 
I h i  Eor a dctailed descrlptlou ot the internet's varlous liiyer$. ice ~ t r '  ,tt 1 18-25 Some 
Internet theoitsts crivislon the layers d~tferently, '15signlng them diffkrent names 'ind 
~onflating two of the four layers identified by most For exdmple. Professor Lawrence 
ILciblg wtltes of three ~~~~~~s the pliys~cal layer, a m~ddle "code" layer. and a top content 
lrlyer %e Laurence Lesstg, The Internet Clntier Szege, FORFIC~N POL ' Y .  Nov -Dec 200 1. at 
56, 59, ,I o~l t rh l r  cit littp Iwww lessig orglcontent/coIuinn~/fore~gnpoltcy 1 pdf 
164 Not c HTFRI F I N  S: WFI\FR, cttpra note 160, dt 130 
165 J \( k ( iOL[>'r~11 T t l  & TIM Wli, WHO COYTROL', THF I \  ~ F R N F  T' I L  L U ~ I O ~ S  OF. \ 
f3orc1jr-111 -5s W ~ I I L D  33-34 (7006) In the first years of the Internet's existence, the dot-coin 
ndmtng iystcm was cornprtsed of only one text tlle named "'hosts txt," wh~ch was itored on 
,I Staunford Lnibe~sity ierver Id at 33 

d i sc~ssed" '~~  and ultimately can gain currency in the marketplace. But 
what really is meant by "democracy" and "democratic exchange" in 
debates about the effects of media, and specifically the Internet, on our 
democracy? 
In theory, democracy-from -the fifth-century B.C.E. Greek root 
dernokrtxtia-is "rule by the people."171 In practice, as political theorist 
W.B. Gallie observes, democracy is a contested and protean concept,'72 
Although there are many commonly accepted variations of democracy,'73 
my analysis of the Internet's democratic effects will focus on four of the 
principal interrelated democratic models recognized in American political 
thought: direct democracy, representative democracy, liberal democracy, 
and deliberative democracy. 
Direct democracy, which involves umediated decisiomaking though 
mechanisms such as referenda and ballot initiatives, is popular with the 
American people.174 Direct democratic governance, however, has long 
&en disfavored by theorists as the least accountable and self-actualizing 
model of ~elf-~overnance, '~~ vulnerable to what James Madison termed the 
"confusion and intemperance of the multitude" that "can admit no cure for 
the mischiefs of faction.'"76 Jean Jacques Rousseau, whose political 
170, JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 42 (Tichnor & Fields 2d ed. 1863) (1 859). 
171, Amy Gut-, Democracy, in A COMPANION TO C O ~ M P O R A R Y  POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 411 (Robert E. Goodin & Philip Pettit eds., 1993). 
172. W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTO~LIAN SOC'Y 167, 
168-69 (1956); see also WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, THE TERMS OF P O L ~ C A L  DISCOURSE 
(1974). 
173. See, e.g., Gutmann, supra note 171, at 41 1-18 (including brief descriptions of 
Schmpetetian, populist, liberal, pmicipatory, social, and deliberative democracy). 
174. See Peter M. Shane, The Electronic Federalist: The Internet and the Eclectic 
I~itutionalization ofDemocratic Legitimacy, in DEMOCRACY ONLINE, supra note 33, at 69 
(noting a recent survey that places public support for direct democratic mechanisms at 
between 70% and 80% (citing DAVID MCKAY ET AL., ~ONTROVERSIES IN AMERICAN 
POLITICS AND SOCETY 9 1 (2002))). 
175. Plato reveals himself as a strong critic of direct or classical democracy. In the 
dialogue The Statesman, he arranges for the Stranger to tell Socrates that, among all of the 
forms of govement, "democracy is the worst of [them]"" so far as law-abiding is 
concerned, and the best for flouting the law. PLATO, The Statesman, in THE COLLECTED 
DIALOGUES OF PLATO INCLUDING THE LETTERS 1074 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns 
eds., Lane Cooper et al. trans., 1961). Aristotle took up Plato's antidemocratic mantel in 
characterizing '"xtreme" Athenian (direct) democracy as the worst of all forms of 
govement since "all offices are open to all, and the will of the people overrides all law." 
ARISTOTLE, The Politics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 11 19 ( Richard McKeon ed., 
1941); see ulso Shane, supra note 174, at 69. Professor Shane writes that "It is dificult to 
see. . . how direct democracy promotes the equal consideration of the interests of all 
persons." Id. 
176. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 43-44 (James Madison) (Cambridge Univ, Press 2003) 
("A common passion or interest will.. . be felt by a majority. . . and there is nothing to 
check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party. . . ."). Agreeing with Madison, 
Alexander Hamilton said that '2i pure democracy, if it were practicable, would be the most 
perfect government. Experience has proved that no position is more false than this." THE 
3 6 A DMINlSTR.4 TIVE LA w REVIEW [61:1 
philosophy often is described as favoring direct democratic ideals, 
acknowledged that "there never has been a real democracy, and there never 
will be" since it is "against the natural order for the many to govern."177 
Although direct democracy has gained popularity at the state level, it plays 
virtually no role in federal government given the Constitution's hostility to 
direct popular 1 a ~ m a k i n g . l ~ ~  
Representative democracy is the form of governance most familiar to 
Americans. This form of governance entails popular clection of 
representatives by means of majority or plurality support, and the exercise 
by those elected representatives of decisionmaking power delegated to 
them by the p e 0 ~ 1 e . l ~ ~  The presumption is that the elected representatives 
will act in Eurtherance of the public good through their application of 
expertise and calm consideration, qualities thought to be lacking in the 
direct democratic model. But the representative model is criticized as 
prone to corruption, to the overinfluence of political parties, and to 
conflicts of interest, patronage, and expense, while offering little of the 
transparency, immediacy, and accountability of the direct democratic 
model. I8O 
Liberal democracy prioritizes individual autonomy and liberty over 
majoritarian, collectivist notions of the "public intere~t." '~'  Attributed in 
QUOTABLE FOUND~NG FATHERS: A TREASURY OF 2,500 WISE AND WITTY QUOTATIONS FROM 
THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO CREATED AMERICA 60 (Buckner F. Melton, Jr. ed., 2004) 
(speaking at the New York Ratification Convention on June 2 1, 1788). 
177. JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 65 (G.D.H. 
Cole trans,, 1950). 
178. See Shane, supra note 174, at 70 (observing the limited role accorded direct 
democracy in the Constitution's framing, ratification, and content). By contrast, thirty-four 
states have state-constitution-defined direct-democratic decisionmaking means. JOSEPH F. 
ZIMMERMAN, THE NEW ENGLAND TOWN MEETING: DEMOCRACY IN ACTION (1999); ree also 
Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co, v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912) (upholding, through a refusal of 
jurisdiction, Oregon's initiative and referendum mechanisms, reasoning that the controversy 
was a political rather than a judicial question). 
179. See Shane, supra note 174, at 68 (theorizing that such governance is premised on 
the assumption that citizens, through exercise of self-determination, will warrant their 
allegiance to the outcome and elected politicians will yield equal consideration for the 
interests of ail people). 
180, See generally Gary Orren, Fall from Grace: The Public's Loss of Faith in 
Government, in WHY PEOPLE DON'T TRUST GOVERNMENT 92-93 (Joseph S, Nye, Jr, et al. 
eds,, 1997) (arguing that continued public distrust of American politicians and the political 
process is inextricably tied to the government itself, and not simply a byproduct of external 
factors such as technological innovation, social transformation, or global economic trends); 
JOHN HASKELL, DIRECT DEMOCRACY OR REPRESENTATIVE GOVERMMENT? DISPELL~NG THE 
POPULIST MYTH 2-3 (2001) (positing that advocates of direct democracy argue that 
"[rlepresentative institutions act to stymie the expression of the popular will and fail 
accurately to consider the public interest when policy is made"). 
1 8 1. See Gutmann, supra note 17 1, at 4 13 (describing liberal democracies' insistence 
that basic liberties, such as freedom of thought, speech, press, association, and religion must 
be paramount to the will of popular rule). 
large part to the philosophies of John Locke and John Stuart  ill,"^ the 
liberal democratic theory prioritizes constraints on the power of 
representative governments and popular majorities from interference with 
the rights and freedoms of  individual^.'^^ In prioritizing individual rights 
over public good, liberal democratic theory is the source of much criticism. 
In Democracy's Discontent, for example, Professor Michael Sandel argues 
compellingly that the primacy of liberalism, individual rights, and 
consumerism in American society, in place of more cornmunitarian and 
deliberative activities, has resulted in the weakening of the nation's civic 
life and democracy as a whole.lR4 
The deliberative democratic model is valued in contemporary political 
thinking as most in harmony with the multivalent principles of self- 
governance, including autonomy, dignity, equality, self-fulfillment, and 
free expression in collective self-interest.'*' Deliberative democracy best 
marries democracy with freedom of speech by transcending governance as 
tde aggregation of atomized preferences and interests, and by engaging 
autonomous citizens with a diversity of interests and viewpoints in 
substantive dialogue on issues of public importance.186 As observed by 
Professor Peter Shane, "[Tlhe fundamental accountability in deliberative 
democracy does not run from the governor to the governed, but from each 
citizen to every ~ther.""~ This citizen-centered interdependence in 
political decisionmaking, according to Professor Beth Noveck, is what 
makes public deliberation "fundamental to participatory democratic life" 
182. See DAVID R. HILEY, DOUBT AND THE! DEMANDS OF DEMOCRATIC ITIZENSHIP 9 
(2006) (identifying the "historic worry about disorder and the tyranny of the many" with 
"liberal theories from John Locke and John Stuart Mill"); see also Rainey, supra note 12, at 
3 17-20 (discussing individualistic theories of the First Amendment). 
1 83. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 61 (rev. ed. 1999). 
184. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC 
PHILOSOPHY 4,5,27,250-73,318 (1996) (describing Americans' dual concern with fears of 
community erosion and feelings of waning self-governance), 
185. See ANDREW CHADWICK, I N T E ~ T  POLITICS 25 (2006); Cass R, Sunstein, The First 
Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1757, 1804 (1 995) (arguing that the goals of the 
First Amendment are linked with a deliberative democracy, and that the law must harness 
new technologies for democratic ends); Beth Simone Noveck, Designing Deliberative 
Democracy in Cyberspace: The Role of the Cyber-Lawyer, 9 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1,5, 12 
(2003) (asserting that deliberative speech, rather than free speech, makes true democracy 
possible); Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in DELIBERATIVE 
DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS 67-87 (James Bohman & William Rehg 
eds., 1997). 
186, See, e.g., James Bohman & William Rehg, Intvoduction to DELIBERAT~VE 
DEMOCRACY, supra note 185, at ix ("Deliberative democracy refers to the idea that 
legitimate lawmaking issues from the public deliberation of citizens."); see also CASS R, 
SUNSTEIN, Tm PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 134 (1993) (discussing the primacy of political 
deliberation in the American conception of liberal republicanism). 
187. Shane, supra note 174, at 72. 
and "at the root of American d e ~ n o c r a c ~ . " ' ~ " ~  merging autonomy with 
community, deliberative democrats value the "freedom to think as you wit1 
and speak as you think" as "'means indispensible to the discovery and 
spread of political truth."'x9 @ 
Individual autonomy is important to the general notion of iiemokrcirtics, 
* insofar as we take it as a given that, in order to govern ourselves and act as 
effective civic agents. we must be able to think and speak for oursefves, 
free from the constraints and distorting influences of governmental or 
private forces. "Meaningful autonomy," according to Professor Baker, is 
the ability "to lead a meaningfi~lly self-authored life without unnecessary or 
inappropriate hstration by others."'") E3ut autonomy alone, uncoupled 
with meaningful engagement in political discussion with fellow citizens, is 
of limited worth to the individual as both a speaker and citizen.'" Because 
thought and language are so inexorably linked, democratic self-governance 
requires us to be able to express ourselves as well as hear the expression of 
others.Iq2 Moreover, the benefits ill' individual autonomy-e.g., self- 
discovery, self-authorship, and moral and political agency---come partly as 
a consequence of discourse with other autonomous individuals and the 
concomitant exposure to a diversity of viewpoints and inf~nnation."~ 
Deliberative democratic theories can be rraced back far beyond the 
founding of the Alnerican republic. Kanf called for the "public use 
o f .  . . reason" as a route to enlightenment;'" even Aristotle wrote that 
"[wlhen there are many [who contribute to the process of deliberation],'" 
they "'may surpass+otlectiiiely and as a body, although not individually- 
188. Novcck, supra note i 85, dt 5. 12. 
189. Wh~xney v. Caltfomia, 274 U.S. 357, 375 ( 1  927). 
190. C. Edwin Baker, A~*tontrmy trnd lt?for~~u~zonul F'rrtwcy, or ( ;C)JJZ~:  Tire Central 
Lfeunrng i$ the First Amendment, 2 1 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 2 15,320 (2004). Professor Baker 
calls the other conceptualization of autonrtmy "fitrn-ial autonomy" and describes it as a 
recognition in law of "an agent's legal right to choose what to do with herself (dnd her 
property)" and "domlnlon over [one's1 own mtnd and body." Id.  ~ t t  223. 
191. Polrttcal philosopher Judith Liclttenberg makes an elegant varlatton of this point. 
She writes that "[a] person cannot think freely if he cannot speak; and he cannot think freely 
if others cannot cpeak, for it is in hcanng the rhougl~rs of others and betng able to 
communicate with them that we develop our thoughts." Judtth L~chtenberg, F<>unJ~ttrons 
L~tzd Llrntt.~ of Frtledom o j  rhe Press, ~n D ~ h i i u c ~ ~ z c v  ,\?in n t p  M ~ S S  MFnrn 108 (Judlth 
L~ehtenberg ed., 1990). 
192. See Jason Mazzone, Speech unri Recrrprucr@ A Theor)- c l f  /he Firct Amntdment, 34 
CUNN. L. REV. 305, 417-20 (2002) ( theor~~ing  that dcl~beratlon, not only IS hndamental to 
\elf-government, but 'llso promotes reciprocity as cooperatiQe bchavtor for mutual benefit 
and ultnnately enhancement of democracy). 
193. See Baker. ~ z ~ p r u  note 190, dt 220-21; see ulio K~chard ti. Fallon. Jr , Ttvu  sense^ 
oj..tutonomv, 46 STSXN, L. K ~ v .  575,902-05 ( 1994) (providing contlncing arguments for the 
conceptuali~ation of autonomy as a First Amendment ~a lue ) ;  David A. Strauss, Persuusion, 
iirtonorny, trnd I.i-ce~lom oj E.vprev.clon, 91 COLC'M. L. RFV 334 ( 199 i ). 
194. I M M  \NLrFL K ~ h r ,  .In .it?$wer to the @reition 'kG:htzt 1s Enl~~yhtenment~ ', in 
K A ~ T ' s  P o ~ n  ICAL WRI T I ~ C , S  55 ( I  lans Re~ss d., li.B Ntcbet trans., I97 I). 
the quality of the few best."'" Modem theorists, most notably Jiirgen 
Habemas, posit that deliberative democracy can transhrm citizens whose 
political views start as t~ncieveloped, inconsistent, and confbsed, into ~~~~~e 
enlightened and informed participants in the public sphere.'"6 
Viewed through the lenses of these four general theories of democratic 
governance---and especially the aspiration of deliberative democracy and 
its related free speech ideals----the Internet reveals a mixed record of 
effectiveness as a dernocracy- and speech-enhancing instrument. Contrary 
to the utopran declarations of the early cyberlibertarians, the Intenlet has 
evolved into a communications substrate that promotes democratic and free 
speech ideals but also undermines them in very significant and troubling 
ways. 
I .  Online Cit ize~ ilctivi,srrt 
a, The Democrcrtizution of'lnfbrmation unJ the Demlse (4 
Civaidivecfionul Mi~noctalture 
In contrast to unidirectional, homogenizing, and overly comrnercialized 
broadcasting tncdia, the lntemet makes available countless opportunities 
for citizens to speak, relate, and gather political, cultural, and social 
information from a ~nultiplicity of sources. The blogosphere, which started 
as a collection of "web logs" (or diary websites, has evolved into a source of 
citizen journalism, political information and cornmentaw, and creative 
expression of all ~ o r t s . ' " ~  it has served as a powerful check on 
governments and elected representatives, both by exposing government 
abuses ignored or underreported by mainstream media and by providing 
citizens of speech-repressing regimes a vehicle for dissenting, information 
sharing, and organizing. li)' 
195 ARISTOrLF, rHF- P<)LITIC S OF ARISTOT LE 123 (Ernest Barkcr trans , Oxford Unrv 
Press 1962). 
196 r d l l  Vendelberg, The Drllhntrtrte C~tizen Theorv und Evziien~e, lri POLI I I C  .\L 
D E L ~ S I O N - M ~ ~ K ~ N ( , ,  DFLIU~ RAr lON A N D  P A R I I (  1P4TION 153 (M~chael X. Dcllr carprn~ et al. 
eds., 7002) Siiinmarizing liabermas's \ision as f'ullows "4n rnformed and engaged 
citixnry enrlches the polrt~cdl proces:, In dt least two ways. It  st~mulatcs what we hope are 
better decisions by contrrbuting to the policy \tew and by holdlng pol~tician-cooks to 
dccount. More fundamentally, paflicipation legrtimates the process by whlch we teach 
dects~ons." Froomkin, clrprci note 33, at 3 -3. 
197 For an excellent ovenlew of the importance of the blogosphere in the new rncdia 
ecology, see Lrll LCVI, 1 Vew .tlodel for ,ZiieJru C i - r t r ~ ~ m  Lt.,wrn, /ro172 tlite Sch ta~o  
Coterc~ge, 6 1 U MIA\I~ L RFV 665, 690-94 (2007). 
1 %  See Leslie Davrd Stmon, f2emoc~-u~y rrnJ the ;Vet '4 Irr.tlrou\ C7/rtle', rt? 
DFILIOCRACY \%I>  Jl.-IF I X T I - R N ~ T '  I\I.LIES OR A D V ~  RSARIES'! ")Leslie David Srmon ed , 
1002) (noting that the Internet "'dramatrcaiiy ~ncreases cttizens' ability to 'wek, receive and 
impart ~nformat~on a d ideas through dny l~ledia and regardless of front~ers'"'). Burmese 
bloggers *ere the only rel~able source ot infbrmation for rnternational obscr\crs of the 
The Internet-specifically bloggers and other citizen journalists-has 
brought to light the significant failings of government officials in thisIY9 
and other2'" countries, and wrongdoings of law enforcement"' that would 
have gone unexposed and ~~nredressed in the pre-Internet media ecosystem. 
As an especially recent example, the 2008 George Polk Award for legal 
reporting was awarded for the first time to a blogger, Joshua Micah 
Marshall, in recognition of his reporting on the firing of eight United States 
Attorneys, which ultimately led to the resignation of Attorney General 
Alberto ~onzales.'" Citizen journalists on the Internet also have exposed 
the failings and oversights of the traditional media themsel~es."~ In 
addition, some broadcast and print news media have used their affiliated 
blogs to run stories that have not yet satisfied journalistic standards (i.e., 
verification or coniirrnation) or are too scandalous to carry on the air or in 
newsprint but are later substantiated.*04 
crackdown on dissidents in that country. Wayne Drash & Phil Black, Blogs Helping 
Expose ,bf~anmar Horrors, CNN.COM, Sept. 27, 2007, 
l1ttp:l/ww.cnn.comi200?/WORLD/asiapcf/O9i27/myanmar.dissidents/index.htm1. Likewise, 
Zimbabweans have turned to blogs to share stories about government atrocities that have 
been altogether ignored by government-owned broadcast media and were out of the reach of 
foreign journalists who were barred from entry. Zimbabweans Use Blogs for Info: Since the 
Silencing qf'lndependent Media, People Turning Online for New.7, MSNBCXOM, July 20, 
2008, http:/iwww.msnbc.msn.com/id/25772666/print/l/displaymode/1098i. 
199. For example, blogger Matt Drudge broke the story concerning President William J. 
Clinton's affair with intern Monica Lewinsky. An anonymous blogger brought attention to 
the sexually explicit messages exchanged by Rep. Mark Foley (R-FL) and teenage 
congressional pages. Moreover, bloggers, not the mainstream media, initially brought to 
light racist remarks made by Sen. Trent Lott (R-MS) at a birthday celebration for former 
segregationist Sen. Strom Thurmond (R-SC). See Lisa Napoli, The Post-Lewinsky Winner 
1s the Web, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1998, at C7; Anne E. Kornblut & Katharine Q. Seelye, 
Papers Knew oj'Foley E-Mail hut Did Not Publish Articles, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2006, at 
A20; Paul Janensch, Bloggers, Right and Left, Have Become Modern Vigilantes, HARTFORD 
COURANT, Feb. 17,2005, at D2. 
200. See, e.g., Loretta Chao, Gymnastics Question for the Ages. . . of the Ages, WALL 
ST. J.,  Aug. 23-24, 2008, at A12 (reporting that an ordinary American citizen searching the 
Internet from his home in Washington, DC, discovered Chinese documents online 
apparently contradicting official Chinese statements regarding the age of Chinese Olympic 
gold medalists); see also Levi, supra note 197. 
20 1. See, e.g., Jim Dwyer, When Official Truth Collides with Cheap Digital Technology, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2008, at B1. A cyclist was jailed on charges of assaulting a police 
officer with a bicycle on the basis of a sworn statement by Officer Patrick Pogan. A 
passerby's video uploaded to YouTube, however, showed very clearly that the cyclist 
swerved to avoid Officer Pogan, and the latter lunged toward the cyclist "as if he were a 
halfback running along the sidelines, and sent him flying." Id. 
202. See Noam Cohen, Blogger, Sans Pajamas, Rakes Muck and a Prize, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 25, 2008, at C l .  
203. See, e.g., Marianne M. Jennings, Where Are Our Minds and What Are We 
Thinking? Virtue Ethics for a 'Per-dious' Media, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. 
POL'Y 637, 667-71 (2005) (discussing the role of bloggers in revealing the journalistic flaws 
in CBS News' reporting of President George W. Bush's National Guard service). 
204. For example, mainstream broadcast and print journalists did not devote any airtime 
or newsprint to the story broken by tabloid National Enquirer about the infidelity of former 
The Internet and the political blogo\phere have become especially good 
sources for rn-depth analysis and discussion of political candidates and 
their campaigns, enabling voters to research the positions of the candidates 
and engage In rclated discussions (sometimes with campatgn staff members 
thc~nsehes).~"'  Mastery of the television iiiedium became an impel-ative 
for political candidates in Iiigh-profile elections frotn 1960 onward, 
following the first-ever televised debate between then-Senator John 
Kennedy (D-MA) and then-Vice President Richard Nixon. who appeared 
wan. nervous, and generally uncomfortable coiiipared to the much inore 
telegenic. ,ind ultiinately victorious. ~ennedy."'"n the 2006 congressional 
and 2008 presidential campaigns, mastery of the Internet proved pivotal in 
inany races, with online organizing and fundraising o\ertaking more 
traditional campaigning practices in efficiency and effectivene~s.'~'~ 
The cornbination o f  the Internet with the wide availability of inexpensive 
digital video recording devices I-tas subverted old-world "insider" versus 
"outsider" distinctions in political campaigning. Elected officials now ltave 
difficulty saying in pi~tatively prikate, small-audience settings what would 
be politically and soclally perilous tf said to general audiences. YouTube 
szn'itot 'rnd .i ILC-pics~cientl~tl .'indrdate John I-dwards. desp~tc  the \tory 's I i a ~ t n g  per~nc~ited 
the blogosphcre for seke~a l  days The L 1 Trme\ coiered the >tory prominently In ~ t s  blog 
cfesplte hcli lng not rnent~oned rt 'it ;ill  In rts broadsheets See licttroiitrl Frrqrrrrer IlIcyc~\ 
/ohti i i ~ i ) t ~ r ~ ~ l \  -Ifj'c11t-, Bloqo\~herc Kc~cr~llre, Strlf Shtrker-, L A T ~ w r  s Broc,. July 73. 300X. 
t i~irrl~rhl~~ ut http oplnlort ldt~rnes corn op1n1onId/?008 07 john-ednartis-af html Only after 
t f r  Fcl\ta~ds publicly ,icl\no\+ledged the ;tffatr d ~ d  the Indlnstredm ncwi operat~ons publrsh 
rnfonnatron  bout the story Toe, e y . Scott blartelle & Seema Mehta. Ed\{ tin/\ ' lffulr Pzit, 
f i lm 017 the Ti~/c.lint~\. L A T I C I L ~ ,  Aug 9. 7008, at A l ,  Rrchdrd Perez-Pefia & B ~ l l  Carter. 
Rrricet7t e of 5!c~litrncttrut?i Lledru Becoine, ci Storr Itseif. '4 Y T~\lt.$, Aug 9, 2008, at A14 
I i o ~ i a r d  Wolf\on, the communlcatlons dtrector for Scnator tfrlldry C lrnton's prei.~dentral 
i,inlp~iign. ldter 'trgued that the malnstredm media's fallurc to caber the Edwards 'lffarr story 
dllowed Fdwdrds to itay In the race longer than he should habe, splitt~ng thc l o t e  and 
tilttmately costing Cllnton the nomlnatlon Brian Ross & Jake Tapper, lVo/f\o~ Et/~turd\ '
Cober-Lp C;ist Clrnforr the \rot?~~ncrtion. ABCNl;&scow, Aug 11. 2008, 
http abcnews go corn, Blotter, Story 'rd=5553013&page=l 
105 %c Mary -Rose Papdndrea, Crtrzeii .Joznnuirrrn und the Reporter r Prr~rlegtr. 9 1 
MI\\ L RF\ 515. 523-26 12007) (assertlng that blogs drive natlctnal conielsat~on dnd 
detalllng the benefits o f  blog eommunicatlon, ~ n c l u d ~ n g  access to orrglnal resedrch and the 
opportunity to hear Jlrectly from experti), ice crlro Gracle La\+son-Borders & Rlta K ~ r k ,  
Rlog\ rw Catnpulgn Comn~rrt?rtutron. 49 4\1 B F H A ~  S C I F ~  TIST 538, 555-56 (2005) 
(descnbtng blogc, as a "partrcipdtory outlet" and c ~ t t n g  Hoi\ard Dean's Bloqjor Atnerrctr a> 
stating that .'ppcple from 'ill across the country are debdtrng. organmng, argulng, joking, 
dnd bringlng Inno1  it^\ e rdeas to our orgdni~dtlon") 
106 Tee 2~ C C  HROFIDF R, P R F S I I ) ~  \TJ ' t ~  DFIJ~ZTFS FORT\ Yt. \R$  OF J-II(,H-RP,K 
TV 3-6. 14. 99 j?UOO) On tcievrs~on. Kennedy appeared -'calm 'ind nerbele~s rn 
appcardnce" w h ~ l e  Yrxon looked "ten5e. almost frightened, at turns glolcerlng and. 
occas~onaliy, Iiaggard-looking to the point ofslckness " Id at 6 
797 See J ~ r n  L,ttidekict & ~lcxander  Burns, lVhv rhe COP F P ~ /  So Fur S;) first, 
Pol I rrc o t ctu, 'iept I, 7008. http., /www polltrco eominewsistor1es,0808~ 130 1 X l l tn~l 
(reporzing that the De~nocratlc party's dominance In Internet campaigning hai given rt a 
\rgnlficant ddiantdge In, ruter d l~a ,  fundra~slng and gettlng out the \ate) 
videos of Senator George '4llen's "Macaca" moment and of Oklahorna 
State Representative Sally Kern's statemnts about gay people posing a 
bigger threat to the nation than "ternorism and Islam" by going after two- 
year-olds are vivid  illustration^.^'^ The [nternet has infiltrated 'YnSider 
only'"o1itical spaces, often exposing politicians' true colors to the scrutiny 
of the general public. 3 
As Professor Susan Crawford notes, the Intemet--and especially 'the 
new Web 2.0 social networking and personal webcasting websites such as 
blogs, MySpace, YouTube, and others-have created a "substrate for new 
forms of social re~ationshi~s."~" The Inrernet has allowed geographically 
or socially isolated people to build online communities and engage in 
meaninghl interactions online, This is especially true for racial, religious, 
sexual, and other minorities living in generally hostile communities, whose 
interests and political and cultural concerns are not adequately reflected in 
mainstream media,"' 
The Internet also has empowerred individuals to underlake significant 
social and political collective action without having to go through the high- 
overhead organizations-like political parties, labor unions, and grassroots 
activist groups-that had cornered the market in the pre-internet world?" 
208. See Tim Craig Ck ivichael D. Shear, Allen Quip Prob.nkc?s Oufr~ge, Apology, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 2006, at Al (detailing Senator Allen's slip when he referred to his 
opponent's campaign volunteer, S.R. Sidarth, as "Macaca"") S h m o n  Muchmore, Anti-Guy 
Remarks BIusfed TULSA WoRtn. Mar. 14, 2008, at A l  (discussing Representative Kern's 
>tatements), The Internet also has blurred the distinctions bemeen "on-air" and behmd-the- 
~ ~ n e s  commentary of political pundits, Far example, in September 2008, a video spread 
widely on the Internet that showed conservative pundits Peggy Noanan and Mike Murphy 
3peaking very negatively about the naming of Governor Sarah Palin as the Republican vice- 
presidential nominee moments a&er the two had spoken in positive terms about the 
nomination during a five televised interview, See Jim Rutenberg, Old Fr-ien& ipt the ;liledia 
See u iVew Side of McCirin, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4,2008, at A20. 
209. Crawford, suptddnote 167, at 369. 
210. For example, the Internet is credited with playing a central role in the evolution of 
the gay and lesbian community, both as a central gathering place for mutual support and as a 
platl'ctm for political organizing, fee Edward Stein, Qaeers tInonymaza: Lesbiufzs, Guy 
Men, Fvtre Speech, L J I ? ~  Cyberspace, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159, 162 (2003). Ln 
addition, ~thereas atheism and religious skepticism are almost absent on mainstream media 
ctue to adtcrtrser scnsltivities and other commercial pressures, the Internet has enabled these 
~ndividuals ~ h o  adhere to these views to connect, share tnfomation, and organize political 
action. See Jeff Gardner, Face [$the New Atheism, NAT'L CA~NOLIC REG,, Aug. 10, 2008, 
at A 1, u~~uiluble at http:J!ncregister.comlsite/article/l5575 (profiling an influential, atheist 
professor and blogger whose success is credited in part to the Intenet). Communities wrth 
rnultiple minonty statuses--for example African-Americans who are &at"--also have 
turned to the web to bridge physical distances by building online communities. See 
Natronal Black Deaf Advocates, http://www.nbda.org (employing the Internet as a roo1 to 
Lmlte, and advocate for, deaf At'nean-Americans). 
2 1 1 .  See CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES EVERYBODY: THE POWER OF ORGANIZING WITHOUT 
O R ~ ~ ~ h l ~ ~ r f O l u r r  (2008) (addressmg the various ways in which "social tools" allow people to 
do thlngs together without requiring traditional organizational stmctures); JOHN HENRY 
Cr IPP~NC~ER,  A C OWD OF ONE: THE FUTURE OF INDIVIDUAL ~DENTITY (2007) (discussing the 
2009] TOM' LRD .4 B R ~ A D B A  Y D PUBLIC Z,VTEREST SE-~,VDARIJ 33 
Much charitable giving, in fact, has migrated online, saving charities 
millions in fundraising and overhead costs.'" 
The facility with which many citizens now can access political 
information online and communicate with one another and their elected 
officials promotes important aspects of representative and liberal 
democracy. There is concern,' however, that the Internet has exacerbated 
direct democratic strains in ways that work against the values of 
representative and deliberative democracy. 
Alexander Hamilton wrote in The Federalist that, although republican, 
representative government demands that elected officials remain 
accountable to their constituents, accountability "does not require an 
unqualified complaisance to every sudden breeze of passion, or to every 
transient impulse.5'2'3 The benefits that come with the Internet's 
elimination of distance, time, and cost as barriers h r  communication 
between elected officials and their constituents, therefore, tnay be 
outweighed by the distorting effects this accelerated and magnified 
constituent communication may have on the business of govemment-a 
distortion aggravated by the demographic disparities between online and 
offline ~ommunities."~ 
Although it is true that the Internet can serve as a check on govemment, 
it is also true that the Internet may replace the tyranny of unaccountable 
govemrnent with the tyranny of an irrational but vocal public. In the worcis 
of political scientist Arthur Isak Applbaum, 
'The claim that the greater participation of all entails the greater freedom of 
*11l suffers from a fallacy of composition . . . . [I]t does not follow that rf the 
government were more responsive to the will of the majority we woitld all be 
more free, because we can-and detyrannize one another.'I5 
onglns of rdenttty 'ind the~r  tnfluence on today's highly interconnected world of zocial 
network~ng and virtual reality) 
3 12. Artanna 1 Iuffington, C'hurrtv Muv Begin at Iioine, hut It's lfovrng Onlme, 
111kf . IN( rTON P o ~ T .  July 25, 2008, littp:l/wwwhuffingtonpostcrtm/ar~anna- 
l1uiiington/char1ty-may-begin-&-home-b-l150X2 html (notrng that "the Internet is 
tiefin~tely cnerglztng ph~lanthropy dnd changlng the way that we glve" wtth onl~ne 
donat~ons nsrng from $250 mrif~on In 2000 to $7 b~lllon rn 2006). 
713 T H F  FFDFRALIST NO. 71 (Alexander Hamilton), m THF F F D F R A L I ~ T  ~ H F  !-AM~[,c 
P,\lll R', OU IF IF  PRINCIPI ES OF A ~ I F R I C  A N  GOVFKMMFN~ 359 (Benjatnln Flctcher Wnght ed . 
3004) 
13 13 Prctfessor C'ilss Sunstein warns of the "~zrtous risk that costless crtmmunrcat1on will 
itlcrease govcrntnent's respons~veness to short-term or poorly considered publlc outcries, or 
to \ensational~stic anecdotes that are a poor bass  for governance" C ~ S S  I i  ~C".ICTI Y, 
[)FV(X KAC Y \\I1 TIIF P R O B L ~ M  OF FKFE SPFFCH 258 ( 1  995). 
115 Arthur lsak Appibatim, Frrrlzrre m tile C1Chrr~~;~rkr/~~ltr(e of k l r ( i~ .  IM  
( I O L F R U \ ~ C ~  COU. D F " V I ~ ~ R ~ C Y  I N  TFIE INEORILIRTION A ~ F  23 (Flame C~ulla Kdmarck & 
The framers, Madison as well as Hamilton, valued distance and delay in 
communication separating Congress and its constituents as important 
checks on the passions and power of the populace, and as safeguards for 
the time, space, and peace required for elected officials in Washington to 
do the work of government with quiet diligence."' Applbaum posits that 
"precisely those aspects of interactive communication that thrill the direct 
democrats make the identification and organization of factious majorities 
more likely."2" 
I agree that by cheapening, accelerating, and amplifying the speech of 
Internet-enabled and politically engaged constituents, the Internet can 
disrupt and corrupt the federal government's important deliberative work 
by presenting a distorted version of popular preferences. But this analysis 
is incomplete insofar as it fails to account for the extent to which the ties 
between members of Congress and their constituents have grown 
attenuated and weak as the republic's population has increased with no 
commensurate change in the size of Congress. Although Congress needs 
insulation from the heat of popular passions, too much insulation breeds an 
insularity at odds with the duty of Congress to remain accountable and 
accessible to the citizens that elected it. The framers recognized the 
importance of constituent consultation and communication in the work of 
~ o n g r e s s . ~ ~ '  The Internet, in fact, may have succeeded at restoring some of 
the necessary links between Congress members and constituents that time 
and population growth have eroded. 
The Constitution requires that each state send at least one representative 
to the House of Representatives and that "[tlhe Number of Representatives 
shall not exceed one for every thirty t h ~ u s a n d , " ~ ' ~  but it provides no cap on 
the total membership of the House. Both by means of the Constitution's 
wording and statements in The Federulist, the framers made clear their 
intention that the number of representatives was to increase periodically in 
proportion to the growth in population.'" Congress did, in fact, increase 
Joseph S. Nye, Jr. eds., 2002); see also id at 26 ("[Mlen are not angels, one cannot judge 
one's own cause without bias, passions and interests give rise to faction, and factions are 
prone to tyrannize."). 
2 16. id. at 26-28. 
217. Id. at27. 
218. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 56 (James Madison), in THE FEDERALIST W ~ T H  
LETTERS OF "BRUTUS" 274 (Terrence Ball ed., 2003) (noting the "sound and important 
principle that the representative ought to be acquainted with the interests and circumstances 
of his constituents"). 
119. U.S. CONST. art. 1, $ 2. 
220. See Christopher St. John Yates, A House of' Our O~z~tz or a hzrse  We've Outg-rown? 
An Argument ,for inct-easing the Size of' the Hozise of' Representatives. 25 COLUM. J. L. & 
Soc. PROBS. 157, 175-79 (1992) (citing numerous statements at the Constitutional 
Convention and in The Federalist reflecting the intent that the House of Representatives' 
size grow with population). In The Fec/eraiist I%. 58 ("The Future Size of the tiouse"), 
the s i ~ e  of the House of Representatives occasionally, based on populat~on 
increases, until 19 10. There were 55 representatives for 3.9 million 
,Americans in the first Congress (a 1 -to-60,000 ratio)..'" Tlie ratio was 1 to 
every 39,000 ci t i~ens in 1 X 10, 100,000 citizens in 1860. and 3 1 1,000 
citizens in 1910.~" Then, in 1929, Congress froze the size of the H o ~ ~ s c  of 
Representatives at 435 members."' With an estimated U .S. population of 
303,824,630,"' today's representational ratio for the '.People's House" is 
one congressmember for every 698,447 Americans--a ratio 1 .1  h4"h higher 
than at the inception of the republic, and one described ;is "cratnped" 
coinpared to those of the n l ~ ~ c h  larger European national as~ernblies .~ '~ 
It reasonably can be argued. therefore, that the Internet's fiicility in 
cluickly and cheaply connecting citizens with their representati\es in 
Washington has had the positive effect of reversing the significant 
alienation of Americans from their servants ill the "People's House." An  
early exarnple of this rapid ~nobilization of popular opposition to the 
actions of Congress was the quick formation of the now 3.2 million- 
member website MoveOn.org to organize online opposition to the 
i~npeachmelit proceedings against Presicfent Ril l   linto on.^" h lo~cOn's  
online organizing was credited not only with helping put an end to 
congressional efforts to oust the President that were widely c r i t i c~~ed  its 
wasteful and excessively partisan, but also with shifting control of 
Congress from Republican to Democratic hands in 2006."' 
I ~ m e s  Mdci15on ouplatncd thnt one ot the purpose\ ot tlic 11ecenn1,tl ( cn\ti\ \.\ .~t\ to ,tugnicnt 
ihc nutnbei- of rcprescntatl\c\ ~tnder the \ole Itm~tdtton that tile L\I I IOIC ~ i~ t~ t ibc"~  \hlill  tot 
exceed one tor every tlltrty tIiou\'tnd 1n1idbit;lnts " Tic t  kr i,r ii \I i i i  \io 5 0  c l,tme\ 
Cl,~d~son), tn TIIF k t . I ) F R r l l  I\T WITH Lt T i  f R5 ot "BRI r1 5," 51i f11 t i  iiote 2 18. ,it 283 
21 1 George t W111, (;)ngr.cr \ ./ritt ltr? r B I ~  E I ? o I I ~ / ? ,  W \ili Po4 I ,  l c t l i  14, 200  I .  'it I37 
321 / ( I .  \CC (I / \o  .I,imes K Glassman, 1.~~1 '\ Britlil ( I  Brgqc'r. 1'Iori\~,, Mf t i t i  Poi 1 .  JLIITC 
1 7. 1990. Jt L12 
213 Y'ite5, \ri,~~r.cr note 220, ,tt 180 
224 Ct h i t R 4 L  ~\.;TFLLI(JFN( t. A ( J ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  Ttlt wO1<1 1) f I< I 150i)k. 
http\ N N ~  c1a gov'ltbrary pitbltcatton\/tl~c-\totId-f,tctbook/geo\ 11s iitml ( luly 100k 
cstrmdtc) 
135 See Matthe\\ C'o\\olotto, I.ig/?t for- ' 1  Brggrr tioritr. I 1  \ i i I r o l< r )  (or I< \ W I .  Oct 7, 
1001. at C4 (noting that the U r ~ t ~ r h  tlouse ot C omnioii> coritdrn\ 650 mcrnbcr\ lot ,t 11~1ttoti~il 
pop~il,ttton of 60 tnillton (,I 1 01,000  att to) 'tnd the t rcncli N,itton,tl ~4~\c11ihly cont,itn\ 57' 
mcn~hcr\ tcprcsentlng 'i natlon of 50 ~ntlllon (a I 102.000 r'ttto)) 
21 h SL'C Xboitt the iL1o~ c o n  f cimtly o I ( ) I ~ C I ~ I I / ' I ~ I O I I ~ .  
littp , unu rncneon osg/about 11tml (I'tct \ ~ s ~ t e d  Oct 20. 20OX) (clc\cnbtng tile 
urganizatton's purpose dnd h~\tory), 5c.c (1150 t3rendan r flollowny, McCotincll \ t c d c ~ ~ l  
L-lectron ('otnnits\~on Tllc~ Sir/)r.i~nrc~ ('olrr-t R c ~ t  r rtec r/w Book 0 1 1  ( z'r~~~/~crig~7 / . / t i r r r ~ r  c, I I / $ (  
If'rll Poiltlccil S/)ec~cl? Slrr-vite Phr) iClott Rer etit O r i t l r r i ~ l ~ ~ ' ,  13 C o k i h i L  \LL C ()\.\I>) i I I i 
107, 137-33 (2004) (descnbtng Mo\c(l)notg'i portr~y~il  o f  1tic1t '15 '1 gr~s\ictot\ 
otgantiratton). Scott Duke f l,irr~c. ?lie Rridicol C'ent~rcrr, L iZ 7 I \ I ~  4 bl40 , I cb 29. 2004 <it 
1-22. 1 t i e  r ~ t  littp I/'II tlcIe\ l~tttrnes corn, 3004, feb/2O~rn,tgci~tne tm-inox con00 
(ilescnbing MovcOn's rt\e fiom an onl~ne petltlon to an infltlcrtt~Jl \~cb\ i te  u ~ t h  iilill~o~i\ of 
1nernbcr5) 
217 S<)c Jet'f' Lclcny. 1)eriioc ~.ott Di ye Their. I./rr\i? C'trncltriirtct ro 7/1ct/ (. r l l ~ j  I b  ~~~ilrir .  
But there 1s valid cause for concern. The Internet has tncreased the 
acco~tntability of elected officials by, inter alia, making more political 
information available to constituents back home and empotvering those 
citizens, individually and in virtual groups, to pressure elected officials to 
take certain actions. As discussed below, however, the colnposition of the 
online constituency does not come close to retlecting that of the true 
electorate, given the persistent and significant disparities in Internet, and 
especially broadband, access. Direct democratic communication online, 
therefore, may distort true constit~ient interests and preferences, leading to 
governn~ent responses that favor the preferences of citizens who are online 
and, therefore, are heard the loudest (or at all). 
3. E Pluribus Pluribus-Whither Ileliher~rtive Democ-izriy Onlincr? 
Whereas direct democracy is disfavored, the ideal of deliberative 
detnocracy has proved elusive. Although theorists have proposed varying 
def<nitions, modern deliberative democrats generally seek at least five 
qualities in successful citizen deliberation: ( I )  openness of deliberation to 
a11 citizens; (2) equality among participants, including the universal ability 
to raise questions and engage in debate; (3) rationality in discussion; ( 3 )  the 
enforcement of reasonable ground rules to ensure prodiictive discussion; 
and ( 5 )  transparellcy and openness in the disciissions and any 
conclusions.""wiuated against these criteria, the cilrrent state of the 
lnternct cannot be said to be conducive to genuine democratic deliberation. 
The fundamental obstacle to inclusive and fully representative 
deliberative democracy online is that the United States remains a country 
divided between those with access to broadband Internet service and those 
wlthoi~t. The federal government's generally Ilands-off, tnarketplace- 
reliant approach to the proliferation of household-level broadband access 
has led to the nation's precipitous decline in broadband Internet penetration 
as cornpared to the rest of the tndustr~alized world. The Organisation for 
Econotnic Co-operation and Development (OECD) piibiishes the most 
U Y T r u t \ .  Oct 2-1, 2006, ,lt A23 (descrtbrng blove0n org'i pe~ion~ilized e-inail me5sage 
n~oh l l~z~ i t~on  L'1:lt paig.n to get member\ of Cot~grt.\\ with ,it least Y20C),OOO in  their c'unpaign 
account ,ind no ~ctinp"t'ti\uchallenge In tile tlpcorning 3006 election to donate 301%t to other 
Ucrnocrat~c cdncliddte5) 
138 S'r SI~dne. \ z q ~ r t r  note 174, at 7 1 (providing 'in e~ce l l e i~ t  discus\ion of the general 
rcquttcmcnti oi de l~ber~~t tve  democracy) I'rokssor Ucth Strnone Noleek propom that 
tielrber'it~on ihould be ,~ccessible, free from ccniorshlp, autonornotti, ielekant, tranqarent, 
~etlccting equal~ty ,~nd re~poil~l\cnc\s,  plt~rali\tic, incluii\e, it~frt~rncd. public, and 
I,~c~lltated hoveck, ktipru note 185, :tt 12-1 X 
authoritative comparison of Internet broadband penetration among the 
thirty rnost industrialized nations. In its rnost recent survey, the United 
States had fallen to 15th place out of the 30 most developed nations for 
broadband penetration, with 23.3 broadband subscribers per 100 
 inhabitant^,^'^ down from 12th place in 2006 and 4th place in the first of 
such OECD surveys in 2001. '~~ The OECD also reported that the United 
States placed 14th internationally in average download speed for broadband 
connections, while having the 8th highest average subscription price for 
broadband service.'" Other respected broadband rankings place the United 
States even lower."' 
In July 2008, the Pew Internet & American Life Project reported that 
55% of American adults have broadband access at home, up from 47% in 
2007.~~'  Although this was a promising increase in overall broadband 
penetration, Pew reported relatively flat growth in broadband adoption 
among African-Americans (4396, compared with 57% for non-Hispanic 
whites) and a reduction in the rate of broadband adoption by economically 
disadvantaged households (2596, down from 28% in 2007).~~' In addition, 
229. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION A D DEV., OEC TATISTICS: OECD 
BROADBAND PENETRATION AND GDP PER CAPITA (2007), 
l~ttp:i/www.oecd.orgistiilct~broadband (follow "OECD broadband penetration and GDP per 
captta"). In detemlning these rankmgs, the OECD defines broadband as "having download 
speeds equal to or faster than 256 kbit's." ORG. FOR ECON, CO-OPERATION A D DEV., OECD 
BROADBAND SUBSCRIBER C ITERIA, http:i/www.oecd.or@sti/ictibroadband (follow "OECD 
Broadband Criteria"). 
230, Timothy Karr, The Czrrefcrr America's Inter~~et,  HUFF~CTON POST, June 3, 2008, 
ht~:/lwww.huffingtonpost.comitimothy-kahe-cure-for-americas-1ntb104963.html. 
131. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., OECD BROADBAND STATISTICS, 
~IVERAGE ADVERTISED BROADBAND DOWNLOAD SPEED, BY COUNTRY (20071, 
http://w~.w.oecd.org/sti!1ctibroadband (follow "Average Advertised Broadband Download 
Speed, by Corntry (October 2007)") (noting an average speed of 8.860 Mbps In the United 
States, compared to 93.693 in Japan, 44.157 in France, and 43.301 m South Korea, 
respectively ranked lst, 2nd and 3rd); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., OECD 
BROADBAND STATISTICS, BROADBAND AVERAGE MONTHLY SUBSCRIPTION PRICE (2007), 
11ttp:i/www.oecd.org1dataoeci1122/44/39575002.x1s [hereinafter OECD 2007 MONTHLY 
SUBSCR~PTIONS REPORT] (noting an average subscription rate in the Untted States of $53.06, 
last measured In October 2007); see ulso Organrsation fitr Economic Co-operation and 
Development, OECD Broadband Porral, http:/lwww.oecd.or@sti/iclibroadband (last vrsited 
Feb. 15, 2009) [here~nafter OECD Portal] (list~ng other reports). 
732. For example, the Informat~on Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) 
ranked the United States fifteenth in its 2008 broadband rankings. THE LNFORMATION TECH. 
& I ~ N O V A T I O N  FOUND., 7008 BROADBAND RANKMGS, 
http:i!www.lt1f.or~~files/2008BBRank1ns.pdf. Snnrlarly, the British telecommunications 
research firm Potnt-'Toptc Ltd. placed the United States 17th among developed countries In 
broadband deployment. Peter Svensson, Is U.S. Stuck ztr Internet's Slorv Lane?, 
MSNBC.COM, Oct. 30, 2007, http:iiwww.msnbc.msn.com/id/21549824/. 
233. PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, kf0lklE BROADBAND ADOPTION 7008. ctt 1 
(1008) [heremafter PEW 2008 BROADBAND REPORT], 
http:/1www.pewlntcmet.org/pp0r/257ireport-display .asp. 
234. W at ii, 3 (classlfLing as economically disadvantaged or "poor" those households 
wlth annual incomes of $20,000 or less). 
while 60% of survey respondents living in suburban communities reported 
having household broadband access, only 38% of respondents in rural 
communities reported having such acces~ . "~  
Recent data for American Internet penetration also show persistent 
disparities across racial, ethnic, income, educational, generational, and 
geographical strata. Given generational differences in familiarity and 
comfort with computers generally, it may not be surprising that, whereas 
90% of people between the ages of 18 and 29 report using the Internet 
regularly, only 35% of people over 65 report regular use.'" More 
surprising, however, is that whereas 76% of non-Hispanic whites report 
regular Internet use, only 56% of non-Hispanic African-Americans do.'37 
A 2007 Pew Research Center comprehensive study of Internet access for 
and use by Latinoslas revealed similarly troubling disparities. Although 
Latinoslas already comprise 15% of the U.S. population and are the fastest 
235 Id at 3 Some commentators defend the American performance In the tnternattonal 
broadband penetration rankings by noting the size of the Amerlcan land mass compared to 
the more densely populated and compact nations with much more favorable broadband 
stattstics For example, FCC Chatnnan Kevtn Martin wrote, "Gtven the geographic and 
demograph~c diverstty of our natton, the U S IS dotng excepttonally well Comparing some 
ot the leadtng countries with areas of the U S that have comparable population denstty, we 
see stmilar penetratton rates." Kevin Martin, Op-Ed, Whv Every Amerrcczn Shoirld Have 
Broczdh~znd Accec~, F I N  TIMES (Asia Ed ), Apr 2, 2006, 
http //www ft comlcmslsi2i837637ee-c269- 1 1 da-ac03-0000779e2340 html In reality, 
however, Sweden and Canada have less populatton density than the Untted States (measured 
by ruraltty) and are stgniiicantly higher in the ranktngs than the United States See Mark 
Lloyd, The Broudh~zrrd L>l~rt/e Rural Acters Lugs Far Behind C'ltzel, CFNTFR FOR AM 
PR~(,RFSS, Oct 23. 2007, at 2 (arguing that "the blg difference" IS that both Canada dnd 
Sweden "have nattonal polrcies dtmed at promottng broadband deployment. wtth a 
parttcular emphasis on servtce to rural areas") Five of the fourteen nations ranked htgher 
thdn the Untted States in the OECD rankings-including stxth-ranked, Iceland-have 
population cfenstttes lower than that of the United States. See Testlmonv of Benl~lmln Scott 
on Bel?trlj of Conrumer F~t ferat~on f America, Free Press and the Conczrmeri Union Before 
the S Ci,nlrn on Commerce, Sclenc e and Trun\portat~on Regurdlng Commzinrcut~onr , 
RI o~rd/?md irnd Cotnpetiti~smerr How Does the O S Meurure C@> (Apr 24. 2007). at 12, 
criluhle ut http //www freepress net/filesi42407bssentesttmony pdf [hereinafter Scott 
C'onyrecsional Te$tzmonv] (cittng December 2006 OECD penetration versus population 
denstty cornpartsons) Nevertheless, the FCC continues to argue, most recently in a June 
3008 teport. that "tn maktng tntemattonal compar~sons, tt 1s tmportant to account for 
d~tferences 111 geography and population dtstnbutton, given the economtcs of density tn 
supplytng broadband" Inquiry Concernrng the Deployment of .4dvanced 
~elecommun~cattons Capabrlity to All Amerlcans in a Reasonable and T~mely Fashton. <lnd 
Posstble Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Sectton 706 of the 
~elecommuntcdtions Act of 1996,23 F C C R. 9615,9647 (2008) 
236 See PEW INTERNET & AM LIFE PROJECT, DEMOGRAPHICS OF I ~ ~ F R Y E T  U ~ F R S  
(2008) [hereindfter PEW 2008 INTERNET DEMO<IR~ZPHICS RFPORT], 
http I ~ W W W  pewtnternet orgltrendsiuser-Demo-7 22 08 htm The survey ot 2.25 1 adults 
ib+tth d margin of error of +i-2%) was based on the followtng questions "Do you uce the 
internet, dt least occas~onally '" clnd "Do you send or receive e-mall, at least occasion ally'^" 
Id 
937 Id 
growing minority only 56% use the Internet regularly and only 
29% have broadband Internet access at home.239 Language and educational 
attainment are two of the causes cited for the significant disparity in 
Latino/a Internet use.240 Educational attainment generally, across all races 
and ethnicities, correlates with levels of Internet access and use. Whereas 
93% of college-educated Americans are regular Internet users, only 38% of 
those who lack a high school diploma claim regular use.241 And whereas 
57% of Americans residing in urban areas report subscribing to broadband 
at home, only 38% of rural Americans do.242 
i. Availability 
The govement  estimates that approximately 10% of American 
households cannot subscribe to terrestrial broadband service if they desired 
to do so because no carrier provides the service in their area.243 But the 
L FCC's statistics purporting to show that 90% of the countv has access to 
true broadband service have been resoundingly criticized as inaccurate. 
Until June 2008 the agency required broadband service providers to report 
broadband service based only on zip codes, without distinguishing between 
commercial and residential users.244 This overly broad-stroked data 
collection resulted in the govement7s classification of entire zip code 
areas, which in rural territories can encompass many square miles, as being 
served by broadband when in reality only one commercial customer on the 
238. See Sam Roberts, A Generation Away, Minorities Mb;v Become the Majority in 
U s ,  N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2008, at A1 (noting that by 2050, Latinosfas will account for 
30% of the American population, tripling in number to 133 million). 
239. See PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, LATINOS ONLINE i-ii (2007), 
www.pewinternet.orgipdfs/Latinos~Online~March~14~2007.pdt 
240. The Pew study found that among Latinodas who only speak Spanish, only one in 
three use the Internet. Id. at iii. Moreover, because 41% of Latinoshis do not have high 
school diplomas (compared to 10% of non-Hispanic whites and 20% of non-Hispanic 
African-Americans), Pew reasons that their average tower educational attainment 
contributes to the Internet use and access disparity. Id. at i-ii. 
241. PEW 2008 INTERNET DEMOGRAPHICS REPORT, supra note 236. Of the cohort who 
have a high school diploma but lack a college degree, 66% are regular Internet users, and 
87% who have some college education but lack a degree are regular users. Id. In terms of 
broadband access among these cohorts, 70% of Americans with a college degree have 
broadband access at home, whereas only 21% of Americans without a high school diploma 
and 34% of Americans with a high school diploma but no college degree have such home 
broadband access. PEW 2008 BROADBAND REPORT, supra note 233, at 3. 
242. PEW 2008 BROADBAND REPORT, supra note 233, at 3. 
243. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-426, BROADBAND EPLOYMENT IS 
EXTENSIVE THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES, BUT IT IS DIFFICULT TO ASSESS THE EXTENT 
OF DEPLOYMENT GAPS IN RURAL AREAS 18 (2006) [hereinafter GAO 2006 BROADBAND 
REPORT]. 
244. Id. at 14-16; see also infra note 498 and accompanying text (describing the FCC's 
June 2008 decision to improve broadband data collection practices following widespread 
and longstanding criticism). 
edge of the territory sitbscnbed to broadbanc3."' Moreover, the t-'C7C"s 
definrtion of broadband had encornpassed any internet sertice with 
download speeds of above 200 Kbps (I<ilobits per second)- a speed that is 
not 11iuch higher than dial-up and drastically below the cpeed reclu~ruci fix 
delivering inany of broadband's innovative serv~ces.'"' This has caused 
some commentators to dismiss the U.S. government's broadBand 
pmctfiition figures as inflated and  inr reliable.'" 7relecommilnicafions 
industry analyst Mark Lloyd noted that "the truth of the matter is that over 
1 0  years after the 1996 Telecom Act we don't really know where advanced 
telecommunications services arc deployed in Arnerica.""js 
i i .  Co.st 
I n  addition to racial, ethnic, and geographic clisparities, the relatcci 
differences in hoitsehold income account for the persistence of the digital 
divide. Arnong hor~seholds with annual i~icornes above $75,000, (115% 
report being regular Internet risers,'"' and 8290 have Iiottseholcl broadband 
2 i O  
access. But ainong liouseholds with annual incotnes below 530,000, 
only 53% report irsrng the Internet at and a mere 42'% have household 
brotidband servi~e. '~ '  This income-based access disparity 1s largely 
explained by the fact that liottsehold broadband access retnatns expens i~c  
T i ]  throughout most of the United States." Amer~cans, 111 k t .  pay 
345 .(;c.r ( iAO 1006 13R0 i l j l 3  $ \ I )  K F I % ) I I I ,  \riprtr note 243. at I J I he ( i 4 0  noted that 
'[cjoriipdntes report \crvice In 'I r ip  cocie even rf they o t~ ly  sei>e brrsrncs\cs " It/ ,tt 16 Lt 
fotlnci "that rn some r ip cocies more tlia~i one of' the 1,trgc est,xbl~shcti cable cornp,inie\ 
tcported servrce. f3ccause \uch provrciets rdrely have over1;tpprng service terrttorles, thic 
l~he ly  tndrcatcs th'it their deployment was not / t p - c o d e - ~ ~ d e  riiid tli'it the number of 
~xov1~1a-s  reported In the rrp code overstates the Ie\~el of competltron to ~ncitvldtlal 
iiou\cholds " lit' 
340 For example, dnythlng less than 10 Mbps (50 the spced of  thc I I C"s 
thrc\hold) w o ~ ~ l d  be rnadecluate to c~ccominociate fi~gh-clualrty \ rclco, real-time intcr,icttvity. 
, ~ n d  rrlany telemedic~ne appl~c,itictns SL'IJ (irrlnt iirois. i't~lrfot~titl Nro~t~lht~n~I /?~y)ot f O / / C J ~  \ 
Iht1c.i /or Other Sttrlcs, I W o i t i  I), J,ln I ,  2008, 
hrtp wwm pcworld com!pr~nt;lble~art~cle/ici. I4 I5361pr1ntabie lit~nl 
237 Sct~, cJ , Mark L-loyd, lilrrsc rlir BLW o t r  RI-orriif~trtttt, C'I \i I I I< r I )I< Abr I'I<I t o ~ t  \s.
lttlv IS, 3007. http \v ww ,tmerlcclnprcrgrcs\ org1ts\ues/?0O7 07 hr ct,~tfh'isid html ( I  c t e r ~  i r l ~  
io the I C C ', 300 Kbps bcnchtiid~ k d\ .'slowhand") 
248 L Ioyct, ,r~l)r.t~ note 235 
740 13t iv 700% i f  R \ F  r l ) b % $ o ( , ~ +  \ IWIC  \ I t r  1 ~ ) i < 1 ,  suptc~ note 230 
350 1'1 1C 2008 UKO, \ I )~%$\ I )  K t  I'OR I .  $t~/>rir note 233, '11 3 
25 1 i+ 3008 1% I  I  R \ i  I  1)f %lI)(,il \ l%i i (  \ l>l>l<l.  $ t ~ / ) t - ( i  11otC 336 
251 1" tu 2008 1 3 ~ 0  Z I ) L ~  $ \ I )  IZt iJorti. ,liprtr note 333, at 3 
1 5  1 I lie Ot:('I) October 3007 \tat~strcs tor  Ll\cr,tgo monthly bro,ltlb~tnd \ubscr~ption 
17riccs P I ~ I C C  tile IJnltcd 5t'ltcs 'tmong the most expensltc n~einbcr  n,rtrons, w ~ t h  ,I rnonthlh 
,[kcrage \uhicrtptlon prlcc o f  '553 06, ~ 0 1 1 1 p ~ ~ r e ~ i  to ( i e i n ~ ~ ~ n y  ,jt $3') 63 ( t 'Y i ) ) .  tile I~nr tcd  
K~rrgclotn , ~ t  C i O  (77 ([JSi)). Sor~tli Kotea \37 X I  (11511). Iutkey ,it $77 01 ( I l S l l ) ,  ,ln~i 
Pol'lnci ,it S i c )  04 (CJSl)) 0 t . C  I) 2007 M o \ i  !if \i SI i~  KIP^ lo\', Rt i'o~i I ,  $tipt.tr note 73 I ,  
\c>c trlso Alien Ci f ldinrnctnd. /lit. I)cgr/ci/ 1111 IC/C 1 / 7  ilrt' L c ~ t t  lfil/etrt?~ion. 30 ( \ i < l ) t f i o  IR I5 
s~gn~t'icantly higher monthly subscription rates for broadband Internet 
service that is not as widely available as and significantly slower than 
broadband services available in many other developed nations. For 
example, compared to the average U.S. broadband monthly subscriptron 
rate of $53.06 for an average download speed of 8.9 Mbps (megabits per 
second), Japan has an average broadband subscription rate of $41.05 
(USD) for broadband service at average download speeds of 93.7 
~b~s '"-over ten tlmes faster (and more capacious) than the average 
broadband service in the United States. In other words, a video of a two- 
hour legislative hearing that in Japan could take three minutes to download 
could take well in excess of one hour to download in many American 
broadband homes. 
What is of even more concern is that the relative standing of the United 
States in the OECD surveys is trending downward. As the OECD 
penetration and subscription figures show, the United States continues to 
h l l  behind the rest of the developed world in broadband penetration, 
pricing, and quality of service. And the FCC's own data show that 
broadband adoption in the United States has been slowing since 2004."~ 
iii. GYhy 1s Broudbund Itnportnnt? 
The focus of this Article is on hroucibund instead of Internet access in 
the broader sense because the most vibrant democratic engagement online 
is not as present in the e-mail and plain-text narrowband realm as much as 
it is in broadband. In fact, in a 2008 study, the Pew Internet and American 
Life Project revealed remarkable differences in the online experiences 
between dial-up and broadband users, with "broadband'2efined as access 
delivered by cable modem, DSL, or sirnilar high-speed connection."" 
Broadband users engage in significantly more activities involving 
interactive expression, political engagement, and political inhmation 
gathering. 
For example, on a "typical day," household broadband users were almost 
three times as likely to use their connection to search for infomation about 
the 3008 election and four times as likely to visit a state or local 
government website, to watch a video on a video-sharing website like 
& EI, r L J. 135 (1002) (examtnlng Income d~sparltles as a prrnc~pal cause of the dlg~tal 
cJ1t1cie). 
254 See OECD 2007 M ~ N T F ~ L Y  SIIBSCRIPTIONS KFPOR?, rltpru note 23 1, OECD Portal, 
trlpr[l note 231 In France, the aterage monthly broadband subscrlpt~on pnce 1s $44 77 
(USD) for servtce that averages dn acivertlsed download speed of 44.2 Mbps. Id 
155 FFD. CC)MMC'NC, OMM'N, IhDt  S. ANALYSIS & ~ F C H .  DIV , WIRFLINF COMP~TITION 
UI,RFAL, HI(,H-SPFFI) SFRVIC FS FOR ~ N T F K I ' U F ~  A C C L ~ S :  T/\TLS AS 01. JLINF 30, 2006, dt 1-3 
('OU?), C I ~  trlluhltr (it http:, Itjallfocs fcc gov~edocs publtc/attacl1maecl~1D<>C-270 128A 1 pdf 
256 PEW 2008 B ~ u ~ o n z h i ~  RFPOKI-, 511pr.u note 233. at 5, 19 
<? I D ~ I ~ ~ I . \ T R  rni r: L 111 RI 1 ii i t  jhl 1 
2 > 7  Y'o~iTi~be. or to cio~1i1o;ici ;i pocicast. E3ro;tdbaiid iiscrs itlcrc like titnci, .i\ 
likely to v~ \ i t  a blog, rnore than twlce as l~kely to use a cocial nctwctrkrlig 
tvebsite like MqSpace or Facebook, and twice as likely ro crczttc ctr work i ~ i  
their own blog."" 
In adctition, hoinc broaciband users are sign~i'icantly Inore 11Acly thai~ 
dial-up users to access 11ews tvebsites. look h r  ~nfomlatlan rclated to n 
peri,onal hobby or interest, do cniployme~~t-rel~itcct rc\earcll, iise Wikrpedia, 
or pcnise tile bloposphere.'"' They also are slgnrticantly more 11kcly LO 
create and post c~riginal cotitent to the internet, incluci~ng blog 2nd 
discussion posts and graphleal content."'" Few w o ~ ~ l d  questron, In fact, that 
the increase In kouachold broadband conncct~t ity has tint en ~nuch of the 
rise of amatcur, co l labora t~~c  creativity aiid ~nnovation - !?om Wikipcciia 
arici Y o ~ i f ~ t b e  to the creation of new open-access software models."" 
Today's online pop~tlat~on-especidly in the highly cxpressrbc fora 
accessible p-i~nanly via broadband -is much ~vealthicr, more h~giily 
rducatccf, younger, niore suburbtin, and significantly less r:icially and 
ethnically diverse than the general populat~oti. I t  cannot be s a d ,  therefitre. 
that today's Internet is conduci~e  to open and ~ i i c l u s ~ ~ e  ~ i c l ~ b c r a t i ~ e  
cfe~nocrat~c dlscusi,~on. Online politicdl :11id otlxr fOra CH-C open only to 
 how uho  c~tn afford to s ~ ~ b s c r ~ b e  and. lf so, hate broadbancl \cr\lcc 
available in their comm~~~i i l ies .  Bccaiise so many r4mcricans arc left 
offline, there is no opeillless and ecluality of Ltccess. aiid thcretbrc I IO  trirc 
cleliberative democracy, In the broadba~icl public hphere.'"' 
257 /ci 'it 19 
LSX LC/ 
259 I In 1007, Pew coneltided that "a Ii~gh-ipced. .dl~va\i\ on'  connectlor! ~ l cd l l \  
'1110~s users to engage frequently In a wrder range ot  onl~ne  dcttt Itlei, tli'ln (11,11-i1p iiwl. " 
PFW fYT1 R \ F T  61. A z . ~  L ~ F F  P i ~ o ~ i  C T, f i041E BRO\IT)R\\I) ~ I ) O P T I O \  2007, 'It I 1, 
http tvivvl. pewinternet org,pdfs/PIP-Broaiiband0~~2O2007 pcif 
260 Sce Pt.w I P V T F R ~ F T  gL A'\.f Lirt. PROJFC T. T t l ~  B R O r \ l l 1 3 ~ h r )  D ~ F F F  K  i( t I I O L L  
O \ l  I l F  ~ ' L I F K I C  '\hi' H T H A \  IOR CHA\(,F', 'AlT1-f I [ l ( , t f -~ l 'F i - i )  [ U T I - K V F  T C O C C F  C I iO\i  \ I  
f iohrt- 3 (2002), http wucv pewlnteinet org/PPF r1631report drsplay dip 
261 See Yoc. H $1 BF\IWLFR, THF LvF ILTH OF  h l ? ' V I O R K \  f iO \% \Oc 111 PROIII ( TiOZ 
r f < \ Z 5 F o K h l 5  M \ R K I  T 5  2\11 f RFEIIOM 33 (1000) (t10tltlg tkldt the wlcicr ,tcceiilblili\ of 
iwrcon,~l computer\ 'ind bro,idb,~nd connectlvlt has ipii~red t l ~ c  credtlon of 1L ~kipc'ci~d .~nc i  
innovative wttware), see ubo Terry b~slicr, Profes~or St Drr . B:rkm<in C tr Tor internet 8i 
Soc'y. f larcard Untv , The I-iitute L)~glt'il Economy Drgltal Conrent C ~ c a t ~ o n .  
U~,tnbut~on <lnd Access, !)inner Speech at Meeting Organ~\ed Jointly hq the [tiillan Clln~stcr 
for Innovation dnd Technologies and the Organ~sat~on for Econom~c Co-oporallon ,incI 
r)e\clopment 2-3 (Jan. 30, 2006), http I ~ W M . ~  oecd org/dataoecd/Ih 44/3012X608 pdt 
(credltlng broddband networks cvtth the rise In amatcurlsm In tlic creatton ol a ricw iitgltal 
culture) 
2 Cetwork theorlst Albert-Lds~10 Barabasi, at the conclusion of a ueb-mapp~ng 
project, cvrote, "Tlic mo\t Intrtguing result cvds the co~nplcte db\encc of de~i iocr~~cy.  
f '~~rnc\i ,  and egal~tnrlan values on the Web"  ~ L I ~ ~ R I - L  \ ~ Z L O  B , \ R A I ~ \ ~ I .  L I \ K ~ . I ~  fiothi 
E\.FRYTH~VC, 15 CON\FCTFD TO EVFR\ITHIN(, EI  S F  i \ h D  WIIAT l r  M F  t C S  !OR BL\I \ES~.  
Sc lr-\.ic F. EL t ~ y n ~ \ \ i  LIFF 56-57 (2003) 
C. Private Censorship 
Despite the cyberlibertarians' utopian vision of the Internet as an engine 
of free speech-as well as both ~ o n g r e s s ' s ' ~ ~  and the Supreme ~ourt's""" 
own early characterizations of the Internet as a fertile substrate for 
autonomous expression-in reality the Internet is a haven for private 
censorship. News and blog websites can offer users a diverse and 
substantively rich trove of information, but as is the case with broadcasting, 
the ability of the viewer or reader to respond with his or her own 
expression is not guaranteed online.265 
In privatizing the Internet, Congress privatized control over online 
expression as well, largely removing that expression from the First 
Amendment's protective reach.l" In addition, the First Amendment 
public-fomm doctrine-through which the Supreme Court has 
accommodated speech in public spaces-would not apply to the vast 
majority of websites, since they do not constitute government spaces 
analogous to sidewalks, streets, or other public areas open to free speech.'67 
263. See, e.g., Communications Decency Act of 1996, $ 230(a)(3), 47 U.S.C. 
6 230(a)(3) (2000) (calling the Internet "a f o m  for a true diversity of political discourse"). 
264. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997) (characterizing the lntemet as a 
"vast platform from which to address and hear from a worldwide audience" and claiming 
that "[alny person or organization with a computer connected to the Internet can 'publish' 
information"). 
265. See Anick Jesdanun, Is It Censorship or Protection? In Monitoring Online Content, 
Interned Companies Are Judge and Jury, WASH. POST, July 20, 2008, at A3 (discussing the 
power of service providers to limit expression on their websites, such as the posting of 
images on a photo-sharing service). 
266. Professor Dawn C. Nunziato, one of the first scholars to examine the problem of 
Internet censorship, argues in a pathbreaking article that "[wlhat follows from such 
privatization is that today there are essentially no places on the Internet where free speech is 
constitutionally protected." Dawn C. Nunziato, The Death of the Public Fomm in 
Cyberspace, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1115, 1130 (2005). Congress codified the 
privatization of Internet content control by means of 4 230 of the 1996 Communications 
Decency Act, in which it absolved interactive computer service providers (including both 
ISPs as well as website owners) from liability both for content posted by third parties and 
for voluntary actions to remove "objectionable" material, "whether or not such material is 
constitutionally protected." Communications Decency Act of 1996, 9: 230(c)(2), 47 U.S.C. 
g 230(c)(2) (2000). 
267. See Varona, supra note 68, at 190-94 (2006) (providing an overview of the 
Supreme Court's public forum analysis). In brief, the Supreme Court has identified three 
First Amendment classifications for public property: "traditional" public fora, "designated" 
public fora, and "nonpublic" fora. The Court considers traditional public fora as being those 
government-owned spaces that "have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the 
public . . . for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens and 
discussing public questions." Hague v. C o r n .  for Indus, Org,, 307 U.S. 496, 5 15 (1939). 
In these traditional public fora, the "government may not prohibit all communicative 
activity" and must show that any content-based restriction on speech satisfies strict scrutiny 
and is necessary to serve a compelling state interest. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local 
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). "Designated" public fora are government-owned 
spaces that are not traditional public fora, but that the government intentionally has opened 
Thus, despite the popular notion that the Internet is one big public forum, in 
fact the Internet exists as a limitless aggloineration of websites and fora, 
with the vast majority owned by private, nongovernmental entities that are 
not at all subject to the anticensorship requirements imposed by the First 
~mendment."' 
i. Censorship an Social Netu,or-king and News Media Websites 
Virtually all of the most popular websites, particularly those that host a 
significant quantity of political discussion and public debate, are privately 
controlled and regularly enforce Terns of Service (ToS) provisions 
allowing for the removal of any user-posted content at the website owners' 
sole discretion. For example, the popular social networking website 
Facebook, which has played an unprecedented role as an organizing vehicle 
in the 2008 presidential election,'" warns in its Terns of Use that the 
website "may delete or remove (without notice) any Site Content or User 
Content in its sole discretion, for any reason or no reason."270 Many highly 
to some publtc expressive use (like municipal audttonuins and publrc meettng rooms). 
Once opened to the public at large, any speech resmcttons In des~gnated public fora also are 
subjected to First Amendment stnct scrutiny. ld at 45-46, Some courts have used the terms 
"designated" and "limited" interchangeably, although others have referred to hmlted public 
fora to refer to fora des~gnated for use by only a certain class of speakers or for only certaln 
types of speech. See Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F 3d 906, 9 16 ( I  0th Cir. 1997); Whiteland 
Woods, L.P. v. Twp. of W. Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177, 182 n.2 (3d Clr. 1999). Access and 
rpeech restrrcttons In nonpubltc fora, meanlng publlc property that is both not tradrtlonally 
regarded as a platform for publlc expression and not rntentlonally opened for publlc 
d~scourse, survlve revlew "so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable tn llght of the 
purpose served by the forum." Cornelius v NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 
U.S. 788,806 (1985). 
268. See Nunzrato, supra note 266, at 1 12 1 (noting that there IS currently very little free 
speech protectton on the Internet); Steven G. Gey, Reopenrng the Pziblre Forum-From 
SzdewaIks to CC~ herrpace, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1535 (1998): Stacey D. Schesser, A 'Vew Domurn 
for Puhlzc Speech Opening Pub/zc Spaces Onizne, 94 CAL. L. REV. 179 1 (2006) (discussing 
the lack of publ~c fora onbne): Noah D. Zatz, S ~ c f e w l h  zn Cyhevcpace: 1VIukrng Space for 
Publrc Forums zn the Electronzc Ennvrronment, 12 HARV. J.L. & TFCH. 149, 106-10 (1998) 
(discussrng the need for "cyberstdewalks" on the largely pnvatlzed web). 
269 See Br~an Stelter, The Fi~cebooker Who Friended Oburnu, N.Y. T IMES,  July 7, 
2008, at C 1 (discussing how the presldentlal campaign of then-Senator Barack Obama relted 
on the lnternet to "rarse more than two rntllion donattons of less than $200 each" and 
cheaply and quickly mob~llze supporters during the primaries). According to the 
I.tiu~hzngton Post, Obama sald, "One of my fundamental beliefs from my days as a 
community organtzer IS that real change comes from the bot-tom up.  . . . And there's no 
more powerful tool for grass-roots organizing than the Internet." Id.; ree u l ~ o  Jose Antonio 
Vargas, Gi-ctss Roofs Planted zi? C<vbei-space, WASH. Posr, Mar. 30, 2007, at C1 (detailing 
former Senator Edwards's enthustastic adoptlon of soclal networklng sltes as a tool for 
recrumng supporters dur~ng the prestdent~al prtmaries). 
270. Facebook.com, Terms of Use, http://www.facebook.com/terms.php (last vislted 
Sept. 22, 2008). The other top soctal networklng website, MySpace, has very slmllar ToS 
policies and has a long record of censoring user-generated corttent, ~nclt~ding delettng 
content relattng to competttor srtes, deletlng content crrt~cai of tts owner, Rupert Murdoch, 
rated television network and newspaper websites with interactive fora 
ltosting lively discussions on political, cultural, and other matters-many 
with particularly localized themes-are governed by similar ToS 
policies.'7' For example, the "Rules of Engagement" for the discussion 
fora on the CBS News website concedes that "what is not allowable is 
subjective" and requires that comments be "polite and civilw-"no 
bathroom humor, no comparing anyone to Hitler, Stalin, or Pol 
Many newspapers' websites prohibit "insult[s]." One warns specifically 
73.273 that it removes posts "calling someone a moron, idiot, etc. , another 
prohibits comments that are "hurtful," "vulgar,""74 or "in poor taste";275 yet 
another will delete comments "you wouldn't say in front of your mother at 
the dinner table."27" 
Popular websites hosting user-generated video and text, like YouTube, 
MySpace, and LiveJournal, also have engaged directly in (or have allowed 
users to commit) censorship that would violate the First Amendment if it 
occurred in a public space.277 For example, in August 2008, MySpace 
and deiettng nonsexual content concerntng homosexualrty. See Kristen Nicole, ,bloveOn 
tlpetrIIv Buttling il@Spacc Censonhzp, MASHABLE.COM, May 18, 1007, 
hnp:/!mashable.com/2007!05/ 18imoveon-myspacel. 
27 1. For example, the Los ilnge1t.s Titnes warns readers who post comments to the 
company's websrte (www.lattmes.com) that "[alny dectsions as to whether User Content 
\iolates any Posting Rule will be made by latimes.com in its sole discretion." 
LATimes.com, Terms of Servlce, http://www.latimes.com/serv~ces/site/lat- 
terms,0,6713384.htmlsiory (last vlsited Sept. 14, 2008). On the Sun Diego Union-Trzhune 
website (www stgnonsandiego.corn), the company warns posters that it "reserve[s] the r~ght 
to remove posttng pnvlleges of any user who v~olates [the Terms of Use] or jor any other 
t eastln." SignOnSanDiego.com, Terms of Use, 
http:/!www.signonsandtego.comiaboutipr~vacy/temsof use.htm1 (last visited Sept. 14,2008) 
{emphasis added). The Walt Disney Internet Group webslres, wh~ch include the Interactwe 
site for ABC News and the ABC owned-and-operated telev~sion and radro statrons, are 
governed by ToS that reserve to Disney "the nght to screen, refuse to post, remove or edrt 
L'ser-Generated Content at any time and for any or no reason m our absolute and sole 
discretion wlthout prlor notice, although we have no duty to do so or to monitor any Public 
Forum." Disney corn, Terms of Use, http://disney.go.com/corporatellegal/terms.ltml (last 
\ isrted Nov. 29,1008). 
272. Rules of Engagement, CBSNews.com, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stones/2005/ 10/20/utthty/ rnain959709,shtml (last vtstted Oct. 2 1, 
2008). 
173. BillingsCazette.net, 'Talk Back Commentmg Polrcy, 
http:,'l billingsga~ette.net~~~nfo/'?h~~cornmentpol~cy/ (last vlslted Oct. 2 1, 2008). 
174. SignOnSanDiego.com, ~ u p r u  note 27 1. 
275. LATimes.com, supra note 271. 
276. Editorial, L'nderstuncr'lng the Surge, Pool Rules-Leave a Comment Interface, 
METROWESTDAILYNEWS~COM, July 25, 2008, 
hnp:i/www.metrowesida~lynews.com/opintons/editona 109422824iEdttonal-Undemtanhng- 
the-surge (free registfahon required). 
277 See, e g , Benjamm Smith, Internet Vzdnerahle to Free Speech Isszles, POLITICO, 
May 10, 2007, at 1 ,  uvurlable ut 11ttp://www.po11t~co.com/newsistoried0507/39 19,html 
(deta~ling several Instances where YouTube removed user vrdeos that would have been 
protected if the Ftrst Amendment applred, ~ncludmg the removal of a ktdeo featurmg 
deleted pictures uploaded by parents of a fully clothed child who had 
survived bum injuries as an infant but still showed significant facial 
scarring, claim~ng that the pictures were "offensive" and a violation of the 
website's ~o~. '~"he  website threatened to delete the parents' entire 
blySpace account if they reposted the pictures, which showed the boy 
engaged in mundane activities such as eating.27Y 
2. Censorship in the Blogosphere 
Many observers tout the unique ability of bloggers to, in the words of 
David Kline, "combine information with debate," leading "to a 
strengthening of the civic ~nindedness of the citizenry" and to 
"extraordinarily high levels of political parti~ipation."'~~ For example, in 
launching his blog with Professor Gary Becker, Judge Richard Posner 
wrote that "the [Ilnternet enables the instantaneous pooling (and hence 
conection, refinement, and amplification) o f .  . . ideas and opinions, facts 
and images, reportage and s~holarshi~." '~ '  Although the collective 
hloLqospl?ere may be what Professor Cass Sunstein calls "a kind of gigantic 
presidential candidate John McCain singing "Bomb, Bomb Iran"). YOLIT 
can take down videos at their own initiative or in response to the "flagging" by users of 
content that may be a violation of the company's ToS. I c i .  In addition, anyone t~ploading a 
video to YouTtlbe can opt to delete all of the comments posted in reaction to the video that 
disagree with or otherwise have a negative reaction to its contents. YouTube Help Center, 
Video Comments: Removing Comments on MY Videos, 
http:iiwww.google.comisupport!youtube/bin/answer.py~?hlrm=en&answe~56 1 12 (last 
visited Aug. 8, 2008); see also Declan McCullagh, Mass Deletion Spurh Live.Jc-lut*nul 
Ret-vlt, CNETNEWS.COM, May 30, 2007, http:l/news.cnet.com/Mass-deletion-sparks- 
LiveJournal-revolt12 100- 1025-3-61 87619.html (reporting on the outrage following 
LiveJournal's deletion of 500 websites hosted on its service on the grounds that they 
promoted sexual abuse of minors and "other illegal activities," but encompassing many 
websites with no such content, including a website hosting Spanish-language discussions of 
the Nabokov novel Lolita and a number of science fiction websites). Barak Berkowitz, the 
chairman and chief executive of Livejournal's parent company, defended the actions: "Our 
decision here was not based on pure legal issues-it was based on what community we want 
to build and what we think is appropriate within that community and what's not." Id. 
278. Patrick Donovan, Pictur~s of' Br~rtzed Inu'inna Child Banned Jrom MySpuce, 
NBCNEWS.COM, Aug. 28, 2008, 
http:ii\vww.ksdk.cominews/world/story.aspx?storyid= 15328 1. 
279. The child's father, Billy McComb, said, "Regardless of what he looks like he's still 
a child-he's not a monster." Id. 
280. David Kline, Toward a More Participutoty Democracy, in BLOC! How THE 
NEWEST MEDIA REVOLUTION IS CHANG~NG POLITICS, BUSINESS, AND CULTURE 1, 1 1 (David 
Kline & Dan Burstein eds., 2005). 
28 1. Richard Posner, Introduction to the Becker-Posner Blog, Dec. 5, 2004, 
l1~p:i!www.becker-posner-blog.com'archives/2004i12lintroduction~to~I.html. Judge Posner 
writes that blogging is "a fresh and striking exemplification of Friedrich Wayek's thesis that 
knowledge is widely distributed among people and that the challenge to society is to create 
mechanisms for pooling that knowledge." Id. 
town meettrig,""' marly individual hloggerLs, as nongovernmental, private 
actors, can and often do censor visitor comments, thereby distorting the 
tenor and tlow of discussions. Others disallow public participation 
'iltogether. 
For example, Ariarlna Hu-ftington's tnetablog website, the Huffington 
Post, which refers to itself as "the lnternet newspaper," lias been widely 
:~ccused of censoring posts in a politically slanted manner.'" Huffington, a 
\elf-avowed liberal, revealed that among the "certain obvious things" the 
rnocterators do not allow to be posted are "conspiracy theories." "If you 
tliought Sept. 1 1 was caused by the Bush Administration, your cotnrnent is 
not going to appear unless it is a mistake."'*' Conservative blogger 
hlichelle Malkin warns commentators on her website that she "reserve[s] 
the right to delete your comments or revoke your registration for any 
reason r hat so ever."'^' In 2006, Malkin herself complained of having a 
tideo "highlighting the victims of Islamic violence" inappropriately 
r ernoved from Y O L I ~ ~ U ~ ~ . ' ~ ~  
Not only IS there ranipant censorship by individual website owners, but 
rilere are increasing reports of censorship by broadband service providers 
~llernselves. Many of these instances involve expression concerning 
~tr~portant political, legal, and social controversies. For example, in 
Sceptember 2007, Verizon Wireless refused to carry text messages sent by 
Y IKAL Pro-Choice America urging political action to its enrolled and 
pro\pective members.'" One month earlier, AT&T had temporarily 
'X7 C ' I~S  R SL~STFI\ .  YFOTOPIA. HOW MAYY M ~ D S  PRODUCE K ~ O ~ ~ L E D C F  185 
+ 'OOb) 
2 Y  3 See, e g , Huffington Post Cen~orr Ports Favorable to P ~ z l ~ n  or iZlc Carn, Sept. 1, 
8 .  l~ttp./,saywhatyourealIyrnean blogspot com/2008/09/huffington-post-censors-posts- 
t i  oiciblc html 
4 Daniel Llb~t, Tlre C'o~nmentocrucv Rrses Onlrne, POLITICO.COM, July 24, 2008, 
i f j r  u\+,w pol~tico corn newsl~tor1es/070XiI 1890 htn~l. 
' r i  'clichelleMalkin corn, Terms of Use, http:~'michellernalk~n.com/terms-of-use/ (last 
-4itc~l 5ept 22, 2008). 
i Y h  'Llichelle Malktn, Banned on YozrTube, Oct. 4, 2006, 
, r r r ,  inichelleinalkin.comiarch~ves/006048 htm8?prtnt=l (questtoning whether any criticism 
I ~ i h ~ l c t  \n,ould qual~fy ds inappropriate "hate" under YouTube's ToS); .we ulro Tom Zeller, 
r i  t 51ippem Slope of Ccn~orrhip ut YouT14be, N Y TIMES, Oct. 9, 2006, at C5 (pos~ t~ng  
r t ,  .is part of a "campaign to sptt-sh~ne its image and, perhaps, to look a little less ragtag to 
i r ~ t ~ r ~ , l l  buyers," YouTube removed especially incendiary polit~cal vldeos from the ate,  
,, i ~ i ~ i i ng  Micheile Malkln's "Flrst They Came" video denouncing Islamtc intolerance). 
i' See Adam L~ptak, Verrzon Rqects Text Messages from an Abortion Rights Group, 
% ; I i \ l r  s, Sept 17, 2007, dt A1 (noting that a sample message was "End Bush's global 
t i :  ! 111c 'igalnqt birth control for world's poorest women! Call Congress. (202) 224-3 12 1. 
\ I * % '  \ a a l  Text4Gho1ce"); Jeffrey Gold, Verizon Reverses Text-Messaging Decr~rot?, 
v I I IXIFR. Sept 28, 2007, at 66 (following public outcry, senlor Vertzon Wireless 
censored a webcast of a concert by Pearl Jam during a Lollapalooza 
celebration in which the band's lead singer replaced regular lyrics to their 
hit "Daughter" with "George Bush, leave this world alone; George Bush 
find yourself a h~rne."~" In 2006, one of the largest cable modem-based 
broadband providers in the nation, Comcast, was accused of blocking 
access to AfterDowningStreet.com, the website run by a grassroots 
organization known for activism against the Iraq war.289 The blocking 
continued for one week, hampering the group's efforts in organizing a 
massive protest rally.2w 
In addition, broadband providers have been found to censor 
communications on their networks that disparage them or otherwise 
undermine their commercial advantage.291 For example, Verizon and 
AT&T disclose to new subscribers that they reserve the right to terminate 
the accounts of users who use their networks to criticize the companies' 
business practices.292 And in 2006, America Online (AOL) was found to 
be blocking e-mails fYom a coalition of 600 ~rganizations-including the 
AFL-CIO and the Gun Owners of America-that circulated an onIine 
petition opposing AOt's proposal to charge a premium for bulk e-mail to 
circumvent the company's filters.293 
4. The New Scarcity: Scarce Audience, Abundant ''Spectiwm" 
A popular response to the problem of legal censorship on the 
predominantly private Internet is that editorial controls and moderation of 
user-posted content are necessary to preserve civility and focus on 
especially popular websites. Without these controls, the vitriolic, obscene, 
or abusive speech of vandals and the uncivil would drive away other 
executives determined that the decision not to allow the text messages was "an incorrect 
interpretation of a dusty internal policy"). 
288, See Nate Anderson, Pearl Jam Censored by AT&T, Calls for a Neutral Net, 
ARSTECHNICA.COM, Aug. 9, 2007, http:~/arstechnica.com/news.adpost'20070809-pear1- 
jam-censored-by-att-calls-for-a-neutral-. Lawrence Lessig, Jamming the Pearl, 
LESSIG.ORG, Aug. 10, 2007, http://lessig.org/blog/2007/08Ijamming-~ep~l.h~ ("This 
censoring event, whether AT&T's 'mistake' or not, should be a rallying point for this [net 
neutrality] movement."). 
289. Greg Piper, No Harm Yet for Content, VoIP porn Network Owners, Bells Say, 
COMM. DAILY, Mar. 24,2006. 
290. Id. 
291. See DAWN C. NUNZIATO, NET NEUTRALITY, FREE SPEECH, AND DEMOCRACY IN TWE 
INTERNET AGE 16-19 (forthcoming 20091, preface available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfh?abstract-id= 1266365. 
292. Id. at 17 (citing AT&T Worldnet, AT&T DSL Service Subscriber Agreement, 
http://worldnet.att.net/general-info/terms-&l-data.htd (last visited Oct. 21, 2008)); see also 
Verizon Internet Services, Inc., Online Terms of Service, 
http:/lwww.verizon.netipolicies/popups~.asp (last visited Oct. 2 1,2008). 
293. Chris Gaither & Joseph Menn, AOL Blocks Critics ' E-Mails, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 14, 
2006. at C I. 
participants and destroy the forum.'" These are important concerns. In 
Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville noted that in a democracy, 
the government rarely needs to regulate speech since '*public 
disapprobation is enough" for the "multitude. . . to coerce those who do 
not think like them~elves."~" On the Internet, however, the effect of public 
disapproval is much weaker thanks to the medium's allowance of 
anonymous or pseudonymous expression by speakers not physically 
proximate to-and therefore not at risk of retribution from-those with 
whom the speaker disagrees. As a result, some studies show that dissenters 
are more willing to express their grievances online w~thout fear of social 
ostracism or disapprobation.'9h On one hand, this bodes well for the 
diversity and vibrancy of the ideas marketplace online. The expression of 
dissenting ideas, free from fear of physical retribution, promotes individual 
autonomy and self-identity, dissipates resentments that may fester into 
dangerous anger if repressed, and enriches the marketplace. But on the 
other hand, freedom from social constraints may render much online 
expression too angry, too coarse, and so abusive that it denies human 
dignity, silences opposition, and undermines democratic dialogue.297 
As autonomous speakers protected by the First Amendment, priwte 
website owners get to decide the tone and substance of their websites, even 
if such decisions exclude worthy viewpoints and discriminate against valid 
modes of expression. Editorial decisions can shape the thematic 
distinctiveness and identity of a website and, consequently, are themselves 
an important form of protected expression. Moreover, if someone were 
blocked from sharing her ideas on one website, then she is free to find 
another website where the expression would be allowed to stand. Or she 
294 For example. Professor Stephen L Carter argues that the Internet poses d sertous 
challenge to c~vrllty as a result of the preponderance of dutonomous, in\tantaneous 
expresston, and the pauclty of thoughthl ~ntermed~atton. See STEI'HFN L CARTER, CIVILITY 
M A ~ N E R S ,  ~ ~ O R A L S ,  AND THE ETIOUFTTE OF DFFLIO( R XCY 193-202 ( 1998) Carter writes 
that "President Cllnton . proclatmed that the Internet ts becom~ng 'our new town square,' 
but I am not sure that thls IS a town where the student of clvtlity wdntx to Itve " lcl itt 200 
205 ALEXIS DF ~ O C Q L F ~ I L L E ,  DFMOC R ZCY 1". AMIIERIC z 261 (Phtll~p., Bradley ed , 1945) 
( I 830) 
296 See Tamara \"Y'~tschge, Online De/ibercrtlor? Porrlhtlitier o/ [he Internet for 
Deithercltl~e L)ernoct-~~cv, m DFFL~OC RACY O ~ L I U E ,  \upm note 33, at 109, 1 1  5 (ci~scursing a 
nurnber of emptr~cal i tud~es demonstrattng that "anonym~ty and the ;rbsence of ioc~a l  
presence can work agalnst a genuine democratic exchange" anllne) 
797 I agree w ~ t h  Professor Kent G~eenaw~~l t ' s  assertion that "[e]xtremely  ha^-511 personal 
insults and ep~thets directed agalnst one's race, relig~on. ethntc origin, gender, or seyudl 
preference pose a problem for democrat~c theory and practlce " Kent (~reenawdlt, Inrzlitl 
md Eprfhetc Are Thev Protected SpeecI?/, 42 RLTGER', L KFL 787. 288 (1990) Some 
researchers have found that heccrure of the relat~ve anonymtty of Internet ~nteractlons, 
&\\enters are s~~bjected to much more "\tgorous 'ittack and humihatlon" as a icsult of thetr 
~tnpopular vlews and often flee the dtscussion forum ds a re\ult See, e g  , D \vI\, rtipr-cr 
note 5. 'it 162, 163 
could avoid having to coinply with the quixotic standards of third-party 
website owners and launch a website all her own, governed by standards 
she devises.298 
These defenses to the current state of affairs are not without validity, but 
they too readily discount the h a m s  of private Internet censorship. First, 
whereas broadcast spectrum used for channels of programming is 
exceedingly scarce and the broadcast audience is abundant, the reverse is 
true on the Internet. As Professor Ellen P. Goodman has observed, "Today, 
the scarce resource is attention, not programming."'y' Although there 
virtually is no limit on the number of Internet "channels" or websites that 
can be launched, audiences are hard to come by and the vast majority of 
websites get little or no traff i~.~" Despite the Supreme Court's idealistic 
declaration that "any person with [an Internet connection] can become a 
town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any 
soapbox,""" the reality is that political expression "is less like crying oyez 
from the central marketplace and more like whispering in a ~abyrinth."'~'" 
Although a speaker whose content was blocked fro111 a well-trafficked 
website can simply start up her own blog or website, the likelihood is that 
the uncensored website would receive considerably less traffic than the 
censored one."j3 Only a tiny percentage of blogs have amassed large 
audiences. The rest are read by very small numbers of readers or none at 
298 Although t h ~ s  cenarlo would be less prone to cciisorship than tli'it of postings to 
neb\ite\ controlled by others, it would still be susceptible to ccnsorsh~p and content controls 
'~pplied by the ISP or platform proclder, such as a blog-hosting website like Blogspot com 
or Ll\eJoumal com See rip" notes 286-89 and accompmying text 
399 Goodman. srrur-cr note 8. at 1392 Polltical screntlst f-lerbert Simon. hnom.11 tor h ~ s  
study of what he called the architecture of complexity, presaged t l~c  current conditron of 
'ittention scarcrty when he posited In 1971 that "a wealth of informatron creates a poverty ot 
dttentron " Herbert A S~mon,  Designing Organ~zations for an Informat~on-Rich World, 
Speech at the Johns Hopklns University and Brookings Institute Symposium, 1r7 
C O ~ ~ P L ~ T F  RS, C O ~ V ~ I I I U N I C ~ Z T I ~ ~ S  4ND HF PLBLIC I N T F R ~  i T  37, 1 0  (Martrn Cireenberger cd , 
1971), itte~lf in Seth F Krelmer, Censorship hv Ptoxv The Fir i t  irnenclrnent Intererr 
I~~tern?ed~arre&, tmd the Problem of [he CVcnkelt Link. 155 U P \ L RFV 13, I6 (2006) 
300 See BFNKLER, strpru note 261. at 245 ("Many Web pages and blogs wrll s~ i~ ip ly  go
unread. and w ~ l l  not contrrbute to a more engdged polity ") 
301 Keno v ACLU, 52 1 U S 834,870 ( 1  997) 
302 Noveck, cliprci note 185, at 26 Of course, the notion ot the soapbox ipeaker in the 
town center attracting 'in audlence w ~ t h  the allure of his or her wordc; dnd ideas 1s l~kely d 
romantic concett As Steven G Gey notes, "[Slpeakers on street corners have rarely been as 
concerned w ~ t h  communrcating Tntth as they have been focused on winning converts or 
lnotivdting those who dre already converted" Gcy, stipr~i note 268. at 1538-39 Although 
the soapbox speaker as democratic symbol IS "antiquated and somewhat ~naccurate," Cky 
notes tlidt "it 1s d myth that IS lnd~spensible to democracy " Id 
303 "Many leading services, part~c~~larly online hangouts l ~ k c  Facebook, MySpace 
or YouTube, have acqulred a cachet that cannot be casily repl~cated F'o evlct a user 
from an onllne community would be like banishing that person to the outskirts of town '" 
Jesdan~~n, rlipru note 265 
In addition, although website owners have been known to reverse 
their decisions to remove users' content following the protest of the content 
authors or their supporters, removal of the material in today's very fast- 
paced media landscape for even a short amount of time can have a very 
negative effect on the vibrancy add sophistication of online exchanges.'05 
Audience aside, because broadband providers themselves are engaging 
in content discrimination and have the legal authority and incentive to 
censor many more of the messages carried on their networks, subscribers 
may not be as fkee as some may assume to express themselves on an 
alternate website. Subscribers whose expression is censored by their 
broadband carriers are entirely at the mercy of those carriers, since any 
alternate websites would be transmitted through the same censoring 
conduit306 
5, Yaluable Dissent Can Be Impolite 
6 
Another problem caused by the rampant private censorship online relates 
to the role of angry or disagreeable language in political discussion and 
democratic deliberation, The United States was born of heated revolutionary 
protest, and in light of those origins always has recognized "the essential 
value of robust, abrasive, uninhibited dissent."307 Valuable democratic 
304. See Gregory M. Lamb, A One-Stop Shop for the 'Best' Blogs, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, NOV. 30, 2005, at 14 ("Though many of the tens of millions of blogs have few 
readers, a tiny percentage.. . have won large audiences."); Hogging: Going Pro, 
ECONOMIST, NOV. 18, 2006, at 67 (noting that most blogs are "personal diaries that happen 
to be online" and "have tiny audiences"). 
305. See Smith, supra note 277, at 8 (observing that in two cases of YouTube 
censorship, the removed material was restored after protests, "but in the new politics, a few 
hours offline can make a huge difference"). 
306. See NUNZIATO, supra note 291, at 2 (discussing ability and incentives for 
broadband providers to censor subscribers' content). 
307. HARRY KALVEN JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: F R E E ~ M  OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 235 
(Jamie Kalven ed., 1988). There are limits, of course. In 1942, the Supreme Court 
articulated its "fighting words" doctrine, carving out from First Amendment protection 
"insults" and other expressions "which by their very utterance inflict injufy or tend to incite 
an immediate breach of the peace." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 
(1942). The Court, however, has not upheld a conviction under the fighting words doctrine 
since Chaplinsky was decided, and instead has struck down enforcement of prohibitions on 
"offensive" language in public places. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16, 26 
(1971) (overturning conviction of Paul Robert Cohen for wearing a jacket bearing the words 
"Fuck the Draft'" inside a courthouse); see also CONST~UTIONAL L W 1013 (Kathleen M. 
Sullivan & Gerald Gunther eds., 14th ed. 2001) (noting that the Court '%as not sustained a 
conviction on the basis of the fighting words doctrine"). Professor Stephen W. Gard 
dismisses the fighting words doctrine as "nothing more than a quaint remnant of an earlier 
morality that has no place in a democratic society dedicated to the principle of free 
expression." Stephen W. Gard, Fighting Words as Free Speech, 58 WASH. U .  L.Q. 53 1, 536 
(1980). Yet many share the view of Chief Justice Burger in his Rosenfeld v. New Jersey 
dissent, where the Court summarily vacated the conviction of a defendant who, speaking 
before a school board meeting attended by at least forty children, referred to teachers and 
dialogue in fact can include speech that is angry, coarse, vulgar, and even 
insulting, and not something one would want to say in front of one's mother 
at the dinner table. Dissent can be impolite, or impolitic, and still be 
worthwhile. Although Internet utopians may strive for especially rarified 
dialogue in their neck of the online woods, the reality is that much online 
discussion is like offline discussion. It is sometimes rude, crude, and angry, 
The Supreme Court has noted repeatedly that criticism of public officials 
and public figures in particular "will not always be reasoned or moderate."308 
In light of the "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on 
public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open," the Supreme 
Court has protected speech that "may well include vehement, caustic, and 
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."309 
And political speech described as "vulgar," "offensive," "shocking," or 
"insulting" is nevertheless protected under the First Amendment in most 
circumstances; indeed, the Supreme Court noted that ridicule of public 
officials and figures has "played a prominent role in public and political 
debate.""'" Dissonance and disagreement, uncomfortable and impolite as 
they may be, are important in public debate. "However pernicious an 
opinion may seem," the Supreme Cotirt may find value in it as part of "the 
competition o f .  . .  idea^."^" 
D. Online Exposure Diversity--The Ditninishing 
Retzdrns of'Digital Autonomy 
The ability of traditional broadcasting to serve as a point of common 
focus has often enabled it to expose large numbers of citizens to some 
democratically valuable material-like political news, public affairs, and 
i;chool board members, lnter aha, as "motherfiickers." See 408 U.S. 901, 904 (1972) 
(Powell, J., dissenting) (descnblng the uttered phrase as ' m  - - - - - f - - - - -"). Burger 
wrote, "When we undermtne the general bellef that the law will grve protectton aga~nst 
fightmg words and profane and abusive language . . . we take steps to return to the law of 
the jungle." Id. at 902 (Burger, C.J., dlssentlng). 
308. Hustler Magazme, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 48, 57 (1988) (rejecting Jerry 
Falwell's defamation and intentional lnflictlon of emot~onal dlstress clalms agamst Hu.~tlrr 
deer the latter pubflshed a parodlc advertisement detailing "a drunken incestuous 
rendezvous" between Falwell and h ~ s  mother). 
309. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
3 10. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 54-55. When the New York Times opened its webslte postings 
to pubhc comment in late 2007, it also created a "'comment desk" of four part-tlme staffers 
ass~gned to screen all of the submiss~ons before postlng them. When one of the moderators 
warned part~clpants that vitnollc messages would not be posted, some users balked and 
posted comments such as, "We need an open dialogue ln this country, now more than ever," 
and "Mandatlng tepld clvillty in blog comments has an ideological component. Pohteness' 
bars sharpty worded disagreement by dissenters agalnst those who clalm to be authonty, but 
doesn't usually bar dismlss~ve or patronlzlng arguments by authonty agalnst the d~ssenters." 
Clark Hoyt, Op-Ed., Civzl Dacourse, Meet the Internet, N.Y. TIMES.  Nov. 4, 2007, at 14. 
31 1 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 3 3 9 4 0  (1974). 
local news and information-that they otherwise would not have 
affirmatively sought. By contrast, the Internet's plethora of largely 
unmediated and rlnedited content, and the ability of users to filter out 
almost all material except that which they specifically seek, has raised 
significant concerns about its effects on dernocracy, our sense of local and 
national community, and political education and participation. As 
Professor Sunstein has warned, "Unplanned, unanticipated encounters are 
- - r i I 2  
central to denlocracy itself. Democracy depends on diversity. 
For truth to gain currency and prominence in a marketplace of ideas, it 
tnust be allowed to compete in a vibrant, unbridled trade, with speakers and 
listeners encouraged to explore widely, inviting serendipitous exchanges, 
instead of settling for the same handful of familiar "stalls." Access to 
diversity is not enough; there also rnust be a willingness to engage in it. in 
theorizing that the seminal purpose of the First A~nendment was self- 
governance, Professor Alexander Meiklejohn argued that the duty of 
citizen-sovereigns was not only to speak, but to hear and consider ideas 
different fiorn their own."' The great sociologist Robert Merton's work in 
serendipity teaches us that unexpected, inadvertent research discoveries do 
not happen entirely by accident, but by means of purposeful, planned 
exposure to a diversity of it~formation with weak or even no links to the 
primary task at hand."' A mrndful openness to the new and unexpected 
idea can provide an enlightened confirsnation of an initial belief or reveal 
tts rooting in a false premise. Mill himself wrote that tt was "hardly 
poss~ble to overrate the value. . . of placing human beings in contact with 
persons dissimilar to themselves" and "with rnocies of thought and action 
unlike those with which they are Eamiliar" since this social dissimilarity has 
been "one of the primary sources of pr~gress .""~ 
Broadcasters. like newspaper editors, o f k r  their audiences a certain 
arrlount of piunned (;erendipity-giving vlewers, listeners, and readers not 
312 C \\i R St crri r r u ,  RI-PI 131 I(  f OM 8 (3001) 
313 ALf Yf\Dr-K M ~ ~ K L F J O H Y ,  Eltt t s l ) t -€~H IhII 1 FS RFLZTION 1 0  S~-L~-GOVFRNI\ / IFY r 
65-h6 (LLiwbook Exchange 1004) ( 1948) Professor Meiklgohn !%rote that "[wle Ilsten, not 
ilecause they dcsire to spcdk. but bec,~~l\e u e  need to hear If there 'Ire drgument\ ngalnst 
our theory of gobernment. our poiic~c\ in w,tr or In peace, we the citizens, tile rulers,  nus st 
hear and consider them tor ourselbes. ' iil dt 66 
314 Roet R T  K Mt KTO\ 8t E-I lhOf< 131KHf R, r ~ f  TRAVFL ",\hi> AI)LEVTLRF.\ O F  
SERF \DIP1 TY A s71 DL I\  SO( iOLO<rl( \ I  LL Vl 'tX I IC i rIYD r l l F  SOC I 0 1  0 ( r Y  OF SC IEYC t 140- 
46 (1004) 
3 I5 JOHN S i t  \itr VIL L , P~uru( II'I t i ot POLII I C A L  kc o v o v ~  581 ( W  J Ashley od , 
crmans, Lon, <;I ecn 3 Co 1909) ( 1848). tn tiricihle (it 
http ~ ~ t ~ t w  econl~b orgll~br,iry M~l l  'miP I tltml 
only what they seek, but also information that they did uot set out to flnd 
yet would be better off knowing. For example, the news of a World Series 
upset may be followed by a much less prominent story on falling 
graduation rates in urban high schools. Outside of certain neus websites, 
this planned serendipity is in scarce supply on the Internet. 
111 the largely private fora of today's Internet, there is not fiee 
competition of ideas in central, open gathering spaces, but rather an 
atomization of attention and a segregation of users by interests and 
allegiances into a universe of noninteracting websites catering to the 
likeminded."h1though there is abundant debate and discussion online, 
the exchanges often are internecine dialogues within self-selected affinity 
groups. For example, DailyKos.com is the top-rated political discussion 
website, averaging more than 1.4 million visits per day,"' hosting hundreds 
of lively discussions at any one time. But its founder is clear about the 
website's leanings: "This is a Democratic blog, a partisan blog.""%iven 
its name, one would assume that another top-rated website, Townha1l.com 
and its thousands of blog discussions, would serve as a platform for a 
diversity of opinions and ideas. But it too is unapologetically slanted, 
calling itself "the first conservative web community . . . designed to 
3 16 Professor Sunstetn has wrltten ewtenslvely and eloquently about this problem 5e.e 
C \ rs  K S L ~ S T F I ~ ,  RFPURLIC cov 3, 23 (2001) (notrng that Internet user3 are ,tble to cteate 
therr own "Neighborhood Me" or "Darly Me" rn which they purposely only encounter dnd 
Interact w ~ t h  people just lrke them and tdeas w ~ t h  which they agree), Cz5s K Sr wrFrt., 
RFPURIIC COM 2 0. dt 63-64 (2007) ("New technologres, emphat~c;tlly lncludtng the 
Internet, make rt easrel for pcople to surround themselves 141th the oprnlons ot like- 
rnrnded but otlierwrse ~solated others, and to Insulate themselves from competing brew4 
For this reason alone, they are a breedlng ground for polar~zat~on, and potent~ally dangerous 
lor both democracy 'ind soc~al peace ") Professor Sunstem further wrote, 
4 4yrtem of ~nd~c~dua l ly  designed communlcattons optlons could res~ilt In htgh 
degree of bdlkan~zatlon, in whlch people are not presented w ~ t h  new or contrary 
perspectives Such a natlon could not eas~ly sat~sfy democrat~c and deliberatne 
goals In such a natlon, communlcatlon among people wrth d~fferent pcrspectrvcs 
~ n ~ g h t  be far more d~fficult or occn ~ m p o s ~ ~ b l e  In such a natlon, there may be l~ttle 
commonal~ty among people w~tli dicerse commrtments, '1s one group Larlcatures 
'mothel or understand4 ~t by means of simple slogans that debase real~ty anit elrrninate 
mutual undcrstandtng 
'3nnstetn, srrprii note 185, ' ~ t  1786-87 Professor Stephen L Carter dlso h ~ <  wrltten  bout 
the Internet's fac~l~tdt~on of fragmentat~on Compar~ng rt to rel~gron, he wntes. 
The onlrne world seems to be the place to el~mrnate dtssonance inore thoroughly thdn 
any rehglon ever i l~d You can spend your days anci n~ghts rnetitphor~cally 
sturotmded by anonymous people who wrll gleefully assure you that your most 
unlikely fantasies are the real~ty-gleeful. because you are s~rnultancoir~ly ,l\\inlng 
them 
C ~ R T F K ,  szrprn note 394, at 201 
3 17 See SiteMeter S ~ t e  Summary, Dci~lyKos com, 
http //\bww <ltemeter com1"a=stats&s=sm8da1!ykos (last t~srted Nov 25, 3008I (sho~etng ,I 
daily 'ivelage of I 4 mtllton unlque v~s~ to r s )  
3 18 Post~ng of kos [slcl to D'tlly Kos, 
http //\vww da~lykos com/story/2004,1 11 1512 1241 1/47 (Nov 15, 2004) ( 18 23 PDT) 
amplifjr conservative voices in America's political  debate^."^" 
Blog directory Technorati currently tracks 112.8 million blogs,320 but 
one would be hard-pressed to find truly deliberative discussions reflecting a 
diversity of major political and ideological viewpoints. Although there are 
likely liberal visitors to conservative websites, or libertarian visitors to 
socialist websites, it is unlikely that they will feel sufficiently at home to 
contribute meaningfully to discussions and play any role but that of 
interloping contrarian, Self-censorship on the part of these dissenting 
"outsiders" would deprive the rest of the participants of valuable 
information that may have corrected inaccuracies or misapprehensions in 
the dominant disc~urse .~~ '  
An especially extreme example of the insularity of some public affairs 
and discussion websites is that of OneNewsNow.com, which is owned by 
the conservative American Family Association (AFA) and offers "[nlews 
ta 
from a Christian perspective."322 As a service to its readers, the AFA news 
feed automatically replaces certain words in Associated Press (AP) stories, 
like the word "homosexual" for "gay," since the latter term, according to the 
website's news director, puts homosexuality "in a positive This 
practice resulted in an AP story about champion sprinter Tyson Gay's having 
won his Olympic track semifinal being re-headlined for 0neNewsNow.com 
readers as "Homosexual eases into 100 final at Olympic trials" with 
references to "Tyson Homosexual" throughout the story,324 
The fragmentation of Internet communities is troubling, especially given 
the increasing balkanization of the broadcast realm, In the wake of the 
fairness doctrine's demise, broadcast media and their cable television 
counterparts have compartmentalized into sectors that have very evidently 
dispensed with journalistic neutrality in favor of advancing distinct political 
and ideological agendas. For example, despite its "fair and balanced" 
slogan, Fox Broadcasting and Fox News Channel advance self-avowedly 
3 19. About Townhall.com, http:l/www.townhall.comiAboutUs.aspx (last visited Nov. 
28,2008). 
320. Welcome to Technorati, http:ll~.technorati.comiabouti (last visited Nov. 28, 
ZOOS), 
321. Professor Sunstein warns that such self-censorship "is a serious social loss," 
positing that Communism survived throughout Eastern Europe partly because people 
incorrectly believed that it was widely supported. C ~ s s  R. SUNSTEM, WHY SOCIETIES NEED 
DISSENT 81-82 (2003) ("The fall of Communism was made possible by the mounting 
disclosure of privately held views, which turned pluralistic ignorance into something closer 
to pluralistic knowledge."). 
322. OneNewsNow.com, http://.~ww.onenewsnow.com/general.aspx?id=1202 (last 
visited Nov. 28, 2008). 
323. A1 Kamen, I Feel Pretty and Witty and. . . What?, WASH. POST, July 2, 2008, at 
A13. 
324. Id. 
conservative, Republican-slanted versions of the news.32s By contrast, 
MSNBC and Air America Radio are known to slant in favor of liberal 
perspectives.326 Public radio has been characterized as favoring liberal 
ideologies, while commercial talk radio for the most part favors 
conservative ones.327 FuIsome debate and dissension within these bulwarks 
are not especially welcome, as exemplified by the self-proclaimed 
"dittoheads," the listeners who call in to the program of top-rated talk radio 
host Rush Limbaugh and are put through the call screeners to (almost 
always) agree with him.328 During the 2008 presidential campaign, a 
Washington, DC broadcast group owner renamed its two area AM talk 
stations "'McCain 570'" and 'Obama 1260," with hosts and programming 
dedicated exclusively to conservative and liberal slants, r e ~ ~ e c t i v e l ~ ~ ~ ~  
Fragmentation online also should concern us in light of how the nation 
as a whole is becoming increasingly segregated in terms of where we live, 
in what journalist Bill Bishop and sociologist Robert G,  Cushing have 
called "the big sort."330 According to Bishop and Cushing, the nation is 
325. See Timothy Noah, Fox I?ews Admits Bias!, S L A ~ ,  May 31, 2005, 
http:liwww.slate.com/idl21198641 (asserting that despite the "fair and balanced'" slogan, 
"[nlo fair-minded person actually believes that Fox News is unbiased"). Fox News London 
Bureau Chief Scott Norvell wrote in the May 20, 2005 version of Wall Street Journal 
Europe, "Even we at Fox News manage to get some lefties on the air occasionally, and often 
let them finish their sentences before we club them to death and feed the scraps to Karl 
Rove and Bill O'Reilly. . . . Fox News is, after all, a private channel and our presenters are 
quite open about where they stand on particular stories. That's our appeal," See Scott 
Norvell, An Aunt with an Attitude, W ~ L  ST. J. Em., May 20,2005, at A6. 
326. See, e.g., Howard Kurtz, MSNBC, Leaning Left and Getting FIakfiom Both Sides, 
WASH. POST, May 28, 2008, at C1 (noting that MSNBC "has clearly gravitated to the left in 
recent years and often seems to regard itself as the antithesis of Fox News"); William G. 
Mayer, Why Talk Radio Is Conservative, 156 PUB. INT, 86, 86 (2004) (describing Air 
America as "the creation of a group of wealthy entrepreneurs and venture capitalists 
who . . . are using their resources to promote a left-wing agenda"). 
327. See Mayer, supra note 326, at 88-91 (discussing the overwhelming dominance of 
conservatives on commercial talk radio stations, and acknowledging critics' view that 
noncommercial stations affiliated with National Public Radio (NPR) "already provide[] a 
liberal voice on the airwaves"). 
328. See David Finkel, Dialingfor Dittos, WASH. POST  MAG., June 12, 1994, at W9-10 
(describing dittohead John Cavallo's repeated attempts to call in to Rush Limbaugh's talk 
radio program and noting that '"there's nothing he and Limbaugh disagree on"). 
329. See Michael Calderone, On the Dial: McCain 570 vs. Obama 1260, P o m c o . c o ~ ,  Oct. 
2, 2008, hrcp:ll~.politico.comiblogdmichaelcald1008/~~~e~~aI_;McCain~570~vs 
- Obama_1260_;.htm1 (noting that Obma 1260 featured noted liberal personalities Rachel 
Maddow, Stephanie Miller, and Ed Schultz, while McCain 570's lineup included 
conservatives Bill Bennett, Laura Ingraham, and Michael Savage). 
330. See generally BILL BISHOP & ROBERT G.  CUSHING, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE 
CLUSTERINC OF LIKE-MRVDED AMERICA IS TEARPIG US APART 45-49 (2008). "As 
Americans have moved over the past three decades, they have clustered in communities of 
sameness, among people with similar ways of life, beliefs, and, in the end, politics," Id. at 
5 .  President Jimmy Carter won the White House in 1976 with 50.1% of the popular vote, 
but with only 26.8% of voters residing in "landslide counties," defined as counties where 
President Carter won or lost by 20% or more. In 2004, when President George W. Bush 
sorting itself into "balkanised communities whose inhabitants find other 
Americans to be culturally incomprehen~ible,"~~~ Our self-segregation into 
likeminded groups in both the online and brick-and-mortar worlds exposes 
us to fewer contrary viewpoints and ultimately rnakes us more insular and 
extreme in our views.""hat, in turn, makes broader public discussions 
much more polarized and angry at those moments when the fragments 
r e con~ene . ' ~~  
2. Beyond Gatekeepers, Beyond Fences-Finding Truth in the Duta Smog 
Wired Editor in Chief Chris Anderson celebrates the "infinite choice" of 
content online-what he calls the "long tail"-as providing users with the 
ability to transition from an "or" culture, which restricts us to a sequence of 
zero-sum choices from a menu of options compiled by media 
conglomerates, to an "and" culture that affords us the lwtury of having it all 
(or at least thinking that we do).334 By transcending "the tyranny of 
locality" and joining with others online in an appreciative, attentive, and 
sometimes paying audience, we can satis@ our interests for relatively 
uncommon or even exotic ideas, books, or music. And as a result, we also 
make it possible for producers of that material to garner enough attention 
and income to continue making out-of-the-ordinary contributions to the 
"paradise of choice" that has taken root online.335 After all, what may be 
considered obscure today could, if given an opportunity to survive, earn 
widespread acclaim in the future. 
This is a persuasive perspective especially in light of how broadcasting 
presents us with a homogenized, narrow, and commercially distorted vision 
of ourselves and our society, and in so doing marginalizes expression 
won reelection, 48.3% of voters lived in landslide counties. TEe Bfg Sort: Po/ztzcaI 
Segregatton, ECONOMIST.COM, June 19, 2008, 
l~ttp::/www,economist.comlworldunitedstate~/d~splayStory.ch'?source=hptextfeature&stor 
y-ld=11581447. 
33 1. The Big Sort: Polittcal LSegregutzon, supra note 330. 
332. Blshop warns that "lwle now live in a glant feedback loop, hearing our own 
thoughts about what's right and wrong bogneed back to us by the television shows we 
watch, the newspapers and books we read, the blogs we wsit online, the sermons we hear 
~ n d  the neighborhoods we live ~n." [a'.; Jee also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.LOM 2.0, at 
60-64 (2007) (discussing expenments with homogenous, m-group dellberation, concluding 
that after such dtscussions "people are likely to move toward a more extreme polnt in the 
direction to whlch the group's members were orlg~naily inclined"). 
333. Professor Sunstem theorizes that the lack of diversity in subgroups of associates 
generates a pressure to conform and an ampltfication of common ideologies, whereas 
exposure to opposing or differ~ng rdeas has a dampening effect on tdeological rrgid~ty. 
SU~STEIN,  siqru note 321, at 4-5 (discussing how judges appointed to ideolog~cally ilanted 
,~ppelIate courts tend eventually to conform to the dominant ~deology). 
334 CHRIS ANDERSON, THE LONG TAIL 180 (2006). 
335. Id. at 17, 162, 168. 
outside of the monocultural broadcast The disintermediation of 
cyberspace counters the agenda-setting power, often illegitimately 
exercised, of commercial broadcasting. A "symbiosis," as Professor Glen 
Reynolds calls it, has emerged between the Internet and mainstream media, 
with the latter now looking to the former "to decide if something is worth 
paying attention to."337 Consequently, the diversity of online choice may 
be forcing broadcasting to reflect a broader, more diverse, and more 
complex society on its 
some observers, however, are understandably concerned that such 
extreme diversity actually has undermined rather than promoted democratic 
values by drowning democracy-elevating material in an ocean of content 
that offers little or no political, cultural, or social worth. Whatever their 
limitations, the editors and other "middlemen" of broadcast and print media 
play an important journalistic qua democratic role in earning enough public 
trust and accountability, through time, to direct large-scale attention to 
important issues of governance and society that audience members would 
ignore or miss altogether if left to their own devices in digital isolation.339 
Whether bloggers can assume that important attention-focusing role online 
is in dispute.340 
Internet poIemicist Andrew Keen warns that the "inanity and absurdity" 
of much online content results in a general mediascape that provides us 
with "less culture, less reliable news, . . . a chaos of useless information," 
and "even disappearance of the truthed4' He argues that the 
''YouTubification of politics is a threat to civic culture" insofar as it 
"infantilizes the political process, silencing pubIic discourse and leaving 
336. See generally JERRY MANDER, FOUR ARGUMENTS FOR, THE ELIMDJATION OF 
TELEVISION (1 978). 
337. Dan Schulman, Meet the New Bosses, MOTHER JONES, July-Aug. 2007, at 30. 
338. Of course, broadcasters also are desperately looking for new ways to leverage the 
Internet to shore up their declining business models. David Carr, Mourning Old Media's 
Decline, N Y T m s . c o ~ ,  Oct. 28, 2008, 
hnp:l/www.nytimes.com/2008/10/29/business/medi29ca.h1 (noting that even as 
mainstream media revenue is rapidly declining, overall media audiences are rising, with the 
New York Times employing its website, RSS feeds, and hand-held devices to accommodate 
the growing preference for alternative news conduits). 
339. See ANDREW L. S H A P ~ ,  THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: HOW THE INTERNET IS 
PUTTING INDIVIDUALS IN CHARGE AND CHANGING THE WORLD WE KNOW 187-96 (1999) 
(arguing that delegating news-filtering duties to "tnrsted intermediaries" can make 
consumers "more free7' and "more connected to one another"); see also Netanel, supra note 
152, at 456 ('*Whatever their faults, for exampie, traditional news media have the resources 
and professional commitment to check facts and verify sources, and we hold them 
accountable if they do not."). 
340. See Netanel s u p  note 152, at 456 ("Matt D d g e  and other individual online 
publishers often have neither the fmncial wherewithal nor the institutional aspiration to 
meet professional journalistic standards."). 
341. ANDREW KEEN, THE CULT OF THE AMATEUR 5,16 (2007). 
the future of the government up to thirty-second video clips shot by 
camcorder-wielding amateurs with political agendas."3J2 With a paucity of 
"experts and cultural gatekeepers" online, he quips that "[tlhe monkeys 
take over."i33 Habemas himself voiced some alarm at the effect the 
Intenlet has had on the prominence of public intellectuals in the public 
sphere: '"The price we pay for the growth in egalitarianism offered by the 
Internet is the decentralized access to unedited stories. In this medium, 
contributions by intellectuals lose their power to create a focus."3J4 
Not everyone agrees. Political philosopher Dennis Thompson, for 
example, argues that the Internet's superabundance of information actually 
generates more of a demand for experts and mediators to sort through the 
chaff in search of the wheat. He writes that "[tlhe greater the quantity and 
Inore variable the quality of information, the greater the demand for 
authorities who can assess its reliability and re~evance."~'~ In addition, 
there is no shortage of evidence demonstrating how the Internet, and 
especially the blogosphere, has allowed a diversity of experts to apply their 
knowledge in a manner sometimes more effective than offline mechanisms 
for quality control and peer review. For example, in the June 25, 2008 
decision of Ker~nedj? v. Lotlisiunu, a closely divided Supreme Court banned 
the death penalty for child rapists.34"ustice Anthony Kennedy based the 
majority opinion in part on an assertion that, of the thirty-seven 
jitrisdictions with the death penalty (thirty-six states and the federal 
government), "only six of those jurisdictions authorize the death penalty for 
rape of a child," and the federal government is not among them.347 Merely 
three days later, legal blogger Colonel Dwight H. Sullivan revealed in his 
popular military justice blog that the Court had its facts wrong. The federal 
government in fact had amended the Uniforrn Code of Military Justice in 
2006 to allow for the death penalty for soldiers convicted of child rape.348 
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion and Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr.'s 
dissent (and apparently the State of Louisiana's brief) had mistakenly 
overlooked this relatively new law, as had the mainstream media, including 
342 M dt 68 
343 Id dt 9 
344 Jurgen Habermas, Acceptance Speech for the Bruno Krelsky Pnze for the 
Advancement of Human Rlghts (20071, quoted zn KEEN, Atrpra note 341. dt 55 
345 Dennis Thompson, ./urnes iWndr~on on C ~ b e r ~ ~ / e r n o ~ r ~ z ~ v ,  ~ r z  G VFRNAYCF COM, 
trrpmnore 215, at 36-37 
346 Kennedy v Louistana. 128 S Ct. 2641 (2008). 
347 Id  dt 2653 
348 See Dwight H Sull~van. The Supremes Drs the Wzlztnrv Justice Svrtem, 
CAAFLot; cow, June 18 ,  2008, http.i/caaflog.blogspot com/2008/06/supremes-dls-military- 
justlce-iyqtcm html (noting that the Natlonal Defense Authortzation Act for Fiscal Year 
2006 was "right on polnt") 
their vaunted legal commentators and experts.349 
Stories similar to Colonel Sullivan's may have promoted Judge Richard 
Posner to posit in 2005 that, viewed as a journalistic corpus, the 
blogosphere does a better job than traditional media at surfacing and 
- vetting the truth: 
The rapidity with which vast masses of information are pooled and sifted 
leaves the conventional media in the dust. Not only are there millions of 
blogs, and thousands of bloggers who specialize, but, what is more, readers 
post comments that augment the blogs, and the information in those 
comments, as in the blogs themselves, zips around blogland at the speed of 
electronic transmission. . . . [Clorrections in blogs are also disseminated 
vimtally instantaneously, whereas when a member of the mainstream media 
catches a mistake, it may take weeks to communicate a retraction to the 
Judge Posner's argument is a compelling one, and I do not dispute the 
notion that the blogosphere has valuable self-correcting, truth-vetting 
tendencies. I am more skeptical, however, of the premise that all or even 
most visitors to the blogosphere spend enough time and enough focus 
reading a sufficiently wide array of websites so as to obtain the full benefits 
of the blogosphere as a "collective enterprise." It is true that many blogs 
link to the same top stories in rapid succession, and that especially popular 
blogs attract the attention of both the mainstream media and the rest of the 
blogosphere. But it is unlikely that a reader of just a handful of websites 
would get the full benefit of the blogosphere's checks and balances, 
particularly if the websites on that reader's daily diet of blog reading are 
especiaHy inured to criticism and correction from bloggers elsewhere on 
the web. In fact, recent studies have found that despite the Internet's 
expansive breadth, most users visit a small number of favorite websites, 
and not necessarily those with high readership and journalistic standards.35' 
Professor Matthew Hindman's recent research on the behavior of Internet 
users notes that the number of websites an average Internet user visits is so 
349. On the basis of Colonel Sullivan's post, the Washington Post editorialized in favor 
of reopening the case in light of the Court's error. See Editorial, Supreme Slip-Up: A Recent 
High Court Ruling Is Factually Flawed. The Justices Should Correct It, WASH. POST, July 5, 
2008, at A14. 
350. Richard A. Posner, Bad News, N.Y. TIMES, July 31,2005 (book review), at 1 ,  10. 
In effect, the blogosphere is a collective enterprise-not 12 million separate 
enterprises, but one enterprise with 12 million reporters, feature writers and 
editorialists, yet with almost no costs. It's as if The Associated Press or Reuters had 
millions of reporters, many of them experts, all working with no salary for free 
newspapers that carried no advertising. 
Id. at 11. 
35 I .  See, e.g., Matthew Hindman, A Mile Wide and an inch Deep: Measuring Media 
Diversity Online and Ofline, in MEDIA DTVERSITY AND LOCALISM: MEAN~NG AND METRICS 
328 (2007) (discussing the paradoxical nature of online media diversity). 
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small that "the diversity of media outlets that citizens use many be smaller 
online than in traditional media."352 He cautions that "[ilt may be true that 
every web site has a voice-but most speak in a whisper and a powerful 
few have a megaphone.'7353 
While it is widely accepted that the blogosphere has enriched political 
dialogue and held government and mainstream media accountable, it is also 
true that the Internet's destruction of the old tvvenq-four-hour news cycle 
has had negative effects. The former daylong cycle afforded media an 
opportunity to prioritize news items and lead with "headlines." It allowed 
readers and viewers an opportunity to analyze and digest the news. And it 
permitted newsrnakers at least some time to craft thoughtful responses for 
the next day's news. The "always on" blogosphere today has resulted in an 
atmosphere of incessant news production in which, as described succinctly 
by Professor Lili Levi, "blogs can goad mainstream media into sloppy, 
responsive reporting and create partisan swarms that can distract media 
coverage and lead to excessive defensiveness on the part of mainstream 
The round-the-clock, incessant oscillation between digital 
reporting and official government response has left little time for digestion, 
reflection, and the exercise of journalistic diligence. 
The Internet has subverted the edit-then-publish norm of traditional 
media with a new reliance on the "wisdom of the crowd" to serve as a post 
hoc editorial check in the new publish-then-edit online culture. This instant 
publication has allowed the Internet to respond quickly to events and 
controversies, sometimes in positive But the prevalent lack of 
editorial control brings new meaning to former British Prime Minister 
James Callaghan's famous quip that '"a] lie can be halfway around the 
world before truth has got its boots on."356 On the Internet, a mistruth can 
circle the world several times and be featured in countless websites, with 
convincing pictures, text, and discussion, before truth even awakes. Once 
it does, it will need more than boots to counter online falsity. 
The Internet has become a breeding ground for rumor-mongering, 
352. Id. at 328; see also rd at 337 ("[A]udiences on the World W ~ d e  Web appear even 
more t~ghtly focused than those of more trad~tional media . . . . Onl~ne, a smaller number of 
outlets have cons~stently garnered a larger share of the total aud~ence."). 
353. id at 345. 
354. Levi, rzipru note 197, at 692. Professor Lev1 also observes that "the blogosphere 
does seem to contain some strikingly partisan, cxtremlst, dnd caustic rhetoric. which some 
fear will enhance political polarization and undermine reasoned pol~tlcal debate." Id. at 693 
(citmg Kenneth Jost & Melissa J. Hipoht, Blog Exploszon, CQ RESEARCHER, June 9, 2006, 
nt 5 1 1). 
355 See sz4pi-a notes 197-203 and accompanying text. 
356. A m  CnIIaghutz. -1 L~fe in Qztotes, BBCNEWS.COW, Mar. 36, 2005, 
http:/inews.bbc.co.uki2ih1/uk _news/polit1cs/32X8907.stm. 
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defit~nar~oti,  rid ~nisinthrmatlon. '~~ E-11ia11 and \vebbites were L I S C ~  to in\~st  
durrng the 2008 prcsident~al cavnpaigri that B:krack Oharna had radical 
358 Muslirn tres. Altho~igl~ the Obalna campaign used its own tcebsrte to 
couinter tilesc rrirnors. as of July 2008, 12"b of those surveyed contini~cl to 
say that ti1t.y hci lc~cd Obarna to hakc \uch t ~ c s  and 25'51 of Ihclsii survcycci 
: -,t> \a~ci they drd not know tvhdr Obalna'\ religion IS. Sl~t~ilariy,  fhr b>ur 
~nonths a bictgraph~cal cntry on W~hipcdla, the user-generated orhtlc 
encyclopedia that has gamed enormous popularity and ccen statirs as an 
autfiorttative rc-,carch tool, Fdlsely reported that f'or~ner Robert F. Kennedy 
aide Jc.tlln Se~genthaler. Jr. had been lnvol~ed  rn the assahsinations of' both 
Scl-iatur Iiobcrt Kennedy and Itis brother, President John F. ~ennedy. '"" 
Despite being available in almost all populated localities of the nation, 
the Ir~tcrnct is not yet a. source of distinctly local political and public rzffa~rs 
content across the nation. In rejecting the "divcrs~ty index'. the FC'C 
clevised in 2003 to facilitate its liberalization of broadcast ownership 
rcctrictio~~s, the Third Circuit in Pro~lrofhezr.$ K L I L ~ ~ ~  PYO~CYY tl. FCC' 
concludec1 that the FCC was wrong to rely on what i t  called "the virtual 
~ ~ l ~ r \ e r s c  o f  infi)rmation sources" ava~lable or1 the Interr~et as a source of 
-'local ncl.vs*' and *ip~~blic  aH:,\irs programming."'"' The court accurately 
recogni~eti that ttltlroi~gh therc is much local informat~on on the Intcrnct, 
thc great ~nalority 1s not the sort of political, democracy-elevating 
infi~rnlat~on :tt the heart of the FCC's longstanding localisrn pnnc~ple: 
"Search-cnginc sporisored pages s~rch as Yahoif! LOCHI and 
i?\bot~t.co~n . . . [nay be riseful for tinding restaurant revlews and concert 
\chcdules, but this rs not . . . ' n e ~  s and public affiitrs prugratnming.'"'"" 
,\lthough tile Internet has proved to be useful to localities following nat~trrrl 
757 Sc~c : ' ~ ~ ~ r e t ~ ~ i I b  I \ U I F  t J So lo~f .  rtii Fl 11 k t  OF RE PI r'iiioC ( J O \ \ ! I \  I t1  VOR,  
1'11) I%!\ ZC\ ou I I I F  I u ~ F K Y ~ T  (1007) (cxp101111g the tetiston bctucen protccttiig pri\,zcy 
,inti \,lfcguarci~ng tree \pcech) 
7 - ,  t > X  5c.e Jdrncs Hdrron, 9 ./ert t r / r  Iac~z~/i~r\  Sat t: ~ N ~ L I I ~  > p ~ ~ d  LIP$  Ihottt Ohtrmtr. '4 Y 
Tr\f~s. J;ln 16. 20OX. ,it jZ20 (iitsctiss~rig the ,~nitrtymous "h'ltcful e-rn,iiis" i%hich ~lrct11,tted 
for month\, \preadrng lies ~ h o u t  Pres~dent Oharna's Intenttctns) 
i s 9  k c  t igtlt IheSmears corn, 1 lie I ruth tbotit lhrclck Ob%ima's I '11th. 
11ttp my hdrackobdmd corn pagelinvite~Christian (last vi\tted aiept 21, 2 0 0 8 )  idtspetling 
the rnytl~s behlnd Isrestdent Oban~d'i  farth), bllch;lel lhmock. Uc/rt>f J/mt Ohtirntr I\ llirr/iitt 
/ \  i>rrrtrh/iv ficj~rrtir\iin- ilrtt Iio\i L I A C ~ L  to Suc11 Ijc~rtzot rirfit C of(,\ ,  1 % ~  RI\E \ I < C  li ( I R  , 
July 15. 2008,  hrtp pewrescare11 orgtpubs~XYX/ bel~et-that-ohatna-~~-rn~~sItm-~s-btpdri~- 
'o~lt-most-likely-to-\tr,ay-tiemocrat~ (noting that thc bcl~cf that tlicn-Senator Oh'irna way 
Iluslrm did not akfcct the Republtcrtn voter\, but d ~ d  affect certaln Ilcrnocrat~c Lotcrs) 
360 ';L.c J O \ r \ i  t i \ V  L?,ITII< 1111, 1 t l F  b C 1 1  RF Ol- rlib ~ ' I T F R v T T  $21) f IOi4  I 0  SlOl' l i 138 
(3008) (dcrailrng ~lrctlmstanccs \urroundtng LVlkipedld incident) 
361 373 E 3d 372,406-07 (3d Ctr 2004) 
362 icI 
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disasters and other etnergencies,7h' the court was correct in observing that 
there is ti paucity of permanent, interactive websites devoted to primarily 
local or municipal political or other public affairs.363 
As noted in Part I ,  the FCC's policymaking in the area of broadcast 
localism lias been murky, but there is general scholarly agreement that 
localisnl is an instrurnentalist policy-not an end in itself, but a means to 
the closely linked objectives of political and cultural enrichment.3h5 
Governance in the Unitcd States is atomized and localized by constitutional 
design. The decentralization of democracy enables citizens to "learn," 
personalize, and experiment with democracy at the neighborhood level. 
Society can thereby respond to the specialized interests of individual 
citizens while forming a strong foundation and substrate for democratic 
inkmation and innovation, all for the benetit of state and federal 
government.'" Policies promoting media provision of local political and 
public affairs content support not only these local deliberative democratic 
efforts, but also the closely related objectives of promoting a sense of local 
community and culture and a spirit of neighborliness and shared 
enterprise.'67 By -~alorizing coverage of local political, educational, 
commercial, and even agricultural news on commercial broadcasting 
stations,'""he FCC endeavored to preserve what was distinct about local 
363 kc . ,  6. q , Keith '\xllne, C'rutqi/irt b L~I.\IO K U ~ T E I ~ L I ,  W I K ~ I J  COM, Sept. 1 ,  7005, 
http 14c\w wlrcd com1mcdtecIt1he~lt1~~ncws~7005~09i687110 (dr\cuss~ng how class~fied 
.~dve~.tis~ng t4ebsite C'r'tigsl~st pro~~cied mtrch-neccled help to cictlms of tiurricane Katrlna In 
the New Orleans area, I~clplng locate ln~sstrlg persons 'tnd match~ng sunrtors in need of 
Gtssrstdncc wttl? reilcf personnel). 
3 Jcr i3r.otrrrtl?ctrt I<LIL/IO, 371 F 3d at 372 (holding thdt the FCC ~napprc>priately 
~ceighted the lttternct as a \rrbst~tute fix local teleclslon stdtlons In dnerslty Index); see ulw, 
I .  g , .lames E. Scott, ' E  " rhe People Do lhrnrc rpcil Goi~ernrnent IVeh Sitcr Support Plihlrc 
Involtrtrrmt', 66 I'r 13 Xnblru I ~ F V  341, 349 (2006), 'zt'u~luhle at 
littp./ www ppmrn ncti~n~agesircsources/scott -2006 pdf (repomng results of survey 
illvoivlng otficiai gocernment websttes of 100 largest Americdn cltles, and coilclud~ng that 
.'[~ln gefteral, our ~csearch found Lery l~ttle evidence that U S. mun~cipal Web sltes iupport 
\~gn~fic,mt public ~nvolvcmcnt") 
6 5  ,YL#~ N-~IJOLI.  i i l p ~ . ~ ~  note 42, dt 205 (stating that localism hds trad~tionally heen 
pcrce~ved as il way to ,tchrece broader social objective\) 
366 &Sc~e ttl (noting that localism has figured in tlie desrgn ~ n d  functlon~ng of socral 
Instltutlons arid ha\ playcd an Important role in "the d~strlbunon of  gobernmental corltrol in 
the Lnited States"), \cc itlro R~chard i3riff6iult, OEIT Lot~lr\tn 13urt I I - L o L L I I I ~ ~ ~  lrntl Leqcll 
Theom, 90 C'OLLV L REV 346, 394 (1990) (paraphras~ng Gerald Frug's argument that 
transfer of power ro local governments \ciII enhance pollt~cal partleipatron of ~ndlviduals); 
Gerald Frug. The <'it, tr\ t r  L,equl C'ontept. 93 t i . 2 ~ ~  L REV 1057, 1 153 -54 ( 1980) 
iconclud~ng that the concept of communlty 1s probably the most s~gn~licant aspect of the 
localism prlnc~ple). 
367 ,%c Nni>ot I ,  rr~prrr note 42, at 219(conclud1ng that concept of communlty is 
probrtbly the most s~gnificant 'lspect of the locdl~sm pr~nclple). 
368 See l'arona, 5zrprcr note 7. at 19 (stating that the kKC requlred ~ n ~ t l d l  statlon 
,ippl~cants to Irst ueeklq programming In entertainment, rellg~ous, commerc~al, cducattonal, 
,tgricultural, and fratern'il areas) 
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communities across the United States and prevent network broadcasting 
from homogenizing the nation into one impersonal "mass society."369 
1. Are Online Communities Undermining Local Communities on Terra 
Firma? 
There is no disputing the Internet's ability to foster virtual communities. 
Its wide availability and relatively open architecture enable geographically, 
culturally, and sociajly distant people who share common interests or 
problems to find one another and form relationships online. The Internet 
allows users to transcend the limitations of physicality not only by bridging 
distance but also by preempting prejudgments triggered by social and 
visual cues and the physical manifestations of socioeconomic status. Its 
egalitarianism can help bring about pure exchanges of ideas, unencumbered 
by racist, sexist, ethnic, abilist, ageist, or other biases.370 At times, perhaps, 
it may even serve as a rooting medium for Aristotelian "perfect" 
friendships formed on the basis of mutual admiration of mind rather than 
extrinsic at t r ib~tes .~~'  A number of recent studies conclude that Internet- 
and especially broadband-use can promote sociality by helping people 
make connections online that evolve into in-the-flesh friendships and 
ultimately wider and deeper social networks.372 
369. See NAPOLI, supra note 42, at 207-08 (recognizing that "mass society" is viewed as 
a threat to unique aspects of local communities and noting communications policymakers' 
action to preserve local culture). 
370. As the famous cartoon by Peter Steiner aptly put it, "On the Internet, nobody 
knows you're a dog." Peter Steiner, NEW YORKER, July 5, 1993, at 61. It bears noting, 
however, that in a study of online deliberation, Professor Lincoln Dahlberg found that some 
demographic distinctions and privileges offline can reemerge in online discussions: 
"Participation is, in fact, both quantitatively aad qualitatively dominated by those already 
powerful offline (politically active, educated, white, males)." He particularly found that 
gender distinctions offline replicated themselves online: "Not only are there many more men 
than women posting. . . but also a masculine, agonistic style of discouse predominates 
despite the high level of respect fostered." See Lincoln Dahlberg, The Internet and 
Democratic Discourse, 4 INFO., COMM. & SOC'Y 615, 626 (2001), available at 
http://1.cirib.ir/artic1es/pdfdcd1%5CIngenta~Sages/ArticIes_on~l 94_225_11-89/Ingenta918.pdf 
(noting prevatling nature of masculine online activity to emphasize disproportionate amount 
of Internet activity by different social groups). 
371. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 142-44 (H.G. Apostle trans., Peripatetic Press 
1984). "Perfect" friendship, according to Aristotle, is that which is based exclusively on 
mutual admiration and appreciation of intrinsic qualities and character, instead of extrinsic 
attributes such as wealth (as in the case of 'ktilitarian" friendships) or beauty (as with 
fiendships rooted in "pleasure"), which are much less apparent in online exchanges. 
"Perfect friendship is the friendship of men who are good, and alike in virtue; for these wish 
well alike to each other qua good, and they are good in themselves." Id at 143. Aristotte 
cautioned, however, that a perfect friendship "require[s] time and familiarity; for, as the 
proverb says, it is impossible for men to know each other well until 'they have consumed 
together much salt."' Id. at 144. So although cyberspace may birth them, perfect 
fi-iendships may need terra firma to mature. 
372. See CWDWICK, supra note 185, at 104-05 (summarizing numerous studies finding 
The decentralized, geographically untethered communities forged online 
in some ways may promote rather than undermine deliberative democracy. 
Although the concerns raised convincingly by Professor Sunstein and 
others about the harms of fragmentation and polarization of online 
discourse are convincing, it is not hard to recognize the value that online 
meeting spaces provide for geographically dispersed communities of 
common interest. Habermas himself recognized the benefits of 
decentralized, subgroup deliberation as helping to hone the viewpoints of 
subgroups, allowing them to be more legitimately and persuasively 
presented later on in the broader public sphere.373 In-group discussion also 
can enable subgroup members to develop better deliberation skills, thereby 
enriching the quality of the discourse in the wider discussions both in 
substance as well as 
Of course, some communities of interest that have formed discussion 
and mutual support groups online did so to fill the absence of community- 
building opportunities in members' geographic localities, A Muslim 
African-American struggling with isolation and discrimination in a 
predominantly white and Christian rural area can connect with a cornunity 
of geographically dispersed peers online and tap into resources-including 
political training materials and religious fellowship-that otherwise would 
have been out of reach. Similarly, an intellectually precocious teenager 
living in an economically and culturally impoverished community with no 
public museum and with a public library starved of resources can feed an 
avid interest in modern art by connecting to arts communities online. 
Yet despite the Internet's ability to conquer the happenstance of physical 
proximity in fostering disembodied communities of interest, its power to 
enhance political engagement in local terra firrna communities is 
underutilized. Some studies, in fact, demonstrate that engagement in online 
social networking can increase isolation and social disconnection by 
allowing attenuated interpersonal ties online to displace opportunities for 
the initiation of deeper relationships with in-the-flesh neighbors nearby.375 
that the "Net's effects on actual social networks have tended to be quite positive,"including 
one study that found that "Internet users knew three times as many local people as nonusers 
and were more likely to talk to their neighbors and to invite them round to their homes"). 
373. See Jiirgen Habermas, Further Reflections an the Public Sphere, in HABERMAS AND 
THE PUBLIC SPHERE 422 (Craig Calhoun ed., Thomas Burger trans., 1993) (explaining that 
the "contemporary scene has changed," shaping new perspectives in social-scientific 
research); see also Froomkin, supra note 33, at 4. 
374. See Habermas, supra note 373, at: 422. Of course, it would be important to prevent 
the in-group deliberati~n~from venturing into extremism and polarization, by ensuring that 
the subgroup indeed does engage regularly with the wider, more diverse public sphere. 
375. See, e.g., Michael W. Foley & Bob Edwards, Is It Time to Disinvest in Social 
Cupital?, 19 J .  PUB. POL'Y 141 (1999) (analyzing "social capital"); NORMAN H. NIE & LUTZ 
ERBRING, STAN, U. INST. FOR THE QUANTITATIVE STUDY OF SOC'Y, INTERNET AND SOCIETY: 
Political scientist Richard Davis, for example, has written about how "[tlhe 
demise of geographical boundaries, so touted as a boon of the Internet, also 
can reduce a sense of physical community to isolated individuals tied 
virtually to other isolated individuals but unconnected to those who are 
actually physically proximate."376 B~ enabling us to satisfy our need for 
community by relating online with distant digital "neighbors," the Internet 
can thwart the democratic benefits inherent in learning how to understand 
and accommodate the beliefs and needs of neighbors very different from 
ourselves. Professor William A. Galston posits that "[iln a diverse 
democratic society, politics requires the ability to deliberate, and to 
compromise, with individuals unlike oneself. When we find ourselves 
living cheek by jowl with neighbors with whom we differ but from whose 
propinquity we cannot easily escape, we have powerful incentives to 
develop modes of acc~mmodation.""~ The Internet provides that "easy 
escape" for citizens who wish to avoid the hard work of engaging with 
local community by instead forging online communities with the 
likeminded. Why engage in the shared enterprise of community-building 
with proximate but different and even difficult neighbors when one can 
build one's ideal community online, entering and exiting it at the click of a 
mouse? 
This propensity of the Internet to exacerbate civic disengagement and 
the dilution of local community identity clearly works against the 
communitarian, democratic objectives of the media localism principle. The 
hyperindividualism of cyberspace may not only make it difficult to 
engender deliberative democratic values online, but also render users so 
autonomous from both government and their neighbors that it may 
undermine democracy in the brick-and-mortar world. Professor Michael 
Sandel has long bemoaned the unraveling of American civic life and our 
A PRELIMINARY REPORT (2000), avuilable at 
http://www.stanford.edulgroup/siqss/Press~ReleaseiPreliminary_Report.pdf (reporting 
survey results showing that respondents reporting regular Internet use "feel that it has 
reduced their time with friends and family, or attending events outside the home"); see ulso 
CHADWICK, supra note 185, at 84-88 (summarizing the results from numerous studies 
showing the Internet's negative social effects). 
376. DAVIS, supra note 5, at 146. 
377. William A. Galston, The Impact of the Internet on Civic Life: An Early Assessment, 
in GOVERNANCE.COM: DEMOCRACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 215, at 47. 
Galston concludes that "[olnline groups can fulfill important emotional and utilitarian needs, 
but they must not be taken as solutions for our current civic ills." Id, at 56. Andrew Shapiro 
agrees that "[allthough choice is a benefit to the Internet, it's also a weakness" insofar as 
"happenstance of location, climate, and natural resources . . . creates dependencies between 
individuals and groups, and thus creates deep long-lasting communal bonds." Andrew L. 
Shapiro, The Internet Discozrrages Social Interaction, in THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION 64 
(Laura K. Egendorf ed., 2004). 
sense of moral duty to the exercise of politically engaged citizenship."' 
Similarly, Professor Robert D. Putnam has argued that the general trend 
away from civic and local community engagement and toward more 
individualistic, consumerist endeavors has contributed to a weakening of 
the "social capital" we need to sustain a strong and vibrant democracy.37" 
It is not difficult to see how the Internet has contributed to, and perhaps 
even accelerated, these disturbing trends. 
In light of the preceding analysis, it would be reasonable to conclude 
that the Internet's evolution, left largely to the commercial marketplace, 
has fallen far short of realizing the goals of universality: exposure to a 
diversity of viewpoints and speakers, local political and public affairs 
content, and a vibrant deliberative democracy in an online marketplace of 
ideas. Despite the expectation of many cyberlibertarians that freedom from 
government intervention would enable a vibrant democracy-enriching, 
deliberative culture to flourish online, what is prevalent today on the 
Internet is fragmentation, censorship, diffusion, very little use of the 
Internet for local democratic engagement, and more anarchy and autocracy 
than democracy. The Internet not only may be failing to support 
democracy online, it also may be subverting democracy on terra firma. 
The question before us, however, should not be what the Internet is 
doing to our democracy as much as what our democracy, and specifically 
our government, should be doing on the Internet to help realize its fullest 
potential as an instmment for deliberative democratic engagement and 
political expression and ed~cation.'~' Toward that end, this Part discusses 
a number of specific interventions the federal government can undertake in 
adopting a more proactive role in cultivating the Internet as a democratic 
instrument. Not all of these proposals are novel, and other scholars have 
advanced many other good and worthy ideas in support of a more proactive 
governmental role in promoting digital democracy.3" These proposals are 
378 See gerrerallv MICHAEL J .  SANDFL, DFMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AVERICA IN 
SFARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY ( 1 996). 
379 See generaity ROBERT D. PUTJAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL 
OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000). 
380. I borrow thls idea from Professor Putnam, who eloquently wrote, '-The most 
tmportant question 1s not what the Internet will do to us, but what we wlil do with tt. liow 
can we use the enormous potentlal o f  computer-med~ated communlcatlon to make our 
In\ estments m soclal capltal more productive?" Id at 180. 
781 See genemily DEMOCRACY ONLINE, szlpra note 33 (present~ng many tnnovatlve 
ideas, theonzed as well as realized. lnvolv~ng the use o f  the Internet for democratic 
engagement and governance); SUNSTEIN, Jzrpra note 58, at 190-21 1 (proposing, lnter aha. 
dellberatlve domains onilne, self-regulat~on, and nomatlve and government subsidies); 
Patnc~a Aufderhelde, The 1996 Telecornrnz~t~~cat~on. Act. Ten Yeczrs Later, 58 FFD. COMM. 
not a panacea for all that ails democracy--online and on terra firma. Much 
more can be done. The interventions below, however, would help realize 
some of the goals of the broadcast public interest standard-a ubiquitous 
electronic marketplace of ideas presenting a diversity of viewpoints, local 
" political information, and opportunities for deliberative engagement-in a 
dynamic, interactive, and capacious digital environment much more 
capable than broadcasting of achieving some of these objectives. 
The proposals are arranged in two interrelated parts. The first discusses 
opportunities for more affirmative, direct government support for universal 
broadband access. The second discusses government interventions that, 
presuming access, would help realize broadband's democratic promise 
while mitigating some of its antidemocratic tendencies. 
A. IntensiJied Federal Eforts in Support of Broadband Universality 
I .  Assessing the Challenge 
Universal service has been a longtime goal at the core of American 
communications Its roots can be traced to the establishment of 
the American postal system, which achieved nearly ubiquitous access by 
means of the use of subsidies from profitable, heavily-utilized routes to 
build out post roads and post offices in more remote and underutilized parts 
of the nation.383 Universal service programs found enthusiastic support 
from the academic community in the second half of the twentieth century, 
with a new awareness of its positive network externalities-the democratic, 
social, and economic benefits gleaned by society as the size of the 
L.J. 407, 412-13 (2006) (describing ideas currently in circulation by organizations with 
interests in nonprofits and suggesting approaches such as encouraging entry of new players, 
government support for standards-setting, and privileging open access zones in spectrum 
policy); Goodman, supra note 8, at 1465-68 (discussing importance of reform proposals 
that, inter alia, "boost consumption of and critical engagement with" public service content); 
SHAPIRO, supra note 339, at 203 (discussing detailed proposals for a "PublicNet" discussion 
space online); Gey, supra note 268, at 1535 (proposing doctrinal modifications to public 
forum doctrine to allow more public access to online spaces). 
382. See NAPOLI, supra note 42, at 177 (discussing the centrality of universal service in 
communications regulation); see ulso Milton Mueller, Universal Service in Telephone 
History, 17 TELECOMM. POL'Y 352, 352 (1993) (noting that '"universal service' is one of the 
most commonly cited principles of telecommunications policy"). The universal service 
ideal in telecommunications can be traced as far back as Alexander Graham Bell, the 
telephone's inventor, who is quoted as declaring that the ubiquity of telephone service is so 
important to the success of the technology that "a telephone in every house would be 
considered indispensable." ROBERT W. GARNET, THE TELEPHONE ENTERPRISE 12 (1 985). 
383. See STARR, supra note 7, at 88 (describing the development of the postal service 
network and noting the formation of 2,476 new routes between 1792 and 1828); see ulso 
RICHARD R. JOHN, SPREADING THE NEWS: THE &ERICAN POSTAL SYSTEM FROM FRANKLIN 
TO MORSE 49 (1995) (discussing Congress's involvement in the expansion of the postal 
service system). 
communications network 
Congress articulated the universal service principle as "mak[ing] 
available, so far as possible, to all people of the United States . . . a rapid, 
efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communications 
service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges."'x5 Although 
criticized for lacking specific requirements,386 this statutory language 
served as the basis for numerous FCC interventions aimed at proliferating 
low-cost telephone service across the nation.387 That focus has resulted in 
telephone service penetration that has leveled off at approximately 94% in 
384. One of the earliest and most influential pieces of scholarship detailing the dynamics 
of positive network externalities in the expansion of communications networks was by Dr. 
Jeffrey Rohl fs. Jeffery Rohl fs, A Theory c?flnterdependent Demund,/br a Commzrnicutions 
Senlice, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 16 (1974); see ~11sn Nicholas Economides, The 
Economics o$iVetworks, 14 INT'L J .  INDIJS. ORG. 673 (1996) (analyzing the major economic 
features of networks); LESTER D. TAYLOR, TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEMAND IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 9 ( 1994) (describing two types of demand externalities associated with the 
telephone-the call externality and the network externality); Michael L. Katz & Carl 
Shapiro, Network E-~ternulities, Competition, and Cornpatibilitv, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424 
( 1985) (analyzing network externalities derived from the consumption of goods). 
385. 1934 Communications Act, 37 U.S.C. 9 15 1 (2000). 
386. See, e.g., Larry Pressler & Kevin V. Schieffer, ,4 Proposal fbr Universul 
Telec~ommrrnictrtions Service, 40 F E D .  COMM. L.J. 35 1 ,  368 ( 1988) (noting that "[plerhaps no 
other regulatory goal has been so extensively discussed without an established definition as 
ilniversai service"); see trlso NAPOLI, supra note 42, at 177 (observing that "the universal 
service principle has frequently been criticized for lacking a precise definition"); Patricia 
Aufderheide, Univer.~al Sewic,e; Telephone Policy in the Public Interest, 37 J .  COMM. 8! 
(1987) (asserting that the phrase "universal service" is used at the FCC without an adequate 
working definition). 
387. See Angela J .  Campbell, Universcrl Srr~lice Provisions: The 'Ugl)~ Dzrckling ' crf'the 
I996 iict. 29 CONN. L. REV. 187. 189 ( 1996) (noting that the 1934 Communications Act's , \ " 
universal. service provision se&d as' the legislative basis for regulations and policies 
concerning the averaging of interstate toll rates, using long-distance proceeds to subsidize 
local toll service, the provision of accessibility services to the hearing impaired, and deeply 
discounted installation and continuing toll service to low-income households). 
The first wave of universal service requirements was aimed at having the monopolist 
AT&T build out the telephone network to rural and remote areas by means of proceeds 
generated from surcharges on services to more profitable, densely populated areas. See 
Nr~poi.l, .sirpru note 42, at 178 (noting that universal service is typically associated "with 
subsidization policies targeted at low-income and high-cost customers"). Later. the FCC's 
universal service policies expanded to allow for the subsidization of telephone service to 
low-income households by means of surcharges on more profitable business and long- 
distance services. Campbell, strpra note 387, at 189; see also Allen S. Hammond IV, The 
Telecommlmicirtions rict 0/' 1996: Cbd~fiing /he Digitrrl Divide, 50 F E D .  COMM. L.J. 179, 
194 ( 1997) (noting that telephone companies "were allowed to subsidize the cost of serving 
poor, rural, and other less profitable customers with higher margin clients such as downtown 
businesses"). The "Lifeline Assistance" and "Link-Up America" telephone access subsidy 
programs, which provide significant discounts to low-income households for initial 
telephone installation and continuing service, are funded by the Universal Service 
Fund, which in turn is administered by the Universal Service Administrative Company, 
a quasi-governmental entity statutorily charged with coordinating the collection of 
universal service subsidies from telecommunications providers and fttnding universal 
service programs with the proceeds. See Christine M. Mason, Lrniver.strl Service in the 
Schools: One Step Too Far?, 50 F E D .  COMM. L.J. 237, 239--40 (1997). 
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the years since 1995.'" AS noted above, Congress and the FCC also 
applied universal service objectives to broadcasting. 
a. Existing Federal Efforts to Proliferate Internet Access-Lack of' 
Prioritization 
In contrast to its affirmative interventions toward universal service in 
telephony and broadcasting, the federal government heretofore has not 
targeted the proliferation of Internet access, and specifically broadband 
access, with aggressive federal support. Federal resistance to a more 
proactive approach to broadband proliferation has been rooted, not only in 
the market iiber alles mindset of the Reagan Revolution and its progeny,38Y 
but also in the misapprehension that the Internet is a luxury that the 
government has no legitimate role in promoting. President George W. 
Bush's first FCC Chairman, Michael Powell, memorably manifested this 
perspective in discussing the relatively low penetration rate of computer 
technologies in low income, rural, and of-color communities. He compared 
such access to owning a luxury automobile: "You know, I think there's a 
Mercedes divide. I'd like to have one; I can't afford one."300 Recent 
statements from the FCC leadership indicate an increased awareness of the 
importance of universal access to broadband, but the pronouncements have 
not been supported by a proactive and comprehensive federal effort to 
catalyze broadband proliferation.391 In addition, although details of the 
proposed federal economic stimulus legislation were starting to be released 
as this article went to press, its components addressing broadband 
proliferation were criticized as much too modest to be effective.jV2 
388. See JOSEPH S. KRAEMER ET AL., THE PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUNDATION, THE 
MYTHS AND REALITIES OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE, REVISITING THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE 
CURRENT STUDY STRUCTURE 6 (2005) (indicating that nationwide telephone penetration had 
stabilized at about 94% by the mid- 1990s). 
389. .See Hammond, supra note 253, at 1 3 6 3 8  (tracing the market-driven approach to 
Internet and telecon~munications proliferation). 
390. Frank James, FCC4 Porvell Makes Clear Contrtrst ti~ith Pre~lec.es.~or, CHI. TKIB., 
Feb. 7, 2001, at N 1. Professor Cynthia Lanius, Executive Director of the Rice University 
Center for Excellence and Equity in Education, responded to Chaiman Powell by saying 
that "the issue is not, ' I  don't have a Mercedes.' The issue is, ' I  don't have a car."' Kobin 
Clewley, I Hzrve u (Digital) Dream, WIRED.COM, Apr. 27, 1001, 
http:/lwww.wired.com/politics/lawinews/OO 1/04/43349. 
391. ,See Leslie Cavley, Martin Wants Broadband Acro.ss USA, U S A  TODAY, Aug. 19, 
2008. t~ttp:l/www.usatoday.comitech/news/techpolicy/200-0- 19-fcc-martin_N,htm 
(quoting Chairman Kevin Martin's statements that "[tlhere's a social obligation in making 
sure everybody can participate in the next generation of broadband services" and that the 
FCC should "find new ways to address" that obligation). 
392. Spencer E. Ante & Arik Hessendahl, Brondhllnd Bill Dis~zppoint.~ ,YrtrrIj~ 
E\.rtyone, BUSINESSWEEK.COM, Jan. 17, 2009, 
http:/!www.biisinessweek.com/technology/content/an2009/tc00901 1 6-733609.htmG?campa 
ign _id=rss_topStories. 
In the years preceding the 1996 Teleco~n Act, Congress enacted a 
number of modest legislative efforts to promote computer and Internet 
access to the underprivileged. In 1994, Congress passed the Star Schools 
Program Assistance Act, which required the Department of Education 
(DOE) to award grants to schools and private-public partnership programs 
supporting computer-aided instruction to needy children.'"' A handful of 
other legislative programs concerning public education have encompassed 
the integration of technology in public school curricula as well as training 
for teachers on the use of computers in the classroo~n.'~)" 
Then, in the 1996 Telecom Act, Congress recognized that "[u]niversal 
service is an evolving level of teiecolnlnunications  service^"^"' and created 
the Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service (Joint Board). 
Congress tasked the Joint Board with making recommendations to the FCC 
on utiiversal service standards for new services and on how to spend 
universal service program funcis most e f f e c t i ~ e l ~ . ~ " ~ i t i n g  the "public 
interest, convenience, arid necessity"'" standard, Congress also enillneratcd 
the principles that should guide the work of the FCC and the Joint Boarct, 
iticlitiii~~g "just, reasonable, and affordable rates," "access to advanced 
telecoln~nunications and information services . . . in all regions of the 
Nation," anti "access in rural and high cost areas."'""he Act also 
contained a nutnber of provisions collectively known as the "E-Rate" 
progr:ui~. Those provisions require the FCC to develop mechanisnis to 
s~~bsidize disco~lnted telecommunications and "advanced" information 
services (incluciing Internet access) to health care providers, educational 
institutions, and libra~ies.'"~ 
In implementing Congress's directives, the Joint Board focused its 
recommendations for expanded universal service mechanisms on 
niauimi~ing access to telephony-based teleco~n~nunications services.J00 I t  
concludcct that household-level Internet access was not "essential to 
- 
303. 20 {I.S.C. $$ 7255---7255f (2006). 
303. For ail excellent sttmmary of such programs, see I'atricia M.  Worthy. R(lc.irrl 
\ / ~ I ~ O I . ~ ~ I ~ J . Y  O I I ~  i11e Q ~ I ~ I . S /  to  Ni~rrott) i/7e IXgii~11 L)ivi~/c>: Kc>dgjit?it7g /he C'ot7ccy)i ~ / ' U ~ I ~ I > C > I . . Y L I /  
. \ ' c ' ~ . ~ ~ i c , c * .  26 1 1  \S.l'lNtiS COMM. bi ENT. 1..1. 1, 37-38 (1003). 
305. 'fclecomrtittnications Act of 1996, Pub. 1.. No. 104-1 04, $ ?54(c)( 1 ), 1 10 Stat. 72 
( 1006). 
396. I t 1  $ 254(a)( l ). 
397. iii. $ 254(b)(7). 
308. 111. $ 154(b)( 1 )-(6). 
399. Id. $354(li). With respect to schools and libraries, the Act rcquiretf 
tclccctiiimttnications carriers upon a request by a qiralifying school or library for 
telccctnumunications and advanced information services to provide such services "at rates 
less t l i ;~n  the amounts charged for similar services to other pat-tics," with the amount of the 
ciiscouiit to be deterniitled by the FCC as "appropriate and necessary to ensure affordable 
acccss to auci t~se  of such services by st~ch etltitics." I t / .  $ 254(h)( l)(R). 
400. F:cdcral-State Joint Board on CJniversal Service, I? F.C.C.R. 8776 (1997). 
education, public health, or public safety," the guiding principle for 
universal service set forth in 5 254(c)(l) of the 1996 Telecom ~ c t . ~ "  The 
FCC adopted the Joint Board's recommendations, and implemented the 
1996 Telecom Act's E-Rate schools and libraries connectivity programs.4o2 
Five years later, Congress returned to the technological needs of schools in 
the No Child Left Behind Act, which in Part &-entitled "Enhancing 
Education Through the Use of Technology9'-provided funding for 
computer equipment, Internet access, and increased technoIogica1 training 
for students and teachers.403 
b. Mixed Results in Educational Connectivity Initiatives-Many 
Children Lejt Behind and Ofline 
In its latest repart on Internet penetration into public educational 
institutions, the DOE claims a progressive increase in the number of public 
schools and libraries connected ta the Internet attributed to the legislative 
and regulatory connectivity efforts in the 1990s and early 2 0 0 0 s . ~  The 
DOE reported that by 2005 virtually all American public schools had some 
sort of Internet access, compared to 3% in 1994."05 A closer look at the 
DOE'S statistics, however, paints a much less rosy picture. Although the 
DOE figures purport to show that virtually all schools have Internet access, 
the survey data show disparities in the avaiIability of in-classroom Internet 
access attributed to the predominant racial makeup of the 
Schools with minority enrollment of 21% and higher have 25% fewer 
- 
401. Id. at 8823; see also FederatState Joint Board on Universal Service, 18 F.C.C.R. 
2947-48 (2002) (declining to find that high-speed or advanced services satisfy the criterion 
that supported services be essential to education, public health, or public safety). 
Additionally, the FCC distinguished between the "tetecomunications services" addressed 
by the universal service provisions of the 1996 Telecom Act, and its provisions concerning 
"information services," under which Internet services are classified. Id. at 2947. This 
distinction garnered prompt and heated criticism. See N ~ L I ,  supra note 42, at 191 (noting 
that the points of distinction have been hotly contested in policy circles); Sean M. Foley, 
The Brewing Controversy over Internet Service Providers and the Universal Service Fund: 
A Third Generation Interpretation of Section 2.54, 6 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 245, 250 
(1998) (contending that the distinction is an unfortunate policy choice based on outdated 
regulatory terminology). 
402. FCC Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 12 F.C.C.R. 8776. For a 
detailed description of the federal universal service funding programs and mechanisms, see 
NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 160, at 339-52. 
403. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. It. No. 107-1 10, 115 Stat. 1445, 1623-31, 
1646-47,1671-75 (2001). 
404, See DEP'T OF EDUC., INTERNET ACCESS IN U.S. PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND CLASSROOMS: 
1994-2005, at 1-10 (2006) (presenting key findings from a 2005 survey on Internet access 
in public schools and selected comparisons with data from previous Fast Response Survey 
System Internet surveys). 
405. Id. at 4. 
406. Id. at 16. 
Internet-connected computers for student use than schools with lower than 
6% minority enrollment.407 Access to laptop loans for teacher and student 
projects also was significantly lower in schools with higher minority 
 enrollment^."^ 
In addition, the E-Rate program has been criticized as falling far short of 
what is necessary to address the lack of broadband connectivity and 
computer-based instruction in poor urban and rural school districts. For 
example, the Urban Institute documented that in many rural E-Rate-eligible 
schools a lack of general technology skills and technical support staff was 
impeding the incorporation of the Internet-in-the-classroom environment.409 
The Urban Institute concluded that in poor urban schools factors such as 
weak or nonexistent programs for technology training for teachers, the 
absence of technical support staff, inadequate electrical connections, and 
slow and unreliable Internet connections conspire to render E-Rate 
ineffective in many cases.410 These conditions in poor schools are 
especially troubling in light of how poor students living in households with 
no Internet access often depend on school-based Internet connections for 
access to online  resource^.^" The conditions are also alarming in 
democratic terms, in light of the Deweyan imperative of public education 
as vital in the preparation of young people to be politically informed and 
civically engaged 
407. Id. at 24. Whereas schools with minority enrollment of less than 6% have 3 
students per Internet-enabled computer, schools with 2 1% to 49% minority enrollment have 
4 students per such computer, and schools with majority minority enrollment have 4.1 
students per computer. Id. 
408. Id. at 16, 30. The Department of Education (DOE) reports that schools with less 
than 6% minority enrollment were more than twice as likely as schools with 21% or more 
minority enrollment to lend laptop computers to students for academic projects. Id. at 30. 
409. See The Urban Institute, The Integrated Studies of Educational Technology: A 
Formative Evaluation of the E-Rate Program v ~ i i  (2002), 
l~ttp://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410579~ERateFinalReport.pdf (draft). 
410. Id. The Urban Institute observed that "the mere availability of computers 
and the Internet does not mean that teachers are making use of what the new 
technology has to offer." Id. at 5. It cites a number of studies concluding that "it is not 
simply access to technology that is important for students, but rather how teachers 
use technology as a tool to enhance learning." Id.; see also E-Rate Fzinding 
Ca.sualties, TECH. & LEARNING ( A P ~ .  15, 200 1 ), 
http://archives.techlearning.comidb~area/archives/TL/200104/trendwatch.php ("Small 
schools say the 20 to 30 hours of [E-Rate] application time aren't worth the few 
thousand dollars they'd receive."). 
41 1. The National Science Foundation's 2006 statistics demonstrate that students living 
in high-income households were about three times as likely than those from poor families to 
have household-level Internet access (90% versus 32%), and that the same low-income 
students "were more than twice as likely to use a computer at school than at home . . . while 
high-income students used computers at only slightly different rates at the two locations." 
NAT'L SCI. BD., NAT'L SCI. FOUND., SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2006, at 1-6 
(2006), available ut www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind06. 
412. JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY & EDUCATION 1-12 (Macmillan 1916) (arguing that 
c. What Else Is at Stake-Advantages of Household Internet Access 
Beyond Democratic Engagement 
Although the focus of this Article is on the value of the Internet and 
particularly broadband access as a tool for expression and democratic 
engagement, it is important to recognize that household-level access offers 
very important benefits in closely related areas, including academic 
achievement, employment, and overall national economic productivity. 
Michigan State University recently published a two-year study on the 
academic effects of household Internet access in poor and mostly minority, 
single-parent families. It concluded that children with Internet at home 
earned higher standardized reading test scores and higher overall grade 
point averages than students without Internet access at home.'I3 Students' 
performance improved when they were able to access the Internet at home 
rather than having to rely on school or library access. Moreover, although 
the E-Rate program has allowed students whose families cannot afford or 
otherwise do not have access to household broadband service to use 
broadband connections at a neighborhood public library, in many cases 
library hours, location, and crime make it difficult to depend on such 
access.'14 
Not only is household Internet access important for especially low- 
income jobseekers, but lack of household access may foreclose some 
education is necessary to build communities and that education consists primarily of 
communication); see also LAWRENCE K. GROSSMAN, THE ELECTRONIC REPUBLIC 247 (1995) 
(quoting Moses Mather's 1775 declaration that "[tlhe strength and spring of every free 
government is the virtue of the people; virtue grows on knowledge, and knowledge on 
education"); Jennifer Kathleen Swartz, Beyond the Schoolhouse Gates: Do Students Shed 
Their Constitutional Rights When Communicating to a Cyber-Audience?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 
587, 588 (2000) (stating that the Internet has replaced books and letters as the 
communication device that connects students to the community). 
413. Linda A. Jackson et al., Does Home Internet Use Influence the Academic 
Performance of Low-Income Children?, 42 DEV. PSYCH. 3 (2006), available at 
http://www.apa.org/releases/dev423-jacksonpdf The study cohort was comprised of 140 
children (average age of 13.8 years), 83% African American, 58% boys and 42% girls, 75% 
of whom lived in single-parent homes with a median annual income of $15,000. Id. The 
DOE itself acknowledges that students with home Internet access achieve higher test scores 
than those who do not. Press Release, Nat'l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, The Nations' [sic] 
Report Card: Science 2000 (Nov. 20, 200 1 ), 
http://nces.ed.gov/whatsnew/commissioner/remarks2OO 1 1-20-200 1 .asp. The DOE 
studies also demonstrate a strong positive correlation between in-classroom instruction 
aided by Internet-connected computers and performance in standardized testing. See 
Worthy, supra note 394, at 42-43 (discussing numerous studies correlating instructional 
computer use with higher academic achievement). 
414. See Ian Urbina, Hopes for Wireless Cities Fade as Internet Providers Pull Out, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2008, at A10 (quoting fifteen-year-old Cesar DeLaRosa's statement 
that "[ilf we don't have Internet, that means I've got to take the bus to the public library 
after dark, and around here, that's not always real safe"). 
employment opportunities The lack of household Internet 
access also can significantly disadvantage already-employed individuals, 
since many employers encourage and even expect employees to access the 
workplace computer servers remotely to do work from home.416 
In terms of the national competitive consequences, Brookings Institute 
economist Charles Ferguson warns that the United States' lag in broadband 
deployment may cause the country to lose $1 trillion in productivity 
through 2014."' ~ o b e r t  Crandall (also with Brookings) and Charles 
Jackson estimate that affirmative government promotion of widespread 
household broadband adoption could generate 1.2 million new jobs and a 
$500 billion increase to the U.S. In July 2007, Crandall and 
several Brookings colleagues published the results of an empirical study on 
the efTects of increases in broadband penetration on economic output and 
employment.419 Among many notable findings, the study concluded that 
with "every one percentage point increase in penetration in a state, 
employment is projected to increase by 0.2 to 0.3 percent per year,"which 
translates to 300,000 jobs at the national 
415. See Worthy, supra note 394, at 46 (discussing how 'low-income jobseekers are 
much more likely to rely on the Internet to search for employment than are high-income 
jobseekers"); see also DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FALLING THROUGH THE NET: TOWARD IGITAL 
INCLUSION 50 (2000) (finding that the percentage of Internet users searching for jobs on the 
Internet declines as income increases). 
416. New Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Work at Home in 2004, at 1,4 (Sept. 22, 
2005), h~p:/iw.bls.govlnews.release/pdf/homey.pdf (reporting that as of May 2004, 20.7 
million people did work at home at least once a week for their primary job and 
approximately 70% of those people used the Internet). 
4 17. Thomas Bleha, Down to the Wire, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, May-June 2005, at 1 1 1, 121, 
available at http://~.foreignaffairs,org!20050501faessa843 1 lithomas-blehaldown-to- 
the-wire.htm1. 
418. Id. ("The large broadband-user markets of Northeast Asia will attract the 
innovation the United States once enjoyed. Asians will have the first crack at developing 
the new comercial applications, products, services, and content of the high-speed- 
broadband era."). 
419. ROBERT CRANDALL ET AL., BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, THE EFFECTS OF BROADBAND 
DEPLOYMENT ON OUTPUT AND EMPLOYMENT: A CROSS-SEC~ONAL ANAtYSIS OF U.S. DATA 
(2007), available at http:N~.brookings,eddreports/2007/061abor~cmndall,aspx. 
420. id. at 2. The researchers also concluded that "state output of goods and services is 
positively associated with broadband use." Id, In 2006, Massachusetts Institute of 
Tecknology published the results of a study that found that between 1998 and 2002, 
cornunities in which broadband service was available by 1999 saw rapid expansion in the 
number of businesses (i.e., employers) and jobs, particularly in information-technology- 
specific sectors of the economy. See WILLIAM H, LEHR ET AL., MEASURM~ BROADBAND'S 
ECONOMIC IMPACT (20061, available at 
http:llcSp.mit,eddpublications/CFP~Papers/Measuring~bbeconimpact-finapdf. Other 
commentators have noted that the United States' falling behind other developed nations in 
broadband penetration will have serious competitive consequences, See, e.g., Bleha, supra 
note 417, at 112 ("By dislodging the United States from the lead it c o m m d e d  not so long 
ago, Japan and its neighbors have positioned themselves to be the first states to reap the 
benefits of the broadband era: economic growth, increased productivity, technological 
innovation, and an improved quality of life."). 
8 6 A D~C~INISTRA TIVE LAW RE VIEW [61:1 
In addition, the nation's lag in broadband penetration and pricing 
efficiency has inhibited the positive network externalities that come with 
near-universal broadband availability, such as advances in telemedicine to 
deliver quality healthcare to inore patients (particularly the poor and 
geographically remote)? improved public safety,"" higher education and 
distance learning,J23 and employee telecommuting. Telecommuting itself is 
an important response to traffic congestion, high energy costs, and 
increased pollution.424 
President Bush referred to a number of these benefits of universal 
broadband access in 2004 when he declared that "[wle ought to have a 
42 1. See Broadbund Enables Better Health Care at Reduced Cost for More Americans, 
t-IOSP. BUS. WK., Nov. 5, 2007, at 220 ("The expansion of broadband internet service has 
facilitated the development of telemedicine technologies improving healthcare to more 
Americans at a reduced cost."). According to Neil Neuberger, President of Wealth Tech 
Strategies, LLC, "[tlhe critical prerequisite to success for growing small regional e-health 
programs into a national healthcare agenda is to bring high-speed broadband to every comer 
of America." Id. 
422. CAL. BROADBAND TASK FORCE, THE STATE OF CONNECTIVITY: BUILDMG 
INNOVATION THROUGH BROADBAND, FINAL REPORT I5 (2008), avuilable at 
http:l/www.calink.ca.gov/pdE/CBTFFFINAL_R.pdf (discussing the effect of ubiquitous 
broadband on law enforcement and emergency response services in particular). 
423. See, e.g., Austan Goolsbee, Higher Education: Promises for Future Delive?, in 
THE ECONOMIC PAYOFF ROM THE INTERNET REVOLUTION 269, 269-83 (Robert E. Litan & 
Alice M. Rivlin eds., 2001) (examining the past and future of the Internet education market). 
424. See, e.g., Timothy Karr, America's Ne.xt Moon Shot: Iilternet ,for Everyone, 
EIUFFINGTON POST, June 25, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/timothy-karr/americas- 
next-moon-shot-i-b-109217.html. Karr quotes Robin Chase, the founder of Zipcar, as 
saying that the Internet "is required for full participation in society today" and is 
"fundamental to maintaining a high quality of life and for addressing such pressing social 
problems as America's energy dependency." Id.; see ulso ROBERT D. ATKINSON, THE 
~NFoRMATION TECHNOLOGY AND ~NNOVATION FOUND., THE CASE FOR A NATIONAL 
BROADBAND POLICY 8 (2007), uvailuble at http:/lwww.itif.org/index.php?id=52 
(discussing how widescale broadband deployment increases telecommuting, which is 
shown to increase individual worker productivity and job satisfaction while reducing 
traffic congestion, environmental contaminants, and energy use). Brookings Institution 
economist Robert E. Litan argues that expanded broadband deployment to senior citizens 
and persons with disabilities would result in cumulative savings and concordant output 
increases of at least $927 billion by 2030. ROBERT E. LITAN, NEW MILLENNIUM 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, GREAT EXPECTATIONS: POTENTIAL ECONOMIC BENEFITS TO THE 
NATION FROM ACCELERATED BROADBAND EPLOYMENT O OLDER AMERICANS AND 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES 3 (2003,  available at 
http://www.newmillenniumresearch.org/archive/LitanFINAL120805.pdf. Litan posited 
that increased broadband penetration in these groups would result in "lower medical costs 
for both seniors and individuals with disabilities. . . ; lower costs fiom delayed or avoided 
institutionalized living arrangements for senior citizens and individuals with disabilities; and 
additional output made possible by increased labor force participation by individuals in both 
groups." Id. at 2; see also KRISHNA JAYAKAR & HARMEET SAWHNEY, BENTON FOUND., 
UN~VERSAL ACCESS IN THE ~NFORMATlON ECONOMY: TRACKING POLICY INNOVATIONS 
ABROAD 10 (2007), available at http:llwww.benton.org/bentonfiles/Jayakar~Sawhey.doc 
(concluding that universal broadband access "is not just a social ideal or a redistributive 
tool, but an economic imperative with consequences for job creation, international 
competitiveness and individual empowerment"). 
u~~tversal. ~tf'l-'orclable access for broadband technology by the year 2007."~~' 
But his Adrninistrat~on persisted in relying almost exclusively 011 
~narketplace cornpetition to cleliver that universality. That reliance was 
misplaccd, as demonstrated by the international household broadband 
penetration, speed, and pricing coinparisons discussed in Part 11 and the 
persistent problems in school accessibility discussed in this Part. Professor 
Lawrence Lessig observes that "[wlhat's bizarre about where we are in the 
history of building infrastructure is that this is the first time we have tried 
to undertake the building of fundamental social infrastructure against the 
background of a Neanderthal philosophy, which is that you don't need 
government to do As a threshold matter, therefore, the 
federal government should recognize that broadband access is an essential 
component of modern infrastructure that not only provides opportunities 
tbr democratic engagement and expression, but when universalized, yields 
significant spillover economic, educational, employment, and other 
b e n e f ? t ~ . ~ ~ ~  
2. Inc.re~~.ring Direct Federal Subsidies fi,r Brocc~fia~~d Deplo-yment 
The government's efforts at promoting broadband proliferation would 
not be as modest as they have been if it regarded high-speed Internet as a 
vital element of the nation's infrastru~ture.~~' Faced with a nascent 
electrical industry that would not extend its networks to less urban areas 
because ofthe high costs and low returns associated with nonurban service, 
President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal Administration created a new 
kind of utility-an electric cooperative-designed to build out electric 
-125. Ljonny Jackson, I'r-rstdent Bzrrlz C'nIls for Uril\er\ i i l  Brocidbtrntl, 
Tr r t P H O N Y  Out I N F ,  44 ar 29, 2004, 
http /, telephonyonltne corn~broadband/web~tcIccom~restdent~bush~c~~lls/ 
426 Karr, \lrprci tiote 424 Professor Lcssrg contrntted: 
Shat Neanderthal philowphy has go\erned for about the last eight years, and rt has 
allotlied us to slide froni n leader in this field to an dbysrnal posttton. Qnd it's about 
ttme when people recognire that of course the prlvate sector has a role, '1 central role, 
maybe the most tmpot-tanr role, but it's never enough. 
W 
327 In drgutrig forcefully in fhvor of a greater Awareness of positive rietwork 
cxtcrnailties and the consequences of the far-reaching dcletertous digital ciivtde, I'rofessor 
Allen S klammond 1V Rrttes that "[tjhe network is an evolvtng national asset crttical to our 
tiemocrricy, natronal defense, cducatlon, economtc competitiveness, And physical well- 
being " f lamrnoiid, \ztpru note 153, at 156 
328. The dtscussron in this Article concerntng untvcrsal broadband senice. like the 
Scctlorls thiit tollotv it, focuses on proposals for dtrect federal interwntlon. kor excellent 
proposals toward Lint\ersal cervlce tnvolving regulatory interventions that would erltail 
contributtons from telccommun~cat~ons providers 'ind other cro5s-subsidies. see Allen S 
i Iarftmond 1 V, L'r7~t crral Srri~rc r Prohlt~rnc, Solurrowc, nnd Re>pnn>~t,t. f Jo / t~  irr, 57 FI- D 
C O ~ I ~ I  L J 187, 193-97 (2005). 
gnds to rural and other underserved areas.429 The electric cooperatives 
received significant support from the federal government, including grants, 
and low- or no-interest loans for the construction of generation plants and 
distribution towers and lines.430 Focused, comprehensive, and well-funded 
federal intervention ensured that all populated areas of the nation were 
connected to the electric grid.433' Twenty-five years later, President Dwight 
D. Eisenhower agreed with Congress to prioritize the construction of an 
interstate highway system to bridge distances between population centers, 
spur commerce, and serve the national defense. The federal government 
allocated $27 billion in funding over a ten-year period.432 The economic 
and social returns on this investment were evident as soon as construction 
of the 4 1,000-mile Interstate Highway System commenced.433 
Despite rhetoric to the contrary, the federal government has not made 
similar significant investments in helping build out a broadband 
infrastructure. Although the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) 
Rural Utilities Service (RUS) has administered a loan program that has 
helped fund some local utilities' attempts to build out broadband to 
underserved areas, the program has been criticized for neglectful 
In addition, experts have criticized the RUS's exclusive 
reliance on loans-with no agency funds devoted to grants-as 
counterproductive and woefully inadequate for accelerating broadband 
deployment in areas neglected by commercial carriers."' Testifying before 
429. As Amity Shlaes notes, President Roosevelt had four goals. 
The fust was to provide electricity to homes and farms-many farms were still 
without. The second was to increase the use of electricity in all homes, providing 
Americans with a better standard of living. The third was to reduce the cost of 
electricity to the average consumer. And there was a fourth, more ephemeral goal: 
that through the electricity industry the New Deal might create a new and more 
prosperous form of society. 
A M ~ W  SHLAES, THE FORGO?T'EN MAN: A NEW HISTORY OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION 175 
(2007). 
430. Jim Cooper, Electric Cooperatives: From New Deal to Bad Deal?, 45 HARV. J .  ON 
LEGIS. 335,335-45 (2008). 
431. See id. at 347 ("Electric co-ops eventually reached virtually all potential 
customers."). 
432. High-Cost Universal Service Support, 23 F.C.C.R. 1539, 1561 (2008) (Copps, 
Comm'r, approving in part, concurring in part). Commissioner Copps calculated that in 
2005 dollars, the $27 billion allocated in the mid-1950s amounts to $196 billion. Id. at 
1561. 
433. See Michael E. Lewyn, Suburban Sprawl: Not Just an Environmental Issue, 
84 MARQ. L. REV. 301, 313-15 (2000) (noting that the federal govemment paid 90% of 
highway construction and maintenance costs). 
434. See Dan Morgan & Gilbert Gaul, Lawmakers May Refocus Rural Internet 
Financing, WASH. POST, May 2, 2007, at A5 (noting that despite the program's mission to 
help finance broadband deployment in rural areas, the Rural Utilities Service (RUS) has 
directed more than half of the available loan funds to projects in metropolitan areas). 
435. See JOHN WINDHAUSEN, JR., A BLUEPRINT FOR BIG BROADBAND: AN EDUCAUSE 
WHITE PAPER 31 (2008), available at http:Nnet.educause.edu~ir/librarylpdflEPOO8Ol.pdf 
Congress in October 2007, Curtis Anderson, the USDA's deputy 
administrator for the RUS, conceded that because companies find it very 
difficult to craft business models that would ensure repayment of loans 
used to build out broadband infrastructure in unserved areas, few 
companies seek the loans, and the RUS often does not exhaust its annual 
f i ~ n d i n g . ~ ~ ~  
In addition, the amount of direct subsidies allocated by the federal 
government for broadband deployment under new funding programs has 
been roundly criticized as inadequate in light of the enormity of the task, 
one FCC Commissioner characterizing it as "like fighting a bear with a fly 
swatter."437 In November 2007, the Universal Service Joint Board issued a 
Recommended Decision that addressed federal universal service support 
for household-level broadband subsidization.438 The Joint Board 
recornended that the FCC establish a Broadband Fund charged with 
"disseminating broadband Internet services to unserved areas" by means of 
grants for construetion of new and upgrading of preexisting but 
substandard facilities. The Joint Board also recommended that the 
proposed Broadband Fund be funded by annual federal contributions of 
$300 million per year.439 FCC Commissioner and Joint Board member 
Michael J. Copps argued that the amount of $300 million is evidence that 
"the Joint Board has basically closed its eyes to the level of challenges we 
(positing that this loans-only policy "does not address the needs of high-cost or low-income 
communities that may desperately need broadband but where the returns may not satisfjl 
traditional commercial criteria"). It bears noting that in 2006 the FCC itself launched a 
Rural Health Care Pilot Program to provide up to sixty-nine applicants with h d i n g  for up 
to 85% of costs associated with the construction of state or regional, broadband networks 
designed to connect public and private nonprofit health care providers in underserved 
locations. The pilot program also sought to provide 25% discounts for broadband service to 
eligible health care providers. See Rural Health Care Support Mechanism, 21 F.C.C.R. 
1 1,111, 1 1,111-1 2 (2006) (order); Rural Health Care Support Mechanism, 18 F.C.C.R. 
24,546 (2003). None of these funds, however, can be used for residential broadband 
service. 
436. See David Hatch, Broadband: Rural Internet Program Is Flawed, Official 
says, 10 TECH. DAILY 9, Oct. 23, 2007, 
http:/lwww.nationaljoumal.comltechdaily/~~2007 1 23-3 .php?related+rne&storyl=tp_200 
7 1023-3&story2~null&story3=null. 
437. High-Cost Universal Service Support, 23 F.C.C.R. 1539, 1561 (2008) (Copps, 
Comrn'r, approving in part, concurring in part). 
438. Id, at 1539 (majority opinion), 
439. Id. at 1543, "Another secondary purpose would be to provide continuing operating 
subsidies to broadband Internet providers serving areas where low customer density would 
suggest that a plausible economic case cannot be made to operate broadband facilities, even 
after receiving a substantial construction subsidy." Id. The Joint Board's Recommended 
Decision also notably recommended that "the Commission revise the current definition of 
supported services to include broadband Internet service" in order to "effectively declare an 
explicit national goal of making broadband Internet service available to all Americans'hnd 
"legitimize existing support mechanisms that already provide support for broadband-capable 
facilities." Id. at 1553. 
face."JJ0 For the sake of comparison, the federal budget for Fiscal Year 
2009 totals $3.1 trillion,44' and Citizens Against Government Waste 
identified $380 million in pork barrel spending appropriated to the State of 
Alaska alone in the last fiscal year."2 
The current federal financial commitment to broadband proliferation 
seems especially meager in light of recent predictions that, absent major 
upgrades to the nation's broadband infrastructure within the next several 
years, the domestic broadband network will not be able to satis@ 
bandwidth demand and Internet service will degrade for most users.a3 
Such an outcome would be especially troubling to the nation's competitive 
position vis-a-vis other developed countries where national governments' 
massive subsidization of broadband deployment has achieved much higher 
broadband penetration levels at significantly lower prices. For example, 
the Japanese government subsidized one-third of the cost of building the 
fiber-optic cable necessary for very-high-speed broadband service to 
individual homes in Japan ("fiber to the These direct subsidies 
were accompanied by significant tax incentives and loans to private carriers 
deploying fiber to difficult-to-serve locations.445 For example, the South 
Korean government prioritized broadband deployment as an economic 
development strategy and invested $9.2 billion in subsidies and other direct 
financial support between 1999 and 2003 alone.M6 Other nations that are 
significantly ahead of the United States in international broadband 
440. See id. at 1561 (Copps, Comm'r, approving in part, concurring in part) ("Bringing 
broadband to the far comers of the nation is the central infrastrucrure challenge our country 
confronts right now" and it is "no different than the challenges previous generations of 
Americans faced to build the essential infrastructures of their times-the roads. turnpikes, 
bridges, canals, railroads and highways of centuries past."). 
4 1 .  OFFICE OF MGMT. hM) BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE 
UNITED STATES GOV'T, FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 142 (2008), 
http:l/www.whitehouse.gov/ombibudgetlfy2009/pdElbudget.pdf. 
442. CITIZENS AGAINST GOV'T WASTE, 2008 CONGRESSIONAL PIG BOOK SUMMARY 2
(2008), available at http:Nwww.cagw.org/site/DocServer/CAGW- 
Pig-Book-08.pdf?docID=3001. Citizens Against Government Waste (CAGW) identified a 
total of $17.2 billion in what it considered pork barrel spending in the FY2008 federal 
budget. Id at 1. 
443. See WINDHAUSEN, supra note 435, at 7 (discussing a November 2007 Nemertes 
Research study concluding that, in the United States, $42 billion to $55 billion in network 
upgrades would be needed in order to match demand for residential and commercial 
bandwidth in 201 0). 
444. Id. at 60. 
445. See Bleha, supra note 417, at 114 ("The [Japanese] government used tax breaks, 
debt guaranties, and partial subsidies. It allowed companies willing to lay fiber to 
depreciate about one-third of the cost on first-year taxes, and it guaranteed their debt 
liabilities."). 
446. See Hannibal Travis, Wi-Fi Evewhere: Universal Broadband Access us Antitrust 
c~nd Telecommunications Policy, 55 AM. U .  L. REV. 1697, 1791 (2006) (citing Irene K. 
Kunii & Moon Ihlwan, Where Broadband Is Really Booming, Bus. W K . ,  May 5, 2003, at 
88). 
proliferation rankings have implemented similar significant government 
subsidies, including loan and tax supports, far larger than the U.S. federal 
commitment.447 
3. Financial, Technical, and Legislative Szlpport,for Mzmicipnl Broadband 
and Pziblic-Private Initiatives to Build Out Broadband 
A number of developed nations with significantly wider broadband 
availability at lower rates than the United States-including France, Japan, 
and the United Kingdom-have achieved those outcomes as a result of 
their imposition of common carrier requirements on broadband 
providers.4" By contrast, the United States' deregulatory approach to 
broadband resulted in the elimination of all common-carrier regulations on 
broadband services.JJ9 The classification of both cable modem broadband 
service and DSL copper-wire-based broadband service as deregulated 
"information services" under the 1934 Communications Act, as amended, 
relieved providers of all unbundling, nondiscrimination, and other common 
carrier requirements.450 
447. See WINDHAIJSEN, supra note 435, at 50-64 (detailing significant direct 
government supports for broadband deployment in nations such as Canada, the 
United Kingdom, and France); see also JAMES BALLER & CASEY LIDE, BIC~GEII 
VISION, BOLDER ACTION, BRIGHTER FUTURE: CAPTURING THE PROMISE O F  
BROADBAND FOR NORTH CAROLINA AND AMERICA 45-50 (2008), uv~i i luh le  trt 
l1ttp:llwww.e-nc.org/2008/pdf/Broadband~report~composite.pdf ( etailing government 
financial and other support in Japan, South Korea, China, Sweden, and France, including 
low-interest or no-interest loans to both private entities and local governments, tax breaks, 
and grants). 
448. See WINDHAUSEN, supra note 435, at 47-66 (discussing how many of the nations at 
the top of the OECD broadband penetration rankings-like France, Japan, and the United 
Kingdom-had required broadband providers to unbundle their networks and sell 
component services to competitive resellers in a nondiscriminatory manner). 
449. See lnquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other 
Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4802 (2002) (declaratory ruling), c!ff"dslrh nom. Nat'l Cable & 
Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2004) (classifying broadband 
cable-modem services as an "information service" instead of 3 "telecommunications 
service" under the 1934 Communications Act, as amended by the 1996 Telecom Act, 
thereby relieving cable broadband services of common-carrier regulations under Title 11); 
Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 20 
F.C.C.R. 14,853, 14,858 (2005) (report, order, and notice of proposed rulemaking) 
(relieving digital subscriber line (DSL) providers of common-carrier obligations); 
Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the lnternet over Wireless 
Networks, 22 F.C.C.R. 5901, 5914 (2007) (declaratory ruling) (relieving wireless lnternet 
providers of common-carrier regulation); United Power Line Council's Petition for 
lleclaratory Ruling Regarding the Classification of Broadband over Power Line lnternet 
Access Service as an Information Service, 2 1 F.C.C.R. 13,28 1, 13,290 (2006) (opinion and 
order) (relieving broadband over powerline (BPL) providers of common-carrier 
obligations). 
450. See 1934 Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. $4  201-203 (2000) (requiring common 
carriers to provide "just and reasonable" rates and charges, and nondiscriminatory 
practices). 
u. Cable Modem and DSL Duopoly 
Although Congress and the FCC hoped that this deregulation of 
broadband services would spur more investment in proprietary networks, 
interplatform competition, and the proliferation of inexpensive broadband, 
the result is still "a rigid duopoly that shows few signs of weakening.+""' 
In excess of 95% of residential broadband subscribers buy their access 
from telephone companies (36%) or cable operators (60%)"~ Cable 
modem and DSL broadband providers have competed minimally in the 
marketplace, particularly since both cable and telephone companies have 
profited from entering long-term contracts with upper-income subscribers 
for "bundled" services that can include local and long-distance telephone 
service, multichannel video programming, and other services in addition to 
br~adband."~ And there has been little effective competition fiom 
non-wireline broadband providers, such as satellite broadband 
companies.J54 Initially, broadband over power line . (BPL) systems 
45 1. Scott Congressional Testimony, supra note 239, at 7. Mr. Scott contended, 
While much of the rest of the world has opened up vigorous competition within 
platforms, we have staked our broadband hture on competition between platforms. 
So far, it has not worked out. . . . 
The lack of price competition between DSL and cable modem is apparent in the 
marketplace. 
Id. at 7; see also Bleha, supra note 417, at 117 (noting that "vigorous multiplatform 
competition is unlikely to emerge soon"). 
452. See FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, INDUSTRY ANALYSIS & TECH. DIV., HIGH-SPEED 
SERVICES FOR INTERNET ACCESS: STATUS AS OF JUNE 30,2007, at 3 (2008) [hereinafter FCC 
HIGH-SPEED ACCESS REPORT], available at 
http://hraunfoss,fcc.gov/edocsqublic/attOC-280906Al.pdf (providing data to 
demonstrate that the majority of broadband subscribers purchase their Internet access from 
telephone companies or cable operators). 
453. See Scott Congressional Testimony, supra note 235, at 8 (stating that cable and 
telephone duopolists "have slow rolled deployment, kept prices far above those in other 
nations, and emphasized bundles of services targeted to upper income Americans built 
around 'franchise' services"); see also Aaron Ricadela, U.S. Broadband Access Slips 
Further, BUS. WK., Apr. 25, 2007, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/apr2007/tc20070424 190579.htm 
(reporting that the decision not to impose common-carrier obligations on broadband 
providers "keeps broadband prices high by concentrating delivery in the hands of a few 
phone and cable companies"). 
454. Although satellite Internet services are available in most parts of the country, these 
services are not considered effective substitutes for terrestrial broadband provision because 
residents without a clear view of the southern sky or without the ability to affix a receiver 
dish on the exterior of a household would not be able to use satellite services. See GAO 
2006 BROADBAND REPORT, supra note 243, at 15 & n. 15 (stating that although broadband 
satellite service is deployed, it is not heavily regarded as a strong substitute for other high- 
speed technologies). Moreover, subscribers who can establish a strong satellite downlink 
face higher monthly subscription rates than terrestrial broadband for service that is slower 
than broadband speeds, less reliable, and incapable of accommodating some of the more 
interactive and innovative bandwidth-intensive Internet servlces due to the signal delays and 
interruptions inherent in satellite downlinks. The FCC itself acknowledges that "[wlith a 
few exceptions, none of the three most widely subscribed satellite-based Internet access 
appeared to be a means to use existing residential wiring to deliver a "third 
pipe" for broadband service. But initial trials have been disappointing, and 
obstacles related to interference with radio services, slow speeds, the 
expense of repeating equipment, and general unreliability have kept BPL 
from serving as a viable alternative, at least for now.4s5 
b. Municipal Broadband  network^ as an Emerging (but Underjilnded) 
Third Option 
Assuming (quite safely) that the wireline broadband market will remain 
deregulated and that the cable and telephone company duopoly will persist 
for the foreseeable future, a more proactive governmental approach to 
promoting broadband proliferation could come in the form of direct 
financial and other assistance to municipal broadband initiatives. As cable 
and telephone companies have written off large swaths of the country as 
unprofitable for broadband deployment, state and local governments have 
attempted to fill the void by launching low-cost and wide-scale municipal 
broadband networks-popularly known as "municipal ~ i - ~ i . ' ~ ~ ~  Many of 
services satisfies. . . the Commission's definition of advanced services, which calls for a 
minimum transmission speed of in excess of 200 Kbps downstream and upstream." Inquiry 
Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All 
Americans. 23 F.C.C.R. 9615, 9628 (2008). Similarly, new wireless mobile Internet 
services for personal communications devices, such as 3G mobile cellular broadband, are 
not a substitute for high-speed household Internet access for fully functional computing 
devices. Although these new wireless mobile personal communications devices represent 
significant progress in Internet connectivity, their connections typically are much slower 
than residential broadband and often slower than dial-up, carriers impose strict limits on 
bandwidth use, and they do not enable their users to access many Internet broadband 
functionalities and utilities (like VolP). See T I M  WU, WIRELESS NET NEUTRALITY: 
CELLULAR CARTERFONE AND CUSTOMER CHOICE IN MOBILE BROADBAND 12- 14 (2007), 
http://www.newamerica.net/publications/policy/wirelessnetneutrality (pointing out the 
slow speeds and hidden limitations on bandwidth associated with Verizon and AT&T 
mobile wireless broadband access); see also Scott Congressionnl Testirnot~v, siipru note 235, 
at 9 (describing the failure of mobile wireless connections as cable and DSL substitutes due 
to their slow connections, strict bandwidth caps, and connection limitations). 
355. See Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 245 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(granting American Radio Relay League's petition for review and remanding for a new 
notice-and-comment proceeding of FCC's 2004 final nlle concluding that existing 
safeguards together with new protective measures would prevent harmful interference from 
BPL facilities); see ulso David Coursey. Why Brouclband over P o ~ ~ r r  Lines Is tr Bcrd Idea, 
ANCHORDESK, Feb. 27, 2004, available crt http://www.dslreports.con~/shownews/Why- 
broadband-over-power-lines-is-a-bad-idea- (observing that, because BPL relies on 
radio waves to send signals through the electrical power grid, "[tlhe problem with BPL is 
simple physics: radio waves like to fly off into space" and "[wlhen they do, interference 
results"); Joe Barr, Fltrwed BPL Is No Broirdband Punaceu, LINUX.COM, May 17, 2005, 
http:l/www.linux.com/articles/44975 (noting that the major flaw with BPL is the 
interference it causes with radio communications operating at or near the same frequencies). 
456. See generirlly Craig Dingwall, Municipul Broclclhcrn~i: C'Iiul1enge.s trnd 
Prrspectivrs, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 67 (2006) (lauding the beneficial aspects of broadband 
deployment and noting the steps that municipalities can take toward providing accessible 
these initial attempts failed because of economic and technical glitches.J57 
For example, the City of Philadelphia's 2005 announcement that it would 
partner with major ISP Earthlink to blanket 135 square miles of 
metropolitan Philadelphia with free or low-cost broadband prompted many 
to hope that universal broadband service could be achieved in short 
order.J58 But the business model for the Earthlink-Philly partnership 
required the city only to provide free access to municipal rights of way and 
utility poles while Earthlink bore all of the build-out and maintenance costs 
with the expectation of realizing profits down the road. That model proved 
unrealistic, and reception and speed problems discouraged new 
subscribers.459 Similar municipal Wi-Fi plans in Chicago, Houston, Miami, 
and San Francisco find themselves in a predicament similar to 
~hi ladel~hia ' s . "~  
The latest iteration of municipal broadband projects appears to be faring 
better, but these projects require a significant amount of public funding. In 
Minneapolis and Portland, for example, the ISP partner agreed to build out 
broadband in their regions). Municipal "Wi-Fi," or wireless fidelity, operates by means of 
wireless transponders located throughout a geographic area that wirelessly connect 
computer and other digital equipment with compatible digital transceivers-devices that 
both receive and transmit signals. WiMAX is an emerging technology, sometimes referred 
to as "Wi-Fi on steroids," which allows a wireless network to be deployed over a large area, 
such as a neighborhood or subdivision, with fewer transponders and repeater stations than 
required by standard Wi-Fi deployments. Id. at 70-73. 
457. See, e.g., Deborah Yao, Earthlink to Pull Plug on PhilIy's Wi-Fi, MSNBC.COM, 
May 13, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id~24598616/printI/displaymode/l098/ 
(explaining the economic and technical failures that led to the abandonment of a near- 
universal Wi-Fi project in Philadelphia); Urbina, supra note 414, at A10; Marguerite 
Reardon, Facing Economic Realities of Mtrni Wi-Fi, CNETNEWS.COM, May 3, 2007, 
http://news.cnet.com/Facing-economic-realities-of-muni-Wi-Fi/2 100-735 1-3-6 18 1058.html 
(detailing EarthLink's failure to complete contracts that would have provided municipal 
Wi-Fi in a number of major American cities). 
458. See Yao, supra note 457 (reporting EarthLink's failure to adhere to a contract that 
would have provided municipal Wi-Fi in Philadelphia). 
459. See Urbina, szipra note 414, at 2 (explaining that the failure of EarthLink to 
continue the municipal Wi-Fi project was due to unforeseen equipment issues, such as 
requiring more routers than predicted). Among other problems, effective deployment of the 
network required significantly more equipment than expected, drastically raising the costs 
for the project and ultimately rendering it unprofitable for Earthlink. Id. (explaining that 
underestimating the amount of routers required for the project was a major flaw in 
EarthLink's Wi-Fi plan). 
460. See id. (describing how EarthLink's pullout also affected residents in San Francisco 
who would have received free citywide wireless): see ulso Jose Antonio Vargas, Binary 
America: Split in Two bv a Digital Divide, WASH. POST, July 23, 2007, at CI (noting that 
municipal Wi-Fi projects in Charleston, South Carolina, and San Francisco, California, also 
have struggled); Chicago Scraps Plans for Citywide Wi-Fi, MSNBC.COM, Aug. 28, 2007, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20482568/ (depicting the shelving of a municipal broadband 
system in Chicago due to high costs and expected low demand); Reardon, supra note 457 
(noting that some municipal broadband systems-such as those in Tempe, Arizona; Chaska, 
Minnesota; and Lompoc, California-have had trouble signing up new subscribers because 
of indoor coverage problems and other technical impediments). 
a citywide broadband Wi-Fi network but only if the city served as an 
"anchor tenant," guaranteeing a significant amount of ongoing subscription 
revenue from municipal departments."' Whereas the initial failed 
Earthlink projects with Philadelphia and other cities demanded no financial 
commitment from the municipality, the new generation projects require the 
city to subsidize construction of the network and ensure its ultimate 
profitability by becoming its largest subscriber.j6* Facing budget deficits 
and public demands for more expenditures in traditional public safety and 
education initiatives, many municipalities have not been able to afford 
these investments in municipal broadband networks despite significant 
citizen demand.;"" The significantly wealthier suburban municipalities and 
relatively small cities, like Burbank, California, and Tempe, Arizona, have 
had more success in establishing their own tax-supported broadband 
 network^."^ Less wealthy ~nunicipalities have not been as fortunate. 
In the face of federal inaction, several states have launched initiatives to 
promote statewide broadband proliferation. For example, in December 
3007, the California Public Utilities Commission allocated $100 million 
over two years to broadband companies to build out service to underserved 
and unserved areas in the state? Massachusetts initiated a similar 
program, cotnrnitting $40 million raised through state-bond financing for 
the direct subsidization of fiber networks, wireless towers, and other 
broadband infrastructure in areas of the state bypassed by commercial 
broadband  carrier^.^" Several other states, like Georgia, Kentucky, and 
461. See Urbina, s~rpt-t-il note 414, at A10 (reporting that the ISP in Minneapolis required 
the city to become an anchor tenant before agreeing to build a city network); .see trlso 
Reardon, .s~rpra note 457 (defining the anchor tenant requirement as forcing the city into a 
contractual obligation to purchase an agreed-upon amount of service in exchange for the 
city network). 
462. Joanne Hovis, President of Columbia Telecommunication Corporation, said of the 
Minneapolis municipal-broadband project, which involves a residential Wi-Fi network 
overlay on a public safety network, 
[Tlhe key thing there is that the city is paying a pretty substantial annual fee to the 
provider for those two networks. I think the difference between that and the models 
that were not successful is that. . . [i]n the Minneapolis case, the city is financing 
[buildout] as a tenant on the network. 
77ze Kojo ~Vt~ tmld i  Sholt': The Fzrtlcre 0/'12lzrt1ic'iptrl Br-otr&nncr'(WAMU radio broadcast July 
15, 2008) (transcript on tile with author). 
463. See Travis, .sztprrr note 446, at 1782-83 (discussing differing outcomes in larger 
cities versus wealthier and smaller municipalities). 
464. Id .  
465. Press Release, California Public Utilities Commission, CPUC' Promotes Broadband 
Service in Unserved Areas of California to Bridge Digital Divide (Dec. 20. 2007), 
l~ttp:ildocs.cpuc.ca.govipublished/news~rclease176879.htm. California's initiative, partly 
the result of a study of broadband at 10 Mbps upstream and downstream speeds-the 
minimurn speed required for high-quality video, tele~nedicine, and other emerging 
bandwidth-dependent technologies. C'AL. BROADBAND TASK FORCE, szrpr-cr note 422, at 32. 
466. Srr Scott Stafford, Their- Frrtzrre Is Brocrdbuncl, BERKSHIRE EAGLE, Aug. 8, 2008 
Maine, have launched comparable, although less genero~~sly hinded, 
initiatives to encourage broadband deploytnent.'"' As is the case with 
municipal Wi-Fi networks, most of the proactive state-level broadband 
proliferation programs are relatively modest in their objectives and scope, 
focusing on relatively low-speed broadband projects and not entailing the 
large-scale broadband infrastructure buildout required for universal 
access.'"* Some broadband is better than no broadband. But the local and 
state programs have been financially and logistically unable to achieve the 
deployment of very high-speed and low-cost broadband present in Canada 
and many Asian and European nations.'('" 
L'. Cuhke and Telephone Cotnpuny Kiffi~rts to Thwart Pzrhlic :Vefi.vol-ks 
In at least fifteen states, telephone and cable companies have applied 
their influence in state legislatures to pass laws that altogether prohibit or 
hamper local and state governments' efforts in deploying public broadband 
 network^.'^' Take, for example, New Orleans, a city struggling to recover 
(detatlrng state rntttattves In Massachusetts that aim to make rt more cost etfecttve for ISP to 
bring broadband to areas lackrng coverage) 
367 Tee WIILDHAU~FN,  \zrpra note 435, at 36-44 (descrtbrng, In detatl. state initratt\es 
to boost broadband proltferatlon). 
368 Sce id at 66 ("Unfortunately, the majority of state programs do not <iddre\s the 
need to promote btg broadband capabil~ty that will be necessary tn the next few ycars "), lee 
trlto CALIFORNLA F'LIFR(,ING TFCH FI,NI), O\FRirIrW. ~i~trrlahle r ~ t  
1ittp.i mww cetfund orgiprogre\sinvervtewi (last vlstted Nov 30, 2008) (dercrtbtng 
relatrvely modest fundrng efforts by the state of Caltfornia given the onormtty of the 
challenge of prolrferitting broxiband in the state) 
369 See rravts, czrprrr note 446. at 1787-94 (detarlrng the results of masstve nclttonal 
rnvc\tments In local broadband deploymei~t In Canada, Sweden, South Korea, Japdn. ,~nd 
other natrons) 
370 See C'hrtstopher Rhoads,  ties Sttrrr OIVM I ;f /orft to Speeti Dp Bt-ocltiharr~/. W ~ L I  
S r  J . May 19, 2008, at A1 (descrtbtng telephone and cable cornp'iny ciforts to prevent 
~nuntcrpaltttes from enterlng the broadband bustness by clarmrng lnlproper ~ t \ c  of t'~rpayer 
funds and unfkrr competrt~on), tee qenerollv Drngwall. czrpt-c~ note 356, at 85-87 (provrcitng 
,In excellent overview ot state statutes b'irrtng rnuntctpalrtres ftom deployrng bro'1db;ind) 
Inctividual state restrtctlons vary from '3 complete proh~b~tton on the provrslon of 
tclecomm~tnicat~ons servrces (rncl~tdrng broadb'tnd) by polrtrcal subt~rirts to procedural ,~nd 
>ttbstantrve tcqutrernents th,tt 'ire srgniticant ttnpcdrmentc .SLY> A R K  C o ~ t  A'UU 
$ 21- 17-409 (Supp 2007) (prohrbttrng government entitles ii-om provtdtng any h a w  
tciccotnmuntcatror~s >ervices), COLO RE.V S ri\ 1 4 29-27- 103 (1008)  (prohrbtt~ng local 
governments from providing, directly or tndtrectly, telecornmuntcattons \ervrces (rncluding 
broadband) to sub\crtbers of cable televtsion servtce), F L A  S r n r  ANIC 4 166 047 (West 
2000) (rcqutrtng that telecon~n~unrcdttons cornpanres controlled by local government entttteq 
be >ubjected to tile same iocal requtrernents applyrng to privately owned c~?tttio\), 10% i 
Covb ANV 388 10 (West 2007) (prohrbrttng local government cntrtti.\ th'tt p ~ ) \ ~ d e  
tclccommunrcattons cerl~ces from ustng general fund rnoncys or rrtoney gcrlcr,itctl from 
piibllc t~trlrtier services to \upport the cervtces, reyurrrng payment ot rensctn,rblc coit\ for 
use 01. crty cqutpment, and imposing stgnrticant recordkeeptng ~ u c f  cct t r  lic'1tron 
rcqurrements), LA RFL S rx r  ANN QQ 45 844 33. 45 834.37-39 (20071 (pto111btt111g the 
probision oftclecornmuntcattons and advanced servtces by any local go\cti~ii~cllt ii~lIc\s the 
economically and socially from the devastation of Hurricane Katrina, and 
nlore recently Hurricane Gustav. Once the local state of emergency is 
lifted, the city must reduce the already slow 5 12 Kbps download speed for 
an under-construction Wi-Fi network to 144 Kbps in compliance with the 
Louisiana law severely restricting the ability of municipalities to offer 
broadband  service^.'^' 
Although # 253(a) of the 1996 Telecom Act proscribes state or local law 
that "may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity 
to provide any . . . telecommunications ~ervice,""~ the FCC has refused to 
enforce that prohibition against anticompetitive state and local laws 
advantaging cable and telephone In 2004, the Supreme 
govctnment satisfies numerous condittons. including a comprehens~ve feasibil~ty study), 
M o  Auu RFV STAT 4 392 310 (Supp 7007) (prohibiting government entitles from 
providing telecommun~cations servtces for whtch a cert~ficate of senrce author~ty IS 
required to the public or to telecommunications providers), NEV REV STZ r Ayh 268 086 
(2007) (prohibttlng the gokerning body of an incorporated ctty that has a populat~on of over 
25,000 from selllng telecommunications services to the publtc and provtdtng itrict 
conditions for the purchase or construction of telecommunications facil~t~es), PA CO\S 
STXT ANN \i 3014 (2005) (prohlbitlng polittcal subd~vis~ons of the state from provldtng 
telecommunications senices to the pubhc for compensation unless the subdiviston sends a 
uritten request to the local exchange telecommui~ications company serving the area and rt or 
one of its affjl~ates has not agreed to provide the services requested within two months), 
S C COIIF Ah4 Q 58-9-2620 (Supp 2007) (proh~b~tlng the use of non-telecommunlcatlons 
revenue sources to subsidize the cost of provtdtng telecommun~cat~ons entees dnd 
requiring the tmputatlon of costs that nongovernmental enttties Incur In computing the cost 
ot providing 5ervtces and the rates charged), TFNN CODE A\h b Q  7-52-401 to -407. -601 to 
-61 1 (2005) (nottng that any rnuntcipality that operates an electr~c plant can own and operate 
rt tor the provision of telecotnmunications 5ervices but cannot prov~de sub\ldles fbr rt, 
however, tile municipality cannot provtde for telecommunrcat~ons iervlces wlth~n the 
\ervIce area ot ,in exlsting telephone cooperative w ~ t h  fewer than 100,000 !me\, and 
munictpallttc~ that operate electric plants as de5crtbed In Q 7-52-401 may offer cable and 
Internet scrkices if  certain procedures, such as maintaining separate accounting and 
recorcikeeping for such services, are satisfied), T b X  U r lL  CODF A ~ N  $4  54 201 02, 54 205 
(Vernon 2007) (prohibiting rnunicipal~tles from ofkrlng the public telecommtlnrcatrons 
service? by prohtbittng is5uance of the requlstte certificate to a munlc~paltty), (ITAH CODF 
4\u 4 9  10- 18-20 1 to -204 (2007) (requtring that the munlctpality hold a public hearing, 
 ond duct n fc;rsibtltty itudy, hold 'inother p~iblic hearing, dnd adopt by resolutron the 
icas~blllty itudy before the mttntc~paltty can provide to Anyone cable televr\ion servtces or 
ptiblic telecornmun~catloiis scrvtces), V z C ~ D F  AYY $ $  15 2-2 160, 56-265 4 4 (2008) 
(tcquiring that '1 locallty obtaln a certtficate befo~e rt can provltle telecommunrcat~ons 
\ ~ I V I C L " ,  and outltmng the t'lctors considered by the rnuntcipality before such certrficates are 
gr,tntcd), M, \ s H  R k v  CODF 4 h Y  Q 54 16 330 (2006) (dllowtng public tltil~ty districts to 
own and operate telecommunications filctltttcs for the d~strict's Internal needs but 
proh~blt~ng the sale of such services to publtc) 
-17 1 Si?e Marg~iente Reardon, Veit Oi~/i.tn?\ to OfJer E-ree MJI-FI, CNETNFW~ cov, Nov 29, 
2005, http ncws cnet comNew-Orleans-to-offer-tiee-h'1-I-r~2 1 0 0 7 3  3 - 9 7 8 4 5  html 
(describing the need to reduce download and upload speeds In Wew Orleans to comply with 
'1 state law that restrtcts Internet speeds on serkrces provrded by mtin~clpalit~es) 
472 37 U S C $ 253(a) (2000) The 1096 Telecom Act ,iuthorized the FCC to preempt 
i'nforcement of any 5tate or local itatute that contravened Q 253(a) 11 $ 253(d) 
373 See Public Lttl Comm'n of Tex , 13 F C C R 3460, 3547 (1997) (concluding that 
the cietin~tion of "cnt~ty" In $ 253 does not encompa5s a \rate's pollt~cal subdivistons, 
Court in Nl3iof1 i l .  ~ V l i ~ ~ o l i r i  ,Wl~tlni~'ip~~I ,!,errg~,ei7" upheld a hlissouri statute, 
enacted as a resiilt of intensive lobbying by cable anil telephone companies 
that prohibits poiitical subdivisions of the state from providing 
telecotnnnunications services."7i The Court nlled that 8 253 does not 
"affect the power of States and localities to restrict their own (or their 
political inferiors') delivery of telecommunications ~ e r v i c e s . " " ~ ~  This 
decision emboldened cable and telephone broadband carriers to enforce 
existing anticompetitive state statutes and pursue new enactments in states 
w~thotit such statutes.477 
Cable and telephone companies also have started filing lawsuits against 
inuntcipalities launching public Wi-Fi or wireline broadband networks. 
Those suits clairn that the broadband projects are an irnproper use of 
revenue, constituting tinfair competition and inappropriate local 
governmental intervention in an inherently private, cotn~nercial 
~n te rp r i s e . ' ~~  'The co~npanies also have argued that municipalities that own 
or lease their own broadband iietworks would easily succumb to the 
teinptat~oii of giving their networks preferential treatment, thereby putting 
private carriers at a con~petitive disadvantage. 479 
-. Iliese arguments are weak in several respects. First, most of the 
~nunicipalities that opted to build oitt tlieir own tletworks did so because 
rlierehy a l l o \ ~ ~ n g  states to rcitrrct the '~brl~ty of subo~d~nate  govetnment cntttles to pro\~cie 
t~ I~co tn r i i~~n t c~ t t~c> t i i  ser\ rccs) 
374 541 11 5 I25 (11004) 
475 \CYJ  Mo R I  I S I A r 4 302 410(7) (prohtbttrng government cnt~ttei lrotn pro>rdtt~g 
telec~~lirlit~ntcat~oni scr~tccs  tor LCIIICII 'I eertrtic;tte of servrce 'ltlthorrty rs ~cclu~rcd to the 
piihlic or to t c l c c o r n ~ n ~ ~ n ~ c ~ ~ t ~ o n i  provrders): ,"Vr\clti, 541 U S 125 (upholti~ng the st'~ttitc) 
i or .tn excellent cx,inlltiatron of the conitrtut~onol 'tnd polrtlcal context of the V t t o r l  c,iic. 
see Ir , t \~i ,  \ i rprc/  note 346, ,it 1728-37. 
176 Sce ti tot^, 54 I lJ S 175 rile Court concluded, I ~ I  part. that "any enttty" 111 
4 253(a) t i~d  not encoitlpass d itate's iubtitvr\ic)ns ,111ci that a itate thcrefote could proll~b~t 
counttcs. crttec, 'ind other polrttcal suhordtnates from offering telecomm~tntcat~o~~s ic \rcos 
i t /  ~t t  175-37, \ C V  cl l \o  r ~ ~ n e  W'irner Telecom of O r ,  LLC v Ctty of Postland, 452 
t 511pp 2ci 1084, 1096 (11 Or 2006) (concludrng that Q 253(d) of the 1990 1 clccom le t  
cl~ci riot prwn~pt t l ~  c ~ t y  of Pott1,ind fro111 ielltng t e l c c o m r n ~ ~ n ~ c a t ~ o ~ ~ i  bet\ tees. ~ncludtng 
b~o'ltfh'tnd, lo pt~bllc schooli ‘inti other tnun~ctpalrtres) 
177 YCY T l n ~  I \ .  5l ip ic i  note 416, ,kt 1705-72 (dlrcuis~ng state I,tw ~estr'irnti on I I I I I \ C I \ , I ~  
h~ ocicihGind) 
478 SC,~, f211oatii. ~ I I ~ I L I  110te 470 ( ~ t ~ s e r r b ~ r ~ g  V0111cdit C L ~ b l ~  i t l t  rtgai~ist C I lr l t tat~~ogl~.  
rcnnesscc, ,~llcgtng Impropct t'ix eipend~tures and tinfar co~npetrtlon) 
179 / ( I .  t . 1 1 ~  I3anget-rtan. C ' o i ~ r t r ~ z t r r ~ r v  Broitdhthtmd I c t  L Z o t r M  0 1 e t f 1 1 i . i ~  f jr t i is o t ~  
t titiitc / / ) i t /  / ! I  O C / L / / ~ L / ~ ~ ~ / ,  T F ~  t i h ~  2, . \ t~g  3. 1007. 
http L~r\tcci~i~ic'i coin iletvs , I I ~ ,  post~20070803-coi1in1~1ntty -broadband-ilct-u oi~ld-OL CI ttlt II- 
b , t ~ i s - o n - ~ n t ~ n ~ c ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ l - b ~ ~ ~ ~ d b ~ i ~ i d  htnil, ~ L Y ,  e q , C'o111c:iit v Flee Pottct I3d , NO 08-029 I. 
slip op 'tt I 3 (TctmCCh ('t July 11, 2008) (notlee of c~ppe,~l), crlcrrltrltlc t r r  
Ilttp ~llt'dtit ~n~~\fi-ecptcii i o n ~  C[0~~2C)O8/07'1x~e1iior~i11ldlfm op~nton" 1,2Oanti otdcr pcJt. i t j , ~ / ) c , ( ~ i  
file</ t i t h  tlon7 Yot~ce of \ppcal, rcnn C'tblc rclecomrns 4 i i ' n  \ l-lee Powct t3d ot 
Ch,ttt,tnoogii. Yo 07-1145 (Tcrxn C h  C t  July 38. 2008). 
http rnecitd t~~neifi-eepr csi com1doci~2008107 Stamped Nottee _of-~Xppedl pdf 
for-prof3 carriers had refused to offer broadband service to their residents 
due to concerns about profitability.'"' Additionally, even where a 
municipal Wi-Fi system would run parallel to a private broadband network 
(i.e., fiber-optic or coaxial cable), it is most likely that the two services 
ivould cater to different segments of the market by delivering materially 
different products-fiber or cable providing more expensive and higher 
speed broadband, and Wi-Fi providitlg very inexpensive or even free 
Internet access at relatively low speeds. Moreover, there is nothing new 
with local governments offering services in competitior~ with private 
providers. If it were inappropriate for government to compete with for- 
profit enterprises, then the government would need to cease its provision of 
public variants of healthcare, education, library services, transportation, 
parking, housing, police, and power generation.'" In addition, in offering 
these services, it is well within the public interest to pass along to citizens 
any cost savings resulting from public ownership of the resource at hand. 
It is ironic that the telephone and cable companies have been so forcefully 
pursuing regulatory and judicial restraints on municipal broadband 
deployment when, in all other contexts, they are vehement opponents of 
regulatory constraints.4x2 
In sum, in addition to significantly increasing its direct financial support 
for broadband deployment, the federal government should enact legislation 
lifting all protectionist, anticompetitive state and local legal restrictions on 
480 See Rhoads, ~tlpru note 470 (d~scussing evpenence in Chattanooga, rcnnesscc. 'ind 
notrng that cable and telecom companies focus most the~r efforts on larger U S cities), we i r / \ o  
Ar~k  tiesseldahl, Brtngzng Broucjh~lnci to Rztlal 4nzwtca. B U S ~ ~ F S S W F F ~  <OM, Scpt 18. 3008. 
http.// www businessweek.co~wpr~nt1'technol~~gy~cc~1itent/sep2OO/tcO9 17-797892 htm 
(discussing how lack of profitabilrty has detel-red broadband providers from deploy~ng 
broadband in low-dens~ty areas). 
481 For expanded versions of these and other arguments dgain\t cable and telephone 
company efforts to thvcart municipal broadband projects, see Jon Le~bowitz, Comni'r, Fed 
Trade Comm'n, Remarks to the Natronal Assoctatton of Telecommun~cat~ons Otflcess and 
Adv~sors (Sept 22, ZOOS), L I E  ~1111hle tit 
llttp i www ttc gov/speeches/leibowitz/050922municipit1b1oadb;tnd pdf hlerno~dbly. 
Comm~\s~oner Letbowrt~ said, "To put this in context, linaglne rf 13ordcss and Barnes & 
Noble, claimrng it was hilling their book sales, asked lawlnahers to ban crtres from building 
libraries Plie legrsldtors would laugh them out of the State House " M 
-182 Nevertheless, should neutraltzlng any competrtrve 'tdvantages of i~iun~cipal~tres 
provtdlng broadband service be necessary, states can adopt legislation destgncd to emure 
f a ~ r  competition between private and publlc provrders ot broadband servrccs ~n\tedd ot 
implementing statutory bans or severe restrlctlons on rnunrc~pal broddbdnd For eu,lrnple, 
regulations could be promulgated requiring munlcrpal broadband projects to dbrde by 
~cr ta ln  rules pieventrng below-cost prlcing funded by cioss-subsidles w ~ t h  other mun~cipal 
projects, tinancral reporting and transparency, fair cost Imputation for use of publ~c s~ght\ of 
way, and other rules des~gned to mittgate cornpetitwe advantages For d detallod anaiy\rs of 
options for neutrai~~rng any competltlve adkantages on munrcipal broadband project\, ice 
Dingwdil. ,zipm note 456, ,it 98-100 (prov~ding a deta~led 'inalyirs of opt~ons for 
ne~~trallzing any conlpetrttve ahantages on municipal broadbdnd projects) 
the building of broadband networks by municipalities and other 
government entities. 
4. Stipf>orti~g Dern~~nd-Side Digital Literacy Progrums 
Not everyone with access to residential broadband service and enough 
money to afford it subscribes. In the July 2008 Pew Internet & American 
Life Project survey of residential broadband adoption, 33% of non-Internet 
users-with a median age of 61 and Inore than twice as likely to live in 
low-income households than Internet users-responded that they are not 
interested in using the ~nternet."' Among users of low-speed, dial-up 
Internet access, 19% said that nothing, including residential availability at 
low subscription rates, would persuade them to migrate from dial-up to 
broadband se r~ ice . "~  vint Cerf, known popularly as the "father of the 
Internet," responded to the survey results by theorizing that "[s]ome 
residential users tnay not see a need for higher speeds because they don't 
know about or don't have ability to use high speeds."'" In other words, 
some oftline Atnericans do not know what they are missing. 
To address the lack of awareness or even fear of new technology In 
certain population sectors, a number of nations at the top of the OECD 
broadband rankings have sitccessfully incorporated demand-side promotion 
of broadband and digital literacy as a key component of proactive national 
strategies to prolnote broadband universality. Fourth-ranked South Korea, 
for example, passed national legislation creating the Korea Agency for 
Digitai Opportunity and Promotion, which in turn devised and 
implemented a national program to educate South Koreans on the use of 
broadband Internet ~ervice."~ south Korea's digital literacy programs 
aggressively deployed training resources as well as equipment across the 
nation's schools to train children from all socioeconomic strata on 
intelligent broadband use as early in their academic careers as possible.4s7 
The nation's programs also deployed training and equipment resources to 
reach individuals who may be especially prone to isolation and reticence to 
383 PEW 2008 BRO~DBAUI> REPORT, rztpm note 233, at 111 
384 Id According to the Pew Report, 62% of dial-up users replied that they are not 
interested now in switchrng to broadband, but 35'4 of those reqpondents explained that htgh 
broadband prices prevent their migration to broadband, and 14°/0 explained that broadband 
servlce is not available to their household. Id 
385 Anlck Jesdanun, iMcmt, Dzc11- L'p user9 Don 't Wui?t Brociclhcl~td, T~hli- c OM, July 3. 
2008, http.//www trme.com/tlmeibusinessiart1clei0,8599,18 9972,00 html Cerf explained, 
"My enthus~asm for video conferenc~ng Improved dramat~cally when all family nienibers 
had MacBook Pros w ~ t h  built-in vrdeo cameras. for example." Id 
386 See JAYAKAR & S~CCHNEY,  ~ u p r u  note 424, at 5 .  
387 (notlng that South Korea's demand-slde lnrtratives are so extensive that -'as 
many a\ 10 rnlllron South Koreans may fall Into the d~sadvantaged categories targeted by 
the d~grtal iteracy programs"). 
adopt new technologies, including stay-at-home mothers, older citizens, 
military personnel and veterans, and the disabled.""apan and the United 
Kingdom also have funded national digital literacy programs to spur 
broadband proliferation by cultivating awareness and demand."9 
Other nations' demand-side broadband awareness programs are 
reminiscent of the United States' own efforts in the 1930s to catalyze 
demand for electricity. Although much of rural America was left unserved 
by private electric utilities that viewed service in those areas as 
economically infeasible, many of these communities remained 
unconvinced that they needed electric service at all."' Regarding electric 
service as not only a convenience but an imperative for innovation and 
economic and social growth, President Franklin Roosevelt signed into law 
the 1936 Rural Electrification Act. That Act created the Rural 
Electrification Administration, tasked in part with increasing the demand 
for electricity in unserved areas and administering a heavily subsidized 
federal loan program for new rural electric co~~erat ives ."~ 
Although a few state-level broadband initiatives in the United States 
have incorporated modest digital literacy programs to promote more 
interest in broadband in low-adoption communities, there are no 
comprehensive digital literacy programs supported by the federal 
government.4" Federal demand-side support could be in the form of grants 
to nonprofit organizations, public schools and libraries, and similar entities, 
for the creation of localized broadband awareness and digital literacy 
programs. It also could take the form of a centralized federal effort to 
educate children and adults on broadband use, especially the resources 
488. Zd. 
489. See ROBERT D. ATKINSON ET AL., INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOCND., 
EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL BROADBAND LEADERSHIP 37-40 12008), 
littp://www.~tdorg/files/ExplainingBBleadership.pdf. 
390. See Joel A. Youngblood, Note, Alive and Well; The Rural Electr$cntion Act 
Preempts State Condemnation Law: City of Morgan City v. South Louisiana Electric Coop. 
Ass'n, 16 E ~ E R G Y  L.J. 489, 491-92 (1995) (discussing history and demand-side objectives 
of federal electrification initiatives during the 1930s). 
391. See Rural Electrification Act of 1936, 7 U.S.C. $9 901-918 (2006); see ulso 
SHLAES, supra note 429, at 175 (noting that among Roosevelt's goals was "to increase the 
use of electricity in all homes, providing Americans with a better standard of living" 
(emphasis added)). 
492. For example, the "e-NC Authority" broadband initiatives in North Carolina 
and the "ConnectKentl~cky" program in Kentucky encompass plans to educate low- 
adoption communities in broadband resources and use. See North Carolina e-NC 
Authortty, Who We Are, http://www.e-nc.org/whoweare.asp; About ConnectKentucky, 
l~ttp://www.connectkentucky.org/about~us/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2009). ConnectKentucky, 
and its new national umbrella organization ConnectedNation, have "employees [who] fan 
out to small towns and rural areas and hold meetings where they demonstrate the benefits of 
broadband.. . . For instance, they'll show parents better ways to communicate with 
teachers and brainstorm ways to use broadband in local institutions.'9esseidahl, Jzlpra 
note 480, at 2. 
available through broadband related to political information and democratic 
involvement. Such efforts can be part of, or run parallel to, information 
literacy programs already implemented by the National Institute for 
Literacy. That federal agency-in partnership with the Departments of 
Education, Labor, and Health and Human Services-promotes the 
improvement of reading skills of children and adults, with the intention of 
cultivating a more informed and engaged citizenry.493 
5. More Federal Research Support, Better Data Collection, und Better 
Spectrum Management 
A more aggressive federal role in broadband proliferation also should 
attend to improvements in the interrelated areas of technological research, 
data collection, and efficient spectrum utilization. Although the United 
States for many decades was the international leader in public and private 
telecommunications-oriented research and development, it has fallen 
behind. For example, the European Union spends upward of $13.5 billion 
per year in public and private telecommunications-oriented research and 
development, whereas the United States now spends between $250 million 
and $350 mi1li0n.j~~ The National Research Council recently issued a 
report tracking the steep decline in American telecommunications research 
and development, concluding that "[w]ithout an expanded investment in 
research, . . . the nation's position as a Ieader is at risk.'495 
As noted above, the failure of the FCC to collect comprehensive and 
reliable data on broadband penetration throughout the nation has hampered 
efforts to catalyze the government's response to delays in broadband 
proliferation. The FCC's practice was to treat an entire zip code as 
broadband-deployed even if it contained only one Internet connection at a 
speed as slow as 200 Kbps (which is too slow for many current 
applications). That allowed the FCC to claim that 99% of the nation had 
broadband a ~ a i l a b i l i t - ~ ~ ~ - - a  claim that FCC Commissioner Deborah Tate 
conceded was "something of a running joke."497 The FCC in June 2008 
493. National Institute for Literacy, http://www.nifl.gov. 
494. WINDHAUSEN, supra note 435, at 33. 
495. COMM. ON TELECOMMS. RESEARCH AND DEV., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
RENEWING U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH 1 (Robert W. Lucky & Jon Eisenberg 
eds., 2006), http://www.citi.columbia.edu/conferences/telecom/luckyrepo.pdf. The 
National Research Council advises that "[a] strong, effective telecommunications R&D 
program for the United States will require a greater role for government-sponsored and 
university research." Id. at 2. 
496. See FCC HIGH-SPEED ACCESS REPORT, szrpru note 452. 
497. See Matthew Lasar, Joke's Over: FCC Adopts New Broadband Penetration 
hfetrics, ARS TECHNICA, June 15, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/200806 15- 
jokes-over-fcc-establishes-new-broadband-measurement-system.html. 
promulgated a new data collection system that will require ISPs to report 
broadband service on the basis of census tracts, which are typically much 
smaller than zip code, and to report the speed of broadband service offered 
according to tiers, with basic broadband defined as between 768 Kbps and 
1.5 ~ b ~ s . ' ' ~  Although these modifications were positive steps and 
overdue, the data collected under the new system remains thin. For 
example, the FCC will not collect any pricing data from ISPs. Such data 
could be compared with census household income figures, as well as the 
more granular penetration and speed data for detailed examinations of 
broadband affordability and the tipping points at which specific kinds of 
households opt to subscribe to broadband.499 
Finally, a more aggressive federal approach to broadband proliferation 
should include a comprehensive effort to improve the efficiency of federal 
spectrum allocations. The FCC currently is exploring the use of unused or 
"white spaces" between broadcast television channels for unlicensed 
wireless services, including wireless broadband devices.** It also launched 
an auction in January 2008 for spectrum in the 700 MHz band vacated by 
broadcasters as part of the transition to digital transmissi~n.~~)'  Despite 
these initiatives to render more spectrum for broadband use, the new 
spectrum locations may still be inadequate to meet the demands of next- 
498. See Development of Nationwide Broadband Data to Evaluate Reasonable and 
Timely Deployment of Advanced Services to All Americans, 23 F.C.C.R. 9691 (2008). 
Among other refoniis, the FCC revised Form 477, through which broadband Internet service 
providers report the services they make available to the public, to require reporting of 
broadband service at a much more granular level--census tract instead of zip code-and to 
report download and upload speeds available in those areas. Id. at 9692-93. 
499. FCC Commissioner Jonathan Adelstein criticized the exclusion of pricing data in 
the new data collection scheme in a separate statement: "Particularly given the growing 
evidence that citizens of other countries are getting a much greater broadband value, in 
terms of price per megabit, it is regrettable that the Commission misses an opportunity to 
collect useful information about the actual prices available to American consumers." fd. at 
9767 (Adelstein, Comm'r, concurring in part). 
500. Unlicensed Operation in the TV Broadcast Bands, 19 F.C.C.R. 10,018 (2004). 
This still-open proceeding has been delayed by broadcaster-led disputes concerning the 
potential of interference and broadcast signal degradation as a result of the use of wireless 
devices in broadcast-adjacent frequencies. See SASCHA D. MEINRATH & MICHAEL 
CALABRESE, NEW AM, FOUND., UNLIC'ENSED "WHITE SPAC'E DEVICE" OPERA'TIONS O N  THE 
TV BAND AND fHE MYTH OF HARMFUL ~NTERFERENCE 3 4  (2008), 
l~ttp:l/www.newamerica.~~et/files/WSDBackgrounder.pdf; see ulso Ted Hearn, Ozrt of' ihe 
Blire: Vc~curit Chunnrls Could Fzrzz Up Free TV: Brotrdcusters See Red over White Spaces, 
MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Nov. 5, 7007, at 20 ("The NAB insists that sharing the broadcast 
band would imperil over-the-air television because signal interference would be rampant 
and unstoppable, as unlicensed users wouldn't have to answer to anyone-including the 
FCC."). 
50 1. See Chloe Albanesius. Verizon, il T&T Win Spectnim; Google Bllrffs, PCMAG.C.OM. 
Mar. 20, 2008, http:/lwww.pcniag.com/;1rticle2/0,28 17,2277767,OO.asp (noting that the 700 
MHz auction "raised a record $19.59 billion." with Verizon and AT&T winning most of the 
auctioned licenses). 
generation broadband, both in their scope and the speed at which devices 
used on those frequencies could access the 1nternet.jo2 
B. Content: Cziltivating Digital Democracy 
The government's assumption of a much more proactive role in 
proliferating broadband to communities that lack it should be the 
centerpiece of a new federal public interest broadband initiative. As 
discussed in Part 11, access is only part of the challenge. Once online, 
citizens should be presented with more opportunities for localized 
democratic discussion and political engagement in public spaces, where the 
full complement of First Amendment protections applies. Such efforts 
should be focused on optimizing the democratic and expressive potential of 
broadband while helping to mitigate some of the civic disengagement, 
fragmentation, social diffusion, and other harms described in Part 11. 
I .  Building Online Town Squares-Support for Public Fora on Local and 
State Government Websites 
As noted above, although a small minority of Internet websites are 
government-controlled, there is a paucity of public discussion fora on those 
websites. Many municipal, county, and state governments have launched 
websites that provide important and detailed information about governance, 
proposed legislation, and community initiatives, but very few public 
websites in the United States host interactive discussion of issues of public 
importance by means of discussion fora or community e-mail discussion 
lists.503 Moreover, government-controlled websites that do not 
affirmatively provide public discussion boards or other opportunities for 
online public discussion are not deemed traditional or designated public 
fora.'04 In 2003's United States v. American Library Association, a 
502. See, e.g., WINDHAUSEN, supra note 435, at 29 ("Making more spectrum available 
for broadband services is certainly worthwhile. The question is whether there is enough 
spectrum available to provide adequate capacity for big broadband."). 
503. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 364, at 348 (reporting that a study of municipal websites 
from the 100 largest U.S. metropolitan areas found "no applications designed to facilitate 
networking or offline meetings of interest groups, and only two sites facilitated online 
policy forums or discussion lists"). 
504. See, e.g., Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville, 221 F.3d 834 (6th Cir. 2000). In 
Putnam Pit, the Sixth Circuit affirmed Cookeville's denial of plaintiff Davidian's demand 
for a hyperlink on the city's website to Davidian's website, which focused on alleged 
corruption and incompetence in municipal government and area businesses. Id. Davidian 
argued that by hosting a number of hyperlinks to several nonprofit and for-profit 
organizations in the area, the city had created a designated public forum on its website and 
violated his First Amendment rights by rehsing to include a hyperlink to his website on the 
city's website. Id. at 841. The court reasoned that because the Internet is such a recent 
innovation, it could not be classified-like public streets, sidewalks, and parks-as a 
plurality of the Supreme Court held that the application of traditional public 
forum status would not apply to fora that have not "immemorially been 
held in trust for the use of the public. . . for purposes of assembly, 
communication of thoughts between citizens, and discussing public 
questions.""'5 That status prohibits the government from restricting public 
expression absent a compelling state interest and less restrictive means of 
restricting such expression. To qualify as a designated public forum in 
which any government restriction of public expression must satisfy the 
strictest scrutiny, a space must have been affirmatively opened up by the 
government for use by the public for expressive purposes.i0" Thus, 
citizens' First Amendment right-of-access claims for expressive activity on 
websites controlled by government entities not expressly willing to provide 
such a platform are weak at best.507 
'The few jurisdictions that have launched highly interactive municipal 
websites with discussion boards, and other deliberative features, have done 
so to good effect. For example, Seattle, Washington, launched a 
"Democracy Postal" online through which citizens may view city council 
meetings, conlrnent on proposed legislation, and access archived public- 
afhlrs video aired on the city-programmed cable Seattle also 
encourages citizens to arrange and participate in a variety of e-mail 
discussion lists (listservs) adtninistered by the city itself through its 
traditional public forum. I d .  at 8 4 2 4 3 .  It then asserted that the city's website also could 
not be classified as a designated public forum because the city had intended the site "to 
convey information to the reader" and not to serve as a platform for free public discourse. 
I d .  at X44. The court concluded that the city's website was a nonpublic forum and that its 
efforts to limit the number of hyperlinks on its site in order to "avoid a cacophony of 
speakers" was reasonable. but it  remanded to the trial court for a determination of whether 
the city's requirement that hyperlinks on its website "promote the economic welfare, 
industry, or tourism of the city" constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination in a 
nonpublic govemment forum. lii. at 84546 ;  st.e ulso United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 
539 L1.S. 194 (2003) (holding that Internet access provided by public libraries is neither a 
traditional nor designated public forum). 
505. 539 CJ.S. 194, 205 (2003) (quoting Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. 
Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679 ( 1  992) (internal quotation marks omitted); .see ulso Nunziato, supra 
note 266, at 1 150-59 (discussing the significance of the case). 
506. Nunziato, szrpra note 366, at 1 149-50; see ulso Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & 
Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802-03 (1985) ("The government does not create a public 
forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a 
nontraditional forum for public discourse."). 
507. For a thorough discussion of the futility of using First Amendment public forum 
right-of-access claims against unwilling government websites, see Schesser, supra note 268, 
at 18 13-14 (noting that even cases that would succeed in advancing such arguments would 
yield less-than-ideal outcomes: "Weak right-to-access claims do not foster the ideal type of 
public online space because they potentially yield highly restrictive forums"). 
508. Seattle.gov, Seattle's Democracy Portal, 
http:l;www.seattle.govipan/Seattle~DemocracyYPortal04O5.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 
2009). 
web~i t e .~ '~  In addition, a handful of small communities have launched 
online initiatives encouraging citizens to interact with other citizens and 
elected officials online.510 Although these local government initiatives to 
create localized, democratic public discussion initiatives online are 
laudable, they are the exception. The great majority of local and state 
public web spaces are minimally interactive and do not provide 
opportunities for public discussion and engagement. 
a. Causes of the Shortage ofpublic Deliberation Spaces Online 
Although the reasons for the paucity of public discussion websites on 
local- and state-government-controlled websites vary by jurisdiction, some 
of the principal problems identified have been ( I )  a lack of available 
fknding for computer services, software, and staff; (2) a lack of expertise in 
best practices for building and monitoring discussion websites and online 
interaction with elected officials; and (3) a general lack of leadership and 
assistance by the federal government in promoting online democratic 
engagement.511 In contrast to the absence of federal support in the United 
States, the governments of Australia, Canada, the European Union, South 
Korea, and Singapore provide significant funding and technical expertise 
for online public discussion and e-democracy at the local and regional 
In the United Kingdom, the government's "UK Online" website 
provides visitors with proposed laws and regulatory materials and hosts 
public discussions concerning those proposals and other issues concerning 
509. Seattle.gov Discussion Lists, 
h t t p : l l w w w . s e a t t l e . g o v / t e c h l g e t _ i n v o l v e d  (last visited Jan. 30,2009). 
5 10. See, e.g., CHADWICK, supra note 185, at 93-96 (describing government-supported 
online communities in Blacksburg, Virginia (hometown of Virginia Tech), and Roxbury, 
Massachusetts (funded in part by Massachusert institute of Technology)); Schesser, supra 
note 268, at 1819 (describing the Federal Heights, Colorado, practice of facilitating online 
chats between citizens and the city's mayor). The city of Winona, Minnesota, is known for 
an especially successful resident-run website designed "to empower, inform, and engage the 
citizenry by creating an ongoing community-wide discussion of local public issues." 
Winona Online Democracy, http:/lfomms.e-democracy.org/groups/winona/ (last visited Jan. 
30, 2009). The state of Minnesota itself has encouraged the development of the Minnesota 
E-Democracy project, which, although not on a government website but instead one 
controlled by a nonprofit organization, hosts online discussions and debates about state 
politics and regional public affairs. CHADWICK, supra note 185, at 98-99. 
511. Scott, supra note 364, at 349; see also CHADWICK, supra note 185, at 102 
(attributing lack of public deliberative sites to "a combination of poor Eunding, unrealistic 
expectations, inappropriate technology, internal disputes, and lack of clear objectives"); 
Dahlberg, supra note 370, at 629 (noting that nonprofit, nongovernmental online democratic 
deliberation projects, such as Minnesota E-Democracy, are severely limited in their 
effectiveness because of the lack of funding, particularly from government: "funding is 
required to enabk deliberative initiatives to resist incorporation by commercial and 
non-deliberative interests and to expand, multiply and improve"). 
512. Scott, supra note 364, at 349. 
governance and public affairs."' 
In his 2006 study of the resources for public involvement made available 
on the websites of the 100 largest cities, Professor James K. Scott notes that 
in addition to lack of funding, expertise, and federal leadership, another 
reason state and local governments have opted against opening public 
discussion fora online is that they may "want to avoid the political-and 
possibly legal-risks of opening up siich communication channels" and 
may "lack the capacity to monitor, manage, mediate, or othenvise respond 
to such public ciiscu~sions."~'~ These are reasonable concerns, of course, 
especially because of the very little experience local governments have had 
in opening spaces online for public discussion. Nevcrtheless, all levels of 
governinent already have extensive experience in opening government 
spaces fhr public discussion and debate. 
Govemti~ent-sponsored outdoor protest zones, town hal! meetings, 
public meetings of lawmaking bodies, regulatory agency comment 
proceedings, school board hearings, and an array of other public brick-and- 
mortar fora psovide llelpful analogues for how governments could open 
space online fbr the exchange of public views while exercising reasonable 
controls to preserve the purpose of the space and mitigate disruption. The 
same First Amendment principles and doctrines that apply to public expression 
in governliient-controlled spaces on terra finna would apply to govemment- 
provicied public spaces online. In addition, it is worth noting that for several 
ye;lrs the fetferal government itself has been hosting a form of detailed public 
ciiscussion online by way of its electronic adlninistrative rulemaking 
p rocecd~~~g~ ."  ' In these proceedings, any member of the general public with 
an Internet connection is able to read initial regulatory proposals, tile electronic 
co~n~iicnts, and then respond to other commentators in subsequent rounds. 
513. E'roo~nkin. .srrpr.~r note 33, at 15-17. Both England and Scotland also permit 
citizens to propose new laws by means of government websites. fd 
-5 14. Scott, .si/p/~r note 363, at 349. 
5 15. 'The Sedcral govcmmcnt launched its Regulations.gov cvebsite in  7003 to proviclc 
centralized online access to cvcry r~t1i:making proceeding open fol- comment at inorc than 
160 1L.de1-a1 agencies, enabling users to view open procccdings, including already-tiled 
cotntncnts, and file comments and replies electronically. General Inforniatio~t on 
Kegi~l;ltions.gov. http:l/www.rcgt1lations.gov!search/foote1-/faq.jsp#37 (last visited Nov. 30. 
7 0 0 8 ) .  'I'I1esc new online tools Sor accessing rulemaking procccdings arc a n  important step 
toward more pttblic :tu;trcricss and participation in govcrnancc, hilt t l~c  rt~lcm:tking 
proceedings theinselves arc clltitc formal with very limited oppol-tunity for dynamic 
iliscussions. .SCY Shane, . c r ~ / ) i . i t  11otc 174, at 73 ("The strt~ctttre of [Scdcral] I - L I I ~  iti;~kitig . . . i n  
;it least it iilodcst way. positions the agency in deliberative dialogue with citizcns that links 
tlircct citizen input to ol'Ijci;~l yo\,crnmcnt decisionmaking."). In addition, some individual 
kiieral agencies have expcl-inie~~tctl wit11 electronic alternativcs to physical p~tblic hearings, 
S L I C ~  ;IS [lie Environ~ncni;~I I'rotcctio~i Agency's National Dialogue on Public Involvement 
pro.jcct, which entailccl or~li~ie ~lirc;~ticd iscussions, electronic briefing books, and other 
innovations. See Tlioni;is ( '. I<cicrlc. Digitirl Delih~r.crtion: Er1~gctgit7~g rhc. Plihlic T ~ ~ Y I I I ~ ~  
Or7iitlc Polic:l. Di~iIogti(,.s, i l l  I)t.h!o( I<;\(.V O N L I N E ,  SZ(PI.LI  note 33, at 155, 156-50. 
b. Parameters for Online Public Fora 
As with the opening of any government-provided public meeting and 
discussion space, state and local governments would be wise to proceed 
carefully in opening public discussion spaces online to avoid running afoul 
of the First Amendment. At minimum, a local or state government opening 
an online public forum should (1) make clear through widely accessible 
announcements and the website's ToS that the discussion area is one where 
First Amendment protections apply with no content- or viewpoint-based 
restrictions; (2) announce that the website is open to, and welcomes the 
participation of, the general public, similar to an open-air public gathering 
space or public hearing (e.g., city council or school board meeting); and 
(3) adopt reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions designed to keep 
individual discussions flowing without disruptive activities, such as 
repeated identical postings, obscene postings, or other materid that would 
not be consistent with the purpose of individual discu~sions.~'~ 
Government websites also could implement innovations that have worked 
well in private online discussion fora for keeping discussions on track while 
mitigating vandalism, such as the use of automated obscenity filtration and 
user-based "flagging" and reporting systems, like those used on YouTube 
and other websites, which depend on users to report individual members' 
violations of the ToS. The few existing public discussion websites hosted by 
or with the support of state and local governments have developed guidelines 
and practices to support productive discussions while mitigating nuisances.517 
One potential point of contention may arise from attempts by 
government hosts of online public fora to limit the ability of forum 
participants to express themselves anonymously or pseudonymously in the 
hopes of discouraging incivility, vandalism, and disruptive personal 
attacks. Although such restrictions are permissible on privately controlled 
websites, on government websites they may run afoul of the First 
Amendment. The Supreme Court has consistently adhered to the view that 
anonymous speech is constitutionally protected.518 Nevertheless, as noted 
5 16. See Schesser, supra note 268, at 18 18-2 1 (providing excellent, detailed 
recommendations (much more extensive than what I can provide here) for the creation of 
government-hosted public fora for online public discussion). 
517. For example, Minnesota's E-Democracy project enforces a set of complex rules 
developed in part by users themselves. See E-Democracy Forum Rules, 
http://e-democracy.org/rules/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2008) (displaying the rules for 
E-Democracy citizen-to-citizen discussion fora). 
518. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio EIections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) 
("Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority.. . . The right to remain 
anonymous may be abused when it shields fraudulent conduct. But political speech by its 
nature will sometimes have unpalatable consequences, and, in general, our society accords 
greater weight to the value of free speech than to the dangers of its misuse."); Talley v. 
California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960) ("'Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even 
above, some studies show that anonymous discussions online have a 
disinhibiting effect on discussants, at times making it more likely that 
discussions will disintegrate into "shouting" matches or exchanges of 
abusive personal attacks, causing other participants to stay silent or flee the 
space altogether."lg These negative effects can be mitigated by the 
implementation of practices refined on private websites that have proved 
effective at promoting civility in fora permitting anonymous and 
pseudonymous contributions. For example, websites may require 
registration (with e-mail address known only to a website moderator) and 
discussion moderation (which can be done by volunteer discussion 
leaders). In addition, there now is research indicating that, as a normative 
development, discussion participants increasingly are opting to identify 
themselves in posts as a means of making their contributions more credible 
and persuasive.520 
Some of the benefits of public deliberative fora on government-owned 
websites have been achieved on a small number of websites controlled by 
nonprofit organizations interested in promoting public deliberation and 
democratic discussion online."' If operated with the objectives of 
promoting true, censorship-free democratic deliberation, a privately 
controlled website can provide many of the advantages of a government- 
controlled forum, with two advantages of private control. First, complete 
independence fiom the government would ensure the autonomy of the 
discussions and freedom from any potential interference or manipulation by 
the government. Second, private website operators could implement 
website moderation practices designed to preserve civility and the 
books have played an important role in the progress of mankind."). There is a limit to the 
protection of anonymity, however. For example, courts have been willing to unmask 
anonymous and pseudonymous Internet speakers accused of misappropriation of trade 
secrets and defamation. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Doe 1, No. 1 -04-CV-032178, 2005 
WL 578641, at *8 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 11, 2005) (ordering an ISP to disclose identities of 
Internet users accused of misappropriating Apple trade secrets); In re Richard L. Baxter, No. 
01-00026-M, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26001, at *1, *52-53 (W.D. La. Dec. 19, 2001) 
(holding that "a reasonable probability of a finding of defamation" justified compelling an 
ISP to disclose the identity of an anonymous website contributor accused of making 
defamatory statements). 
5 19. See Witschge, supra note 296, at 115 (summarizing research findings on negative 
ekfects of online anonymity). 
520. See id. at 117 (noting that "[ulsers are sometimes not even interested in exploiting 
the potential for anonymous interaction" because "[tlhe use of one's real name can give 
more weight to a posting"). 
521. For example, the Minnesota E-Democracy project, whose original aims were "to 
strengthen, expand, and diversify citizen engagement through effective and meaningful 
online discussions and two-way information exchange on public issues," was not a 
government-hosted website, but an online discussion service originating as an e-mail 
discussion listserv controlled by a nonprofit corporation with the endorsement of 
government entities. CHADWICK, supra note 185, at 98. 
seriousness of purpose of the discussions, such as barring anonymous 
postings, which likely would be challenged under the First Amendment if 
the website were hosted by the government. 
The disadvantages of private website control, however, are significant. 
A number of experiments in nongovernmental online deliberative fora have 
suffered from the inability to raise enough funds to sustain opera&on 
f 
without having to resort to advertising and the pressures of 
commercia l i~at ion .~~~ In addition, public discussion fora hosted on 
municipal or state websites are believed to generate higher levels of traffic, 
and therefore much more vibrant discussions, due to their proximity to 
public information and materials relating to governance (e.g., proposed 
legislation, archived hearing materials, and regulatory proposals).i23 To 
drive traffic to government-controlled public websites, elected oficials 
could affimatively request communiw discussion on a particular proposal 
(e.g., a new recycling policy) or challenge (e.g., juvenile crime). Citizens 
should be empowered to open their own discussions on topics irnportant to 
them but neglected by elected officials. For example, a citizen concerned 
about pollution from a neighborhood industrial facility who has an 
especially friendly relationship with the municipality's elected officials 
could open a discussion thread to engage neighbors in how to address the 
problem. 
In sum, a broadband public interest standard should encompass proactive 
federal support for public discussion spaces on local municipal and state 
websites. These fora would be censorship-free areas that tvould engage a 
diversity of citizens in discussion of issues of local public importance and 
that would foster locally oriented community identity and shared 
experience online in ways that would buttress community-building and 
democratic engagement efforts on terra firma. Support can come in the 
form of federal grants to help fund the efforts of local and state initiatives 
to provide public fora online, and fund technical assistance in the form of 
proven templates and best practices models for the establishment and 
maintenance of such websites. 
2. Linking Pzlhlic Brou&u,rting with Pzlhlie Broadhund-'4 "dew 
Corporutionji~r Ptrhlic Broadband:) 
The proactive role for government sketched out so far in the creation of 
public, noncommercial, localized spaces in electronic media has a strong 
522 See Dahlberg, rrtpru note 370, at. 627-29 (noting that "Mnnesota E-Democracy 
i t d f  has not co~npletely s~destepped the Wcb'c comtnercial~ration," hav~ng  had to 'Iccept 
advertising on each post In order to stay atloat). 
523 Id 
and relatively successful precedent in the American public broadcasting 
system. In fact, perhaps a new Corporation for Public Broadband, modeled 
after the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB), could serve as a 
centralized government entity responsible for coordinating and funding 
some of these efforts as a sister agency to the CPB. 
The American system of public broadcasting was created largely in 
response to concerns that-like the almost entirely privatized, commercial 
Internet today--commercial, private broadcasting was failing to live up to 
the expectation that it would "realize the vast potentialities"524 of the 
medium. It was the brainchild of the Carnegie Commission on Educational 
Television, which in a 1967 report urged the government to assume a much 
more aggressive role in bringing about "a well-financed and well-directed 
educational television system" in order to serve the commercially 
unsatisfied needs of the American public for diverse, locally oriented 
educational and cultural programming.'25 Quoting E.B. White, the 
Carnegie Commission concluded that noncommercial broadcasting would 
serve as "our Lyceum, our Chautauqua, our Minsky's, and our ~amelot .""~ 
At the Carnegie Commission's behest, Congress enacted the Public 
Broadcasting Act of 1967 and, in so doing, created the CPB.'" The CPB 
was designed to act as a fiscal agent through which significant federal 
budget appropriations would flow to the public broadcasting licensees 
themselves, as well as a "heat shield" to absorb political fallout from 
specific programming In creating the CPB, Congress 
emphasized the importance of federal support for noncommercial media 
"for instructional, educational, and cultural purposes" that is "responsive to 
the interests of people both in particular localities and the United States," 
that will "constitute an expression of diversity and excellence," and that 
"addresses the needs of unserved and underserved audiences, particularly 
children and minorities."529 
The American noncommercial broadcasting system has had its 
controversies and dysfunctions, and it suffers from the same insoluble 
structural impediments as commercial broadcasting in serving as an 
524. NBC, Inc. v. United States, 3 19 U.S. 190, 217 (1943). 
525. CARNEGIE COMM'N ON EDUC. TELEVISION, PUBLIC TELEVISION: A PROGRAM FOR ACTION 
SUMMARY ( 1967), c~vcrilrble at http:/lwww.current.or~pbpb/camegie/CamegielSu~nmary.html. 
526. Letter from E.B. White to the Carnegie Cornrn'n (Sept. 26, 1966), uvuiluble ut 
http:/lwww.current.org/pbpb/camegieiEBWer.html; .see L J ~ S O  Weinberg, supra note 
8, at 1200 n.458 (discussing the origins of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB)). 
527. Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365 (codified as 
amended at 47 U.S.C. 3 396 (2000)). 
528. JERVLD M. STARR, AIR WARS 25-26 (2000). The CPB's ten-member governing 
board, which is appointed by the President with Senate confirmation, must be bipartisan, 
with no more than five members belonging to the same party. 37 IJ.S.C. 3 396(c)(l). 
529. 37 U.S.C. 5 396(a)(l), (5H6). 
electronic marketplace of ideas.j3" In light of their dependence on tax 
dollars, public broadcasters at times have had to avoid politically 
controversial subject matter in favor of more bland material.j3' 
Nevertheless, public broadcasting has succeeded at delivering some of the 
locally oriented political and public affairs, children's educational, and 
cultural programming that is virtually absent from the commercial 
airwaves. As Professor Patricia Aufderheide notes, public broadcasters' 
service to their local communities earns them "the highest trust ratings of 
any media in the [United ~ ta tes ] . " '~~  The value of public educational 
television for minority immigrant communities is especially underreported. 
For many immigrant children in non-English-speaking households, free 
educational broadcasting is the only reliable source of English language 
instruction and acculturation outside of This was certainly true 
for me.j3' 
In addition to serving as a fiscal agent for funds and technical expertise 
to support the creation of locally oriented online public fora, a Corporation 
for Public Broadband, like its broadcast counterpart, could serve as a 
source of grants to promote innovative noncommercial uses of the 
530 Professor Aufderhe~de posits that although public broadcasting '-prov~des some 
opponunltles for people to learn about each other and their problems, and to share a 
common cultural experience," it 1s lim~ted by its nature "as a mass medium." She \%rites 
that "[tlhe [commerclal] broadcasters, at one point, speak to the many, who then talk to each 
other. The [public] broadcasters have to stand m the place of the publ~c, and act on their 
behalf, and hope they guessed nght." Pat Aufderhe~de. VIogr, rPods und Beyond. Public 
\fedla's Terr~filng Opportunztres, Ahl. UNIV. CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA 3 - 4  (Nov. 2006), 
u~)ar/uhle ut http'liwww centerforsocsalmedia.org/files!pdf/vlogs-ipods-beyond.pdf. 
53 1 See, e g., John Br~ggs, Surne-Sex Purents Angry ut PBS, BCRLINGTON FRFE PRESS, 
Jan. 27, 2005, at 1A (d~scussmg the PBS decls~on not to distribute an episode of "Postcards 
from Buster," the educat~onal children'$ program, after Secretary of Education ~Margaret 
Spellings denounced the eplsode as lnappropnate for children because it featured, 
incrdentally, the children of two families headed by same-sex parents); we u1i.o 
Aufderheide, Jzipra note 530, at 2 (noting that publlc broadcasters "need to maintaln their 
relat~vely bland reputation for uncontroversial quality, to marntaln the broad support they 
have %onn); KOGFR P. SMITH, THE OTHER F W E  OF PliBLfC TV' CFNSOKIP~G TMF AMERIC 2N 
DKFAM (2002) (deta~l~ng umerous problems assoc~ated 1~1th  encroaching commerclal dnd 
goveinmental interests in pubhc broadcasting content) 
532. 'Iufderhelde, Jzpm note 530, at 7. 
533 Milton Chen, A@ths Ahout Instrzrct~onul Tele~~ir~on A Xtpocte. ~ D U C .  WK.. 'Llay 
24, 1989, avullable at http://www edweek.or~ew/art1cles/1489105/24/083 100 12.h08 html 
(discuss~ng how ~nstructional children's television, sncluding programs like "'The Electr~c 
Company," has been shown by the Educational Testmg Senr~ce to be effective dt teach~ng 
begmnmg read~ng skills, and how "mstructional television can play an especially important 
role in prov~ding new lmm~grant children with the cultural and llngutst~c background for 
interpreting lessons in the humanit~es and sciences"). 
534 Born In Cuba, 1 was brought to the United States at the age of three by my parents, 
who did not speak English. Not being able to learn English from my famlly, 1 was 
'xdmin~stered a steady diet of Sesume Street, Mister Rogers ' Ne~ghborhooci, and The Ele~trzc 
Coml.tcmv, as prescribed by my first-grade teacher. 
technology for locally oriented political and democratic engagement."i A 
more proactive government orientation to broadband also could encolnpass 
significantly more funding for local public broadcasting stations' ventures 
online. Although public radio stations have had some success in streaming 
and podcasting select programming by means of their websites, for the 
most part, public broadcasters have been unable to establish much of a 
dynamic, locally oriented presence online due to funding shortages.536 
Helping local public broadcasting stations establish a more substantively 
rich and interactive presence online wo~lld help to create more locally and 
community oriented points of common focus online, in harmony wtth the 
goal of providing local, public online deliberation websites described 
above. In fact, because the transition to digital television has made the 
prograrnrning of public television broadcasters fully compatible with the 
digital Internet, public television station programming concerning local 
public affairs can be linked to local public online discussion fora, thereby 
forming the basis for discussions on local issues of democratic importance 
and driving participation to the fora. Because many public broadcasting 
stations are licensed to state and local government en ti tie^,"^ such cross- 
utilization may be viewed as mutually beneficial by both the station 
licensees and the hosts of the local discussion websites. 
Finally, although the federal government provides significant financial 
support for children's educational programming on public television,""t 
has made no comparable investment in noncommercial educational 
broadband content for children despite their high levels of Internet use. In 
fact, PBS has resorted to selling advertising on its PBSKids.org and related 
tvebsites-commercialization of the sort prohibited on public broadcasting 
stations-to raise revenue to support its online c n d e a v o r ~ . ~ ' h  more 
535 .See, e g , Press Releace, Corp for Pub Broad. CPB Announces Recrprents ot the 
Ctatlon-Based Electlon Programming lnitlat~te (Aug 3, 200%), 
http i / \ t ~ w  cpb org/pressroom/rclease php )pm=675 
q36 See CORP FOR PI R BROAD , CORPORAT~ON FOR Pt HLlC B R ~ A D C  A S  TIC(,  7007 
~ \ u I J ~ L  KFPOKT 14-15 (7007), 
11ttp / ~ W W W  cpb org/aboutcpb/reportsiannual/cpb-2007-,~nnualreport pdf (descnbtng inodest 
fbrays Into fundtng online rnttratlves beyond the archttrng dnd podcasting of select 
broadcast material) I'rofessor Aufderhe~de obsenes that "[1]t'5 been hard tor tno5t publ~c 
broadcasters even to recognize the power of t h ~ s  new [dlgltal] env~ronment," but documents 
'1 number of very tnodest projects tnittnted by publtc broadcasters themselkes fei~turlng 
ongtnal. lnteractlve onllne media Aufderhelde, ricpru note 530. at 11-12 
537 See Barnstone v Unlv of Houston, 5 14 F Supp 670,683 (S D Tex 19x0) (noting 
tltat, ot 385 publtc teielt?lon itations tn the Unlted States, 132 are Ilcensed to government 
cntittei dnd an 3dditional 77 nre Ilcensed to colleges and unlveriitles, tllany of vhlch are 
pnbltc). 
538 See CORP TOR P I ~ B  BROAD. rzrpru note 536, at 36-38, 42 (dctarllng 2007 CPR 
evpenditures for chtldren's educat~onal programm~ng) 
539 Dinesh Kumar, PBS to Reiztn~e Online Lds to E~ploi t  \l~ltrr-ket Demund COMW 
D ~ I L Y ,  Atig 24. 2006. tr~vr/lirhie ot http IIwwtv eommcrc~alalert ~rg~tssuesicultumpbs pbs- 
proactive federal commitment to public interest broadband should 
encompass efforts to support children's educational and informational 
services on the Internet. 
3. Network Neutrality 
A broadband public interest standard calling for affirmative government 
interventions to promote locally oriented, noncommercial, diverse 
democratic expression and discussion online also could inform and elevate 
the unfolding debate on network neutrality (net neutrality). The net 
neutrality controversy has focused almost entirely on the logical- and 
application-layer implications of net neutrality on innovation, competition, 
and market power. Not enough attention has been devoted to how the 
absence of net neutrality would ramify across the content layer in ways that 
would undermine the Internet's emergence as a platform for political, 
social, and cultural engagement. A full discussion of the legal and 
technical complexities of net neutrality is far beyond the scope of this 
Article, but a brief foray into the controversy will help show how the 
Internet's value as a democratic and expressive instrument is due to, and 
dependent upon, the neutrality of the network. 
At the heart of network neutrality is the norm that Internet carriers must 
transport data packets using "best efforts," from one end of their network to 
the other, without discriminating against any particular classes of 
packets.540 ~dvoca tes  of net neutrality regulation have argued that the 
neutrality norm has been the innovation most responsible for the Internet's 
success.S4' Congress, however, has resisted codifying network neutrality 
principles partly because major ISPs and their supporters, and some 
to-resume-online-ads-to-exploit-market-demand. 
540. See Sascha D. Meinrath & Victor W. Pickard The New Network Neutrality: 
Criteria for Internet Freedom, 12 INT'L J .  COMM. L. & POL'Y 225, 226 (2008) (defining 
network neutrality as the "nondiscriminatory interconnectedness among data 
communication networks that allows users to access the content, and run the services, 
applications, and devices of their choices"); see also Crawford, supra note 167, at 395 
(explaining that a nonneutral network would allow Internet connection and transport 
providers to "monetize these connections by discriminating against particular packets"). See 
generally Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discriminution, 2 J .  ON TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 141 (2003) (comparing network neutrality to open access for all users). 
541. See Lessig, supra note 163, at 2 (noting that the neutral network, end-to-end 
"philosophy ranked humility above omniscience and anticipated that network designers 
would have no clear idea about all the ways the network could be used" and thus "counseled 
a design that built little into the network itself, leaving the network free to develop as the 
ends (the applications) wanted"); see also Meinrath & Pickard, supra note 540, at 227 
("This best effort entails packets being delivered in a 'first-in first-out' method at the 
maximum speed possible given network constraints. Under network neutrality, network 
operators do not decide what content users can access and cannot impede the tlow or give 
preferential treatment to particular kinds of content."). 
respected scholars, have insisted that prohibitions on "network 
management" would, inter alia, slow innovation and hinder carriers' efforts 
to respond nimbly to competitive pressures and consurner dc~nand.'" 
Public demands for network neutrality regulation have grown louder in 
recent years, especially in the wake of reports revealing that lnternet 
carriers were degrading or blocking packets associated with certain 
applications or expressive content.jJ3 AS discussed in Part 11.2.B, there 
have been numerous verified reports in recent years of broadband providers 
censoring political content, or messages critical of the providers 
themselves, over their networks. 
There also have been high profile incidents of violations of the net 
neutrality principle associated wlth carriers' discrimination against data 
packets associated with certain software applications. For example, in 
2005, Madison River Communications, LLC, a broadband servlce provider 
in North Carolina that also offers telephone services, entered a consent 
decree with the FCC assessing a $15,000 "voluntary payment" for having 
blocked packets associated with VoIP telephony applications offered by 
c ~ m ~ e t i t o r s . ~ "  More recently, in August 2008, the FCC found that 
Comcast Corporation-a major cable television provider-had "broadly 
and arbitrarily" blocked packets associated with certain file-sharing 
542. See, r.y., Christopher S .  Yoo, Beyond Network ~Yerrtrtrli~, 19 HARV. J .L.  & TECH. 
1, 7 (3005); see trlso Net Netitt*r~/i~), Heuring B~fbre  flie S. C'umm. on C'otntnerce, .Sc,i. & 
Trcmsp., 109th Cong. (2006) (testimony of Kyle McSlomow, President & CEO, National 
& C'able 7Telecommunications Association), ti,wilahle c~t 
http:licommerce.senate.gov/pdf/mcslamow-020706.pdf ("Congress should . . . allow the 
marketplace to continue to grow and change so network and applications providers can offer 
consumers the fullest range of innovative service options."). 
Broadband providers have argued that originators of' bandwidth-intensive content 
and applications, like Google and MSN, should pay a premium for the transport of their 
packets. For example, SBC Communications, Inc. Chairman Edward E. Whitacre, Jr. 
expounded in an interview that "what they would like to do is use my pipes free, but 1 ain't 
going to let them do that because we have spent this capital and we have to have a return on 
it." Arshad Mohammed, SBC He~id Ignites .-lc~ess Debate, Whstr. POST, Nov. 4, 7005. at 
Dl .  Mr. Whitacre apparently failed to account for the fact that broadband carriers in fact are 
compensated for carrying bandwidth-intensive traffic by means ot' large access fees paid by 
originators as well as end-users, who pay a premium tor high-speed access. Professor Phillip 
Weiser called Mr. Whitacre's cotrlnlent "bizarre on many levels" and noted that "Google 
does not use much bandwidth for its search application" and "has added enormous value 
t e a n d  demand for" broadband service. Philip J. Weiser, The Next b7rontirr,/i)r Newur-k 
.Veu/rrrli/y, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 273,283 (3008). 
543. For numerous examples of net neutrality violations in North America. see JOHN 
WINDHAUSEN, JR. ,  GOOD FENCES MAKE BAD BROADBAND: PRESERVING A N  OPEN INTERNET 
THROUGH NET NEUTRALITY, PUBLAC KNOWLEDGE WHITE PAPER 16-23 (2006), 
l~ttp:i/www.publicknowledge.org/pd0pk-net-neutra~ity-whitep-20060206.pdf. 
544. Madison River Commc'ns. LLC, 20 F.C.C.R. 4295, 4397 (2005) (consent decree); 
cee Jonathan Krim, Phone Cornpca7.v Settles in Blocking oj' Internet C'trlls, WASH. POST. 
Mar. 4, 2005, at E2 (reporting that the company's blocking of calls resulted in a complete 
inability for some consumers to use their VoIP services). 
qplications, such as RitTorrent, thereby denying subscribers onllr~e video, 
;45 
music, and other content of their choice. The FCC rejected C'omcast's 
:trgumcnt that the blocked traffic merely was the result of "reasonable 
network management," noting that the record showed that Comcast was 
blocking these packets even at times when there was no network 
congestion, and that its actions had an anticompetitive nlotive since peer- 
to-peer file-sharing applications "including those relying on BitTorrent, 
provide Internet users with the opportunity to view high-quality video that 
they might otherwise watch (and pay for) on cable te le~is ion."~ '~ 
Comcnst's appeal of the FCC's order is pending. 
Wh~le  proponents of net neutrality praised the FCC's Comcast ~rder ," '  
the action was not a inodel of administrative clarity and coherence. In his 
statement supporting it, then-FCC Chairman Kevin J.  Martin said that by 
"tell[ing] Comcast to stop" blocking and delaying certain traffic, the FCC 
i~ i t c i  taken "another inlportant step to ensure that all consumers have 
unfettered access to the ~nternet."'" But in the same statement, Martin 
declared that "[olur action today is not about regulating the Internet" and 
that he has "consistently opposed calls for legislation or rules to iinposc 
network neutrality."'J9 This contradiction caused sorne observers to 
q~~es t ion  the FCC Co~ncast Order's validity and longevity.ii" 
T11e lack of clarity in the FCC Comcast Order may be attributable, in 
part, to uncertainty surrounding the FCC's authority to hold carriers 
accountable for violations of net neutrality. As noted in Part 111, the FCC 
deregulated cable-modem broadband service in 2002 and DSL broadband 
service in 2005 by removing them from the scope of Title 11's common- 
carrier requirements and reclassifying them as unregulated "information 
545. Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Corncast 
Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 F.C.C.R. 13,028 (7008) 
\hereinafter Formal Complaint Against Comcast] (opinion and order). 
546. Press Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Commission Orders Comcast to End 
Discriminatory Network Management Practices (Aug. 1. ZOOS), 
iittp:~~'l1munfoss.fcc.goviedocs~public/attachmatch/DOC-2426A I .pdf. The Commission 
concluded that "[sluch video distribution poses a potential competitive threat to Comcast's 
video-on-demand ( 'VOD') service." Id. 
547. For example, Commissioner Michael J. Copps called it "a landmark decision" and 
"a meaningful stride forward on the road to guaranteed openness of the Internet." Formal 
Co~nplaint Against Comcast, 73 F.C.C.R. at 13,078. 
548. fd. :~t 13,065. 
549, Id. at 13,067. 
550. See, eg . ,  Charles Cooper, The FCC on Cotncust: Cor?jifirsion in Spude.~, Coop's Comer, 
CN ETNEws.c~M, http://news.cnet.com/'830 1 - 10787-3- 10005350-60.html (Aug. 7, 7008); 
Posting of Olga Kliarif to BusinessWeek.com, FCC '.s Cbrncust Kzrling Opens ti C C J ~  (?I' Wor*rns, 
http:i'/wcvw.businessweek.com/the~threatechbeatarchives000fccscomcast -ru. html? 
campaign-id=rss-blog-techbeat (Aug. 1, 2008) (suggesting the FCC Comcast Order will 
"likely open a whole new can of worms" i11 regard to the "net neutrality debate"). 
services" under Title I of the Communications ~ c t . " '  Although the 
Supreme Court in Brand X noted that the FCC could still "impose special 
regulatory duties" on cable-modem broadband providers "under its Title I 
ancillary j u r i s d i c t i ~ n , " ~ ~ ~  the FCC has promulgated no regulations 
addressing net neutrality in cable broadband or any other Internet service. 
In addition, scholars disagree about whether Title I ancillary authority 
would, in fact, support FCC regulation of broadband providers of the sort 
that net neutrality proponents demand, absent new authorizing 
Even if the FCC were to promulgate regulations mandating 
network neutrality, those regulations likely would be challenged promptly 
as inconsistent with the overarching policy objective Congress articulated 
in 5 230 of the 1996 Telecom Act, namely to preserve "the vibrant and 
competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other 
interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation."s54 
55 1. See slrpra no& 449 and accompanying text. 
552. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Sews., 545 U.S. 967, 996 
(2005). 
553. Professor James B. Speta, for example, has written that "the FCC's authority under 
Title 1 is. at best, uncertain" and that with broadband services under Title I of the Act it is 
"unlikely that the courts would permit the FCC to regulate the Internet in any significant 
fashion." James B. Speta, FCC rizrthorit?, to Regulute the Inter-net: Crmting It irr~d Litnitirzg 
It, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 15, 22 (2003); see also Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue 
Watts, .,tgenqv Rilles with tire Force u f ' la~v:  The (Irzgii~al Convention, 1 I 6 I -~ARv.  L. REV. 
467, 5 17-1 9 (2002). Professors hlerrill and Watts argue that the legislative intent of Title I, 
3 4(i) of the Communications Act, as amended-which states that "the Commission may 
perfbrm any and all acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not 
inconsistent with this act. as may be necessary in the execution of its functions"-is not a 
grant of legislative n~lemaking authority but merely the grant of authority to make 
procedural rules and undertake other internal "housekeeping" functions. Id. They posit that 
Congress expressly conferred legislative rulemaking authority to the FCC only in the areas 
of common carriers (Title I[), broadcasting (Title III), and cablecasting (Title VI). Thus the 
Communications Act's rulemaking language in Title I, if interpreted as conferring blanket 
legislative rulemaking authority to the FCC, would render superfluous the latter substantive 
grants of rulemaking authority. Id Professor Weiser disagrees, arguing that the FCC does 
have adequate authority under Title I to promulgate regulations imposing substantive duties 
on broadband providers. See Weiser, sz~pru note 542, at 289; see L ~ S O  Philip J .  Weiser, 
To\t>crrii tr lVe.xt Generution Re&rll/tltory Stratety, 35 LOY. U .  CHI. L.J. 41, 48-67 (2003) 
(conceding that the FCC "will face serious questions as to whether Title 1 authorizes the 
FCC to regulate broadband platforms" but concluding that the FCC could pro~nulgate 
legislative regulations using its Title I ancillary authority if, inter alia, it were to articulate "a 
limiting standard to contain the reach of its authority over the Internet"). 
554. Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. $ 230(b)(2) (2000); see ul.so Editorial, 
FCC.politics.gov, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2008, at A14 ("It's also not clear that the FCC even 
has the authority to enforce net neutrality, because Congress has never passed a law 
establishing such a policy."). The FCC responded to this argument in the Uorncast Order. 
arguing in part that "the policy embodied in this provision cannot reasonably be read to 
prevent uny governmental oversight" of broadband providers since, when the provision was 
enacted, Internet providers were subjected to "extensive common carrier regulation." 
Formal Complaint Against Comcast, 23 F.C.C.R. 13,028, 13,042 (2008) (opinion and 
order). Although this characterization of the regulatory status of Internet services at the 
time of the 1996 Telecom Act's enactment is accurate, it does not go far in resolving the 
Given the FCC's uncertain legislative authority, it is not surprising that 
the agency assessed no fine and merely required Comcast to comply with 
its 2005 Internet Policy Statement. In that nonbinding statement, the FCC 
declared that it "has a duty to preserve and promote the vibrant and open 
character of the Internet as the telecommunications marketplace enters the 
broadband age."5" It also adopted a number of principles central to the net 
neutrality norm, including consumers' right to access the "lawful Internet 
content of their choice," "to run applications and use [legal] services of 
their choice," and "to connect their choice of legal devices that do not harm 
the network."556 
a. Net Neutrality and Democracy Online 
The focus of many of the arguments in favor of legislation mandating 
net neutrality has been on application-layer competition and innovation. 
Professor Lessig, for example, convincingly argues that instead of 
hindering innovation, a neutral Internet respecting the nondiscriminatory 
end-to-end principle has been "an engine of innovation" by decentralizing 
"[tlhe power, and hence the right, to innovate."557 Similarly, Professor Tim 
Wu has posited that a neutral Internet has engendered a much more 
competitive marketplace for Internet applications than would have resulted 
from a non-neutral net.558 
Telephone and cable companies, intent on exploiting their duopoly 
control by churning more profit out of their broadband networks, can 
attempt to do so by further commoditizing the Internet to the detriment of 
end users and third-party content providers. This threat reasonably has 
generated legislative proposals and scholarly theorizing focused on the 
economic, commercial marketplace threats posed by violations of the net 
neutrality norm. For example, in introducing a bill seeking to codify net 
neutrality, Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) argued that allowing broadband 
intermediaries to create and charge premium rates for prioritized carriage 
uncertainty concerning whether the FCC currently has the statutory authority to enforce net 
neutrality, especially given the deregulatory impetus of the statute. 
555. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline 
Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,986, 14,988 (2005). 
556. Id. 
557. Lessig, supra note 162, at 6 1. 
558. See Wu, supra note 540, at 151; see also Tim Wu, Why Have u 
Telecommunications Law? Anti-Di.scriminatzon Norms in Cammunicutions, 5 J .  ON 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 15 (2006) (arguing that network neutrality encourages 
competitors to enter the market and compete for business); WINDHAUSEN, supru note 543, 
at 39 (explaining that net neutrality has spurred, instead of hindered, broadband deployment 
by "provid[ing] certainty to innovators and entrepreneurs who will be more willing to invest 
to develop new services if they have confidence that, once developed, access to the network 
will be available"). 
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of traffic "could have a chilling effect on small mom-and-pop bi~sinesses 
that can't afford the priority lane, leav~ng these sinaller businesses no hope 
of compet~ng aga~nst the Wal-Marts of the world.""" Other proponents 
similarly speak In tenns of "deslgn[~ng] rules that expl~c~t ly  forbtd network 
uperators and ISPs to use the~r  power over the transmtssion technology to 
negatively affect competition" and thereby hann consumers In the 
broadband 
Allowing broadband carrlers such as Cotncast to cornmoditi~e the 
transport of data packets, charging a premium for faster transport, or to 
degrade surreptitiously or block competitors' traffic, triggers senoils 
concerns Involving unfair cornpetition and antitrust generally. Wlth the 
prospect of opt~mizing profit from prior~tized '.extra charge" traffic, 
broadband providers would have an incent~ve to sell as much of that i~ltra- 
high-speed transport to providers that can pay the premiums. They also 
would have the incentive to reserve much of that prioritized "fast lane" for 
their own affiliated applications and services. 
This antitrust lens, however important, does not encompass the totality 
of the hann a nonneutral Internet would cause to diverse polltical 
expression, noncommercial content, and democratic engagement generally 
on the Internet. Although the conditions for political engagement and 
ciisciission orlline are less than ideal, the slgrl~ticant value that the Internet 
delivers today as an instrument of delnocrat~c expression is attribiltable 
largely to the ability of citizens to use free applications, such as YouTube, 
blogg~ng and social networking websites, or low-cost website-hosting 
rervlces, to engage other citizens online. fhe absence of net neutral~ty In 
favor of t~ered, premium pr~cing for packet transport coi~ld threaten the 
v~ability of these free webs~tes, as well as that of the noncornmerc~al, local 
public discussion websites proposed above. A non-neutral Internet also 
would threaten the econornlc viability of print journalism (i.e., 
newspapers), as it continues to make the already precarious trans~tion from 
broadsheets to b r ~ a d b a n d . ~ ~ '  
Absent net neutrality, the internet would become a varlatton of a private 
shopping mall or, perhaps Inore analogously, a homogen~~ed  cable 
559 Prc\\ Kzlcase, Sendtor Ron Wyden (D-OR). Wyden Move, to Ensure Fd~rness ot 
Internet Usage with New Net Yeutrallty Bill (Pvlar 1, 1006). 
llttp Ilwyden scndte gov/newsroorn/record ctm"id-266467 
560 \re Barh,lra i Cherry, Z~I I I I \ IMY Vet~tofX %'e!i'[itt(~l~n 10 1?/117llt/tlt~' C70/?1tt~ot7 
C'ntrr~rqe Ti7reirtrnc btre  Sprrt h utitl / / ~ r  Potful Slrtem, 33 N K\ L RFL 483, -I%(+- X7 
(2006) (ploviciing helpful wrnmdiy of polley dnd d c ~ d e m i c  arguments ,iciv'tnced In support 
o t  net neutral~ty, allnost '111 Socuslng on antitrust dnci ~ ~ ~ a r k e t p l a c e  concern>) 
561 See ROHF R r  W Mc C ~ I F \ U F Y ,  T H E  POI irfcl\L o ~ o v ~ \ r  01 M I D I A  145-46 (3008) 
(no t~ng  that the iuccesslul trans~tlon of prlnt j ~ u r n ~ i l i s m  "ttoln ~ n k  'ind pdpcr to b~ts"  I \  
depenclcnt on riet ncutral~ty, inter d id ,  .tnd the i n a b ~ l ~ t y  o t  bro,trfbmd cdrriel5 to "dein'tnci n 
r'lnsom f o ~  the newspaper to have ,icce\s to the public") 
television service with a preponderance of subscription and other pay 
channels and a paucity of noncommercial, public space (e.g., public, 
educational, and governmental "channels") for diverse, localized 
community dialogue and expression.'" Much of the generative agency on 
the Internet would shift from the masses of users to the carriers themselves 
and to those corporate customers that can afford premium transport pricing. 
Moreover, these carriers' senior executives have made clear in public 
statements that they are interested in the ability to prioritize packets not 
only as a way to gain competitive advantage, but also as a way to control 
content. For example, IDT Corp. founder and CEO Howard Jonas 
proclaimed that he not only "want[s] to be the biggest telecom company in 
the world" but also wants "to be able to form opinion," noting that "[bly 
controlling the pipe, you can eventually get control of the content."563 
Professor Susan Crawford correctly recognizes that, to date, the 
application-layer focus of regulatory, industrial, and scholarly thinking 
around the Internet, and particularly net neutrality, has "see[n] the 
Internet as a content-delivery supply chain-much like a railroad" and 
thus "does not capture what is valuable about the Internet to people."564 
I very much agree with her assessment that "[o]nline communications 
are not just like any other form of economic activity. Ideas are not like 
goods; they are potentially far more valuable.""' Accordingly, calls for 
net neutrality should be broadened to encompass not only competitive 
and antitrust considerations but also the effects commoditization of bit 
transport would have on opportunities for noncommercial, local 
political and democratic engagement online.566 The Internet is not 
562. See Susan P. Crawford, Cultural Environmentalism @ 10: Network Rules, 70 LAW 
& CONTEMP. ROBS. 5 1, 59 (2007) (noting that cable and telephone company efforts against 
the codification of net neutrality requirements are "part of a global attempt by many 
broadband providers to turn their networks into something much more like what cable 
companies and mobile phone carriers already have-wholly monetized 'services,' with 
vertically integrated networks built to allow deep packet inspection and the possibility of 
blocking or degrading undesirable services"). 
563. Ann Wozencraft, For IDT, the Bid Flameouts Light Its Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 
2002, at C4. 
564. Crawford, supra note 167, at 36 1, 381. 
565. Id. at 39 1 .  Professor Crawford further argues that "communications law can no 
longer afford to ignore" how the Internet is "creating opportunities for the development of 
new ideas and new ways of making a living" that are key "to our future economic growth." 
Id. at 391. 
566. Leadership Conference on Civil Rights Vice President Mark Lloyd has 
characterized net neutrality as a civil rights issue because, "[flor communities of color, the 
Internet offers a critical opportunity to build a more equitable media system [by] provid[ing] 
all Americans with the potential to speak for themselves without having to convince large 
media conglomerates that their voices are worthy of being heard." Mark Lloyd & Joseph 
Torres, Net Nezrtralify Is a Civil Rights Issue, COMMONDREAMS.ORG, Feb. 2k, 2008, 
http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2008/02/2 1 /72 101. 
merely a platform for commerce. Net neutrality is both a democratic 
and economic imperative. 
IV. OLD WINE IN A NEW (DIGITAL) BOTTLE? HOW A BROADBAND 
PUBLIC INTEREST STANDARD WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE 
THAN ITS BROADCAST PROGENITOR 
The broadband public interest standard components discussed in Part 111 
would assign the federal government a much more proactive role in 
promoting important democratic and expressive principles on the Internet. 
These principles have been at the heart of the broadcast public interest 
standard for seven decades but have not been fully achieved as a 
consequence of the broadcast medium's inherent limitations. These 
proposals, however, may beg a number of important questions. First, how 
would a broadband public interest standard, comprised of the interrelated 
interventions detailed above, avoid some of the same shortcomings that 
compromised the effectiveness of the broadcast standard and failed to 
engender a diverse, deliberative, locally oriented, and democracy-enriching 
free marketplace of ideas on the nation's airwaves? Would these proposals 
encounter the same First Amendment frustrations as the broadcast 
standard? How might a broadband public interest standard actually be 
more effective than the broadcast standard in delivering the long-promised 
electronic marketpIace of ideas? Finally, why should it be up to the federal 
government in particular to assume a more interventionist posture in the 
broadband sphere? 
A. Avoiding Content Regulation Quagmires 
As discussed in Part I, the tension inherent in the government's having 
to walk the line between avoiding excessive interference with broadcasters' 
free speech on the one hand and championing the public interest in scarce 
spectrum on the other has undermined the broadcast public interest 
standard since its inception. Congress's failure to provide a durable and 
coherent definition of public interest broadcasting fbrther frustrated the 
success of the broadcast standard. Although significant content-related 
programming requirements are in place today, the broadcast public interest 
standard's components have varied so extensively throughout the history of 
broadcast regulation-in sometimes conflicting ways-that the standard 
has been described as "the epitome of analytical emptiness.""' Moreover, 
with the transition to digital broadcasting delivering innovative ways to 
567. Chnstopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-Spectfic Approach to 
the First Amendment, 9 1 CEO. L.J. 245, 256 (2003). 
share spectrum efficiently, the scarcity rationale that served as a premise 
for broadcast content regulation for most of the twentieth century is now on 
its weakest footing ever. 
1: agree with Professor Levi's assessment that we need "to find a 
'practical middle ground" in what has become a polarized media policy 
debate with, at one end, those who are overconfident about the ability of 
commercial marketplace competition and content abundance to best realize 
the democratic benefits of new technology and, at the other end, those who 
discount the manifold disadvantages and inefficiencies of content-based 
command-and-control regulation.568 The middle ground charted in Part 111 
attempts to reconcile those two competing visions by cabining the 
orientation of government toward the Internet to that of facilitator and 
convener, much like how the government proactivefy supports civil society 
on terra firma. The proposals do not harken back to troubling broadcast- 
standard-like content regulation, which would be inapposite in the private, 
post-scarcity digital sphere. They also move away from the Internet 
exceptionalism that, especially since the 1996 Telecom Act, has kept the 
govemment from assuming a more affirmative role in realizing the 
Internet's democratic potential. They depend principally on subsidies and 
the provision of access, leaving the content of the resulting online 
communications up to the individual beneficiaries. Many of the First 
Amendment conflicts inherent in command-and-control broadcast 
regulation are thus avoided by this more modest yet still proactive approach 
to public-interest-minded, governmental intervention into the online 
marketplace of ideas. All of the affirmative interventions above can be 
implemented by means of comprehensive legislation, which would avoid 
the impediments awaiting broad and ill-defined delegations of regulatory 
authority at the captured and excessively politicized FCC. 
In addition, it is unlikely that net neutrality regulation would constitute 
content regulation or other interference with speech that may run  afoul of 
the First Amendment, despite the arguments that have begun to be made by 
a small number of neutrality opponents. For example, Randolph J. May 
claims that a net neutrality regulation would "implicate[] ISPs' free speech 
rights" since "it is as much a ftee speech infringement to compel a speaker 
to convey messages against the speaker's wishes as it is to prevent a 
speaker from conveying messages."569 
568. Lili Levi, In Search of Regulatory Equ~librium, 35 HOFSTRA L- REV. 1321, 1366 
(2007). 
569. Randolph J. May, Communications Policy Pirouettes, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2007, 
at B4; see also Christopher S .  Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 
94 GEO. L.J. 1847, 190547 (2006) (arguing that network neutrality mandates would 
interfere with Internet carriers' editorial discretion). 
But such reliance on the First Amendment by net neutrality opponents is 
misplaced, even assuming the -far-fetched proposition that broadband 
providers are First Amendment speakers as a function of their carriage of 
Internet data packets. The Supreme Court's validation of the cable 
television must-carry regulatory regime in Turner Broadcasting System, 
IUZC. V.  FCC provides a fitting analogy. The Cable Television Consumer 
Protection and Competition Act of 1992 generally required cable television 
operators to carsy signals of local broadcast stations on their cable 
s y ~ t e m s . ' ~ h e j e c t i n ~  the cable operators' First Amendment claims, the 
Court conceded that cable operators "engage in and transinit speech" and 
thus "are entitled to the protection . . . of the First ~ m e n d m e n t " ~ ~ '  as a 
result of their legitimate editorial role in composing channel lineups and in 
producing and transmitting original programming.'7' Nevertheless, the 
Court concluded that any burden on the cable operators' speech was 
justified in light of the important government interests in "prevent[ing] 
cable operators from exploiting their economic power to the detriment of 
broadcasters." The Court emphasized the importance of "ensur[ing] that all 
Americans, especially those unable to subscribe to cable, have access to 
free television programming-whatever its content."j7' Because a cable 
operator's network is connected directly to subscribers' television sets, it 
can "prevent. . . subscribers from obtaining access to programming it 
chooses to exclude" and "can thus silence the voice of competing speakers 
with a mere flick of the Relying on ,-lssociated Prt..,cs v. Civlited 
states,"' the Court reasoned that "[tlhe First Amendment's command that 
governtnent not impede the freedom of speech does not ciisable the 
government from taking steps to ensure that private Interests not restrict, 
through physical control of a critical pathway of communication, the free 
Row of information and ideas."j7" 
Like cable television operators, the telephone company and cable 
modem duopolists in the broadband marketplace in almost all cases prov~de 
the sole interactive "data pipe" into subscribers' homes. They thus have 
the incentive, g i ~ e n  their integration with broadband content providers, to 
act as "gatekeepers" who can "'flick the switch" on competitors or any other 
570 47 l J  S C $4  534-535 (2000) 
571 rurner Broad Sys , Inc. v LCC, 5 12 U S 622.636 (1994) 
5711 Id at 643 The Court also concluded that the mu~t-carry nilci were content-neutral 
because thcy "are unrelated to the content of the rpccch " Id ,it 647 
573 Id at 649 
573 id dt 656 
57.5 126 U S 1, 20 (1945). 
576 Tziri-ter, 512 U S at 657 See Baker, vcpra note X ,  at 55) (cla~ming thar the irtpremc: 
Court relled on Irracrarecf Prrrr rn order to "assert the leg~timacy of bro,icf goternmental 
power over cable") 
online speakers whom they disfavor.577 With online content rivaling and 
perhaps soon exceeding the importance and centrality of broadcasting in 
the &blic sphere, it would nit  be inconceivable that an assertion by 
broadband carriers that net neutrality regulations violate their free speech 
'rights would meet the same fate as the similar argument cable operators 
advanced in ~ u r n e r . ~ ' ~  
Moreover, broadband providers may find it difficult to overcome the 
inconsistency in arguing that they-as carriers-are First Amendment 
speakers whose free speech rights are infringed by net neutrality mandates, 
while continuing to insist that they deserve the broad immunity granted 
them under 230 of the Communications Decency Act from liability for 
privacy, reputational, and other torts committed over their systems.579 
Courts have upheld such immunity for broadband providers because, to 
borrow the words of the New York Court of Appeals, the provider "is 
merely a conduit."58a It is unlikely that broadband providers wi1I succeed at 
having it both ways, forestalling net neutrality mandates by insisting that 
their carriage of data packets renders them First Amendment speakers, 
while at the same time continuing to disclaim tort liability as mere 
conduits. 
B. Subsidies as a Constitutional Alternative to Regulation 
Most of the proposals discussed in Part rely on subsidies in contrast 
to the broadcast public interest standard's mandates, which IargeIy have 
entailed content regulation justified by the increasingly unstable scarcity 
and public ownership rationales. Whereas the regulation of even content- 
neutral speech is presumptiveIy unconstitutional, the government's 
subsidization of speech is presumptively valid even where it poses an 
incidental burden on the facilitated speech.581 
577. See Crawford, supra note 167, at 403 (arguing that, in the absence of net neutrality, 
broadband providers would "cease to be commodity-transport providers, and will instead 
become gatekeepers," causing the "diversity of online experiences, and thus the range of 
freedom of human connection, human relationships, and the diverse generation of new ideas 
[to] diminish"). 
578. See ZITTRAM, supra note 360, at 18 1-82 (drawing a parallel between broadband net 
neutrality norms and the cable television must-carry regulations); see also Sunstein, supra 
note 185, at 1774 (positing that Turner supported government reguIation of "new speech 
sources" by "invoking such democratic goals as the need to ensure 'an outlet for exchange 
on matters of local concern' and 'access to a multiplicity of information sources"' (citing 
Turner, 5 12 U.S. at 663)). 
579. See 47 U.S.C. 230 (2000); see also supra note 266 (describing the liability- 
limiting effect of § 230 of the 1996 Communications Decency Act). 
580. Lumey v. Prodigy Sews. Co., 723 N.E.2d 539,542 (N.Y. 1999). 
581. See Turner, 512 U.S. at 680 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (recognizing that "the government may subsidize speakers that it thinks provide novel 
points of view"); see also Ellen P .  Goodman, Bargains in the Information Marketplace: The 
Contrary to the widely held misconception that the government has 
prioritized an autonomy-based, noninterventionist approach to the First 
Amendment, the government has in fact historically exercised its 
prerogative to use public monies to prornote civic engagement and enl~ance 
political com~nunication among the people.'" As Professor Richard C'. 
Levin has argued, the federal governxnent has intervened especi:illy when 
private commercial forces have caused inequality of access to delnocratic 
2nd political mechanisms or distortions in the speech rnarketpluce.';S' Jo11n 
Rawls warned that "[tlhe liberties protected by the principle of 
participation lose much of their value whenever those who have greater 
private means are permitted to use their advantage to control the course of 
public debate."'" Goveniment, and especially the federal government, has 
long intervened to level the playing field and preserve the free speech and 
other democratic rights and liberties of the less powerful. 
For example, Professor Baker has noted that the framers then~selves 
advocated government subsidization of journalis~n and the democratization 
of "political intelligence and inf~rmation."'~' One of the first tasks of the 
first Congress was to devise a system for richly subsidizing newspapers by 
means of deep discounts on postal rates, free postal delivery of newspapers 
to members of the press, and the building of a network of post roads, both 
for the distribution of news and political information and for 
I'te of Go~er.nrner?t Slrh\rilrc., fo Rcgllltrft. h'c~11 Z!et/i~, I J ON F F L F C O ~ ~ ~ I  & t11(,1i r t c ~  L 
2 17. 219-20 (2002) (pos~tlng that "[slpeech rtyulutrorir, even it they 'Ire content neutral. ale 
prewmpt~vel  y ~nv'ilid under the t Irst Amendment" whereas "burdens on \pet.ch tIi,it ,ire pdrt 
of 3 ci~screttonary ipcech heiwfit may be treated '1s p r e s u m p t ~ ~ e l y  ~ , l l l d  C Y ~ I L I ~ ~ S  of 
eovernment Inrges\eV (c~t lng  Rust v Yull~van, 500 lJ C 173 (1991))),  \cjc2 (11,o K~i\t, 500 
LJ S ,it 202-03 ( t ~ p h o l d ~ n g  a b ~ l ~ t y  of government to deny Public tlealth S e ~ v t c e  Act tundk to 
rcctplent5 who engdge In any 'ictrvitlec 'ldcocat~ng abort~on as "a method ot tdrn~l) 
pldnn~ng") 
582 Cec, r q ,  Bd ot Regent5 o t  the U n ~ v  of WI\  c Southworth, 519 U S 217. 774 
(1000) ( h o l d ~ n g  that a public unlLerslty, I ~ h e  other government entitles, ha\ an Interest 111 
encouraging engagement and partlclpat~on rn C I V I C ,  \ oc~a l ,  L i ~ ~ d  cornmun~ty , ~ t f ~ [ r \ ) ,  re ( I / \ ( )  
Nct,inel. ~ I I ~ I L I  note 152, at 471  ( '~ f t l rn~lng  that the goLernment h,~s the p11~11cge of I I ~ I ~ I L I I I ~  
publlc tundc. not only to promote C I V I C  goals. but to ,idv'ince 1t5 own polrc~es)  
583 Set, K~chard C L c v ~ n ,  Prevdent, Yale U n ~ v  , [Ieniocracy and the M'lrket, \pcech 
tor Dernoclatlc V~btas  The W ~ l l ~ d l n  Clyde DeV'lne Lecture Cer~ek 15 (I-eb 6. 2001) 
hir11,t t / / I /  trrtrrlohle i r f  http 11www yale edui te rc ide~~ioc~, lcy~~~~ed~ci i  tcb6text pdt ( ' ' 0 ~ 1  
Arnerrc,ln dernoc~~icy  ~1ppe,ir4 w ~ l l ~ n g  to t o l e ~ ~ ~ t e  '5 \ubstantlal degree of ~nequa l~ ty .  but we 
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discussion website and exercise editorial control in excluding and limiting 
individual speakers when "reasonable in light of the purpose served by the 
for~m.""~ For example, as in the case of already successful local public 
discussion websites, a public website facilitator may set up an online 
community discussion on a particular topic-for example, a proposal to 
merge two schools or build a new library-and limit discussion to what 
would be germane to that 
Attention also must be paid to ensuring that in subsidizing online public 
spaces and speech, officials implementing these interventions are not 
permitted to manipulate the content of the speech for partisan political 
advantage or other illegitimate ends. Of course, this is a risk inherent in the 
government's subsidization of any speech or public fora, both online and 
on terra firma. Nevertheless, as in the context of federal subsidization of 
public broadcasting, there must be safeguards in place to ensure that the 
government's subsidies in support of online fora and speech are distributed 
in a manner free from partisan or other inappropriate influence. In the case 
of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, Congress assigned a 
"nonpolitical nature"595 to the organization, and requires that its board of 
directors be comprised of a politically balanced and professionally and 
geographically diverse membership.596 The CPB also is required to adhere 
to strict grant- and financial-reporting guidelines in order to ensure fairness 
and transparency.'" As noted in Part III.B.2, the American public 
broadcasting model has not been without political controversies, but on 
balance, the system has delivered democratically and socially valuable 
content not otherwise available to citizens. A new fiscal agent to administer 
federal funds in support of affirmative government interventions online, such 
as the Corporation for Public Broadband proposed above, should be required 
to comply with CPB-like requirements ensuring transparency, accountability, 
and the filtering out of partisan or other inappropriate political pressures. 
In addition, in an era of unprecedented federal budget deficits and 
widespread criticism of federal spending, significant federal subsidies in 
support of the proposals in Part I11 will probably meet with opposition. An 
effective response should, of course, acknowledge the longstanding 
593. Id. at 829 (citation omitted). 
594. See Goodman, supra note 581, at 243 n.83 (discussing the germaneness principle 
as applied in Rosenberger). 
595. 47 U.S.C. 396(f) (2000). 
596. See id. 4 396(c)(l)-(2) (requiring that no more than five of the nine board members 
be from the President's political party and that they "be selected so as to provide as nearly 
as practicable a broad representation of the various regions. . . , various professions and 
occupations, . . . talent and experience appropriate to the functions" of the CPB). 
597. See id. $396(i)(lH2) (detailing annual reporting requirements); id. 
8 396(k)(l)(A)-(I)(l)(D) (providing financial disclosure, auditing, and open records and 
meetings requirements). 
government commitment to the subsidization of public, noncommercial 
spaces for democratic engagement. Just as so much human interaction has 
migrated from terra firma to cyberspace, so too should the government's 
interventions in support of the creation and maintenance of accessible, 
noncommercial public discussion spaces expand into the digital realm. The 
nature of direct federal financial support for broadband proliferation as a 
vital and necessary investment in the nation's economic future is also 
important. As noted above, some estimates place the cost of the nation's 
lag in broadband proliferation at $1 trillion in economic Delays 
in providing broadband service to large areas of the nation significantly 
impeding the ability of businesses in underserved or unserved areas from 
competing successfully against broadband-connected companies elsewhere 
in the United States and around the globe.'99 The federal government's 
massive investments in the building out of key elements of the nation's 
infrastructure-the electric grid, the interstate highway system, railroads, 
and post roads-were repaid many times over by means of increased tax 
revenues generated by the economic growth spurred by the proliferation of 
the power and transportation networks. So too should the government's 
subsidization of broadband proliferation be repaid in increased economic 
activity, and resulting tax revenue, down the road.@-"-' 
C. Bridging Autonomy with Civic Republicanism 
Political scientist Alan Wolfe postulates that the core dilemma vexing 
Americans today is "how to be an autonomous person and tied together 
with others at the same time."60' Professor Wolfe's assessment echoes 
Tocqueville's warning that the autonomy and individualism so defining 
American democracy in its adolescence are at once its strength and its 
weakne~s."~ The American Experiment survives, and can thrive, if we 
598. See DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 404, at 1-10, 16; see ulso Travis, slrpra note 446, 
at 1699 ("As much as $1 trillion in economic growth may be delayed due to structural and 
legal limitations on U.S. broadband access."). 
599. See Hesseldahl, supra note 480 (reporting that businesses in nonbroadband areas of 
the nation are at a disadvantage in attracting new clients, and that counties across the nation 
are finding that "a broadband blackout can also hobble economic development"). 
600. See Crawford, supra note 167, at 390 ("Our national economic policy, which looks 
for opportunities for increased economic growth, should be closely tied to communications 
policy that facilitates the interactive, group-forming attributes of the Internet."). 
601. Galston, supra note 377, at 42. 
602. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 2 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 482 (Harvey C. Mansfield 
& Delba Winthrop eds. & trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) (describing American 
individualism as "a reflective and peaceable sentiment that disposes each citizen to isolate 
himself from the mass of those like him and to withdraw to one side . . . so that after having 
thus created a little society for his own use, he willingly abandons society at large to itself'); 
see also DAVID R. HILEY, DOUBT AND THE DEMANDS OF DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP 26 (2006) 
(noting scholars' reception of Tocqueville's observations about individualism in American 
manage to reconcile our individuality with our membership in a republic 
dependent on engaged, deliberative civic participation. It withers when our 
individualism overtakes our civic identity.'(I3 
The regulation of broadcasting was rooted in an administrative impetus 
to build local, detnocratic civic life-to use the public airwaves to promote 
a civic republican, communitarian vision of the First Amendment. By 
contrast, the Internet, by both technological design and regulatory 
forbearance, has evolved into an instrument of hyperindividualism and 
personal autonomy. While broadcasting convenes and focuses, the Internet 
atomizes and fragments. Broadcasting was to promote democracy, and the 
Internet was to promote autonomy. But, as illustrated in Parts I and 11, 
neither regulatory paradigm has fully realized its aspirations. While 
technological, commercial, and legal impediments make it impossible for 
broadcasting to deliver an electronic platform for deliberative democracy, 
the atomistic nature of the Internet, the prevalence of private censorship, 
and the lack of localized civic spaces online have made it impossible for 
the Internet to deliver an electronic free marketplace of ideas. 
The Internet provides an unprecedented opportunity for government to 
assume an interventionist, supportive role in promoting electronic 
democratic engagement while avoiding the hazards' that bedeviled the 
broadcast public interest standard since its inception. Professor Robert Post 
has written that the problem with government forays into the promotion of 
democratic engagement and debate is that they tend to "permit the state to 
define the agenda and parameters of public debate" as if "to presuppose an 
Archimedean point that stands outside of the process of self- 
determinati~n."~'~ He argues that putting the government in the position of 
"pedagogical state" would be "incompatible with democratic self- 
governance" since "citizens engaged in collective self-determination 
through participation in public discourse are not students to be taught, but 
autonomous masters of their fate. They are adults, not pupils."60' By 
aggressively proliferating broadband access and making it possible for 
tnore locally oriented, public spaces for democratic deliberation to exist 
online, the government acts tnore as a facilitator than paternalistic arbiter. 
I t  acts more like a convener than teacher. The proposals in Part 111 avoid a 
culhlre). 
603. Political philosopher Jean Bethke Elshtain suggested in 1995 that we had already 
reached a point of disequilibrium. She wrote that "our American democracy is faltering" 
with "exhaustion, cynicism, opportunism, and despair." JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, 
DEMOC'RACY ON TRIAL 1 ( 1995). 
604. Robert Post, E~~z~ul i@ und .-lzitonomy in First Antenclment Jlrr.isprrr~/ence, 95 MICH. 
L. REV. 15 17. 1538 (1997) (reviewing OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF 
SPEEC'H A N D  THE MANY USES OF STATE POWER (1996)). 
605. Id. 
paternalistic, pedagogical role for government by respecting the autonomy 
of Internet speakers while providing more, noncoercive opportunities for 
local democratic engagement. 
In addition, the proposals do not entail the subordination of the First 
Amendment rights of one set of private speakers to the rights of others, as 
is the case with the floundering public trusteeship model in broadcasting. 
Although the Internet is far from an embodiment of a fully accessible and 
inclusive free marketplace of ideas, it at least has the potential for 
delivering that vision, unlike broadcasting, which is structurally incapabie 
of serving as a platform for popular democratic engagement and 
deliberation. Moreover, the Internet has demonstrated its ability to serve as 
a check on government as we1 as the dominant media. Much of the 
broadcast public interest standard's requirements, on the other hand, were 
eliminated by an FCC captured by the extraordinarily influential broadcast 
lobby, with the acquiescence of rt Congress chastened by the power of local 
broadcasters to shape the path of political careers. 
At the same time, the proposals in Part 111 acknowledge that the 
autonomy and civic republican views of the First Amendment are not 
mutually exclusive, To the contrary, the Internet is uniquely positioned as 
a medium that, unlike broadcasting, can reconcile the dialectic tension 
between autonomy and civic republicanism. Autonomy, after all, should be 
seen not as an end in itself but as a means to freedom and enlightenment. 
While Justice Brandeis's concurrence in Whitney v. California often is 
cited as support for an autonomy-rooted view of the First Amendment, in 
fact Brandeis reasoned that autonomy was a prerequisite for a deliberative 
democracy: "Those who won our independence believed that the final end 
of the State was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its 
government the deliberative forces should prevail over the a rb i t ra~y."~  
This view of autonomy as a means toward-instead of a counterweight 
against--civic engagement and communitarianism is in harmony with the 
conceptions of the First Amendment of many prominent free speech 
scholars and is the dominant paradigm in contemporary ftee speech 
philosophy. Professor Alexander Meiklejohn vaIorized personal autonomy 
in the speech marketplace as a necessary conduit for civic engagement and 
cofiective self-government.607 Professor Owen Fiss wrote that "[tlhe 
606. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Justice 
Brandeis continued: "They valued liberty both as an end and as a means." Id.; see also 
Rainey, supra note 12, at 317-23 (discussing the tensions between "individualist and 
communitarian" views of liberty and Whitney v. California). 
607. See Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 
14 10-1 1 (1 986) ("Autonomy is not valued by Meiklejohn and his followers because of what 
it does for a person's development (self-actualization), but rather because of the contribution 
it makes to our political life."). 
autonomy protected by the First Amendment and rightly enjoyed by 
individuals and the press is not an end in itself, as it might be in some 
moral code, but is rather a means to further the democratic values 
underlying the Dill of ~i~hts."""xrofessor Fiss argues that "the state [nay 
have to act to hrther the robustness of public debate in circumstances 
where powers outside the state are stifling speech."609 
Other notable scholars have theorized that the proper role of government 
in the speech marketplace is a proactive one that optimizes access and 
promotes civic engagement, in ways that resonate with the proposals in 
Part 111. Professor Zechariah Ghafee, Jr., for example, argued that 
"affirmative action by the government" is required to ensure that the 
marketplace of ideas fmctions optimally, just as the government intervenes 
in commercial tnarketplaces to ensure access, fairness, and a wide and 
dynamic trade."" Professor Sunstein has long recognized an affirmative 
government obligation to provide speech opportunities-a "New Deal" for 
speech in which the government proactively facilitates more deliberative 
democracy." ~e argues that the public forum doctrine not only creates a 
right of speakers to access public spaces for expressive activities, but more 
essentially "creates a right, not to avoid governmentally imposed penalties 
on speech, but to ensure government subsidies for speech.""* Similarly, 
Professor Jack Balkin theorizes that the purpose of freedom of speech is 
not merely autonomous self-actualization but individual development 
through civic engagement. He argues that the objective of free speech is 
the promotion of a "democratic culture" that is "about individual liberty as 
well as collective self-governance."6i3 Other scholars hold harmonious 
 view^."^ 
Finally, the proposals in Part 111 that aim to create more opportunities for 
shared experiences online, and the presentation of valuable democratic, 
608. OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 83 ( 1996). 
609. Id. at 3-4. 
6 10. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., 2 GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMILIUNIUATIONS 3.7 1-77 
( 1947). Professor Chafee wrote that "a free market requlres regulat~on, just as a free market 
for goods needs law against monopoly." Id. at 475. 
6 1 1. SGNSTFIN, rztppru note 2 14, at 241. 
612. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 28 (2001); Jee cxlso id. ("There 1s no questlon 
that taxpayers are required to support. . . expressive activrty."). 
613. Balkin, ~ztpva note 588, at 3. Professor Charles Fried has wnnen that "this 
fundamental liberty [of speech] ts one that must to some extent be deslgned and engineered 
by the state after all." CHARLES FRIED, MODERN LIBERTY 4ND THE LII\/IITS OF GOVERNMENT 
1 07 (2007). 
614. Professor Baker has taught, "Although the First Amendment ought to rcstnct 
purposeful suppression of speech, it should not and has not restricted structural interventions 
deslgned to improve the quallty of the press." C. E ~ w m  BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS AND 
DEMOCRACY 4 (2002). Professor Fned similarly acknowledges that the fundamental liberty 
of speech In public spaces "is one that must to some extent be des~gned and engineered by 
the ctate after all." FRIED, st~pra note 613, at 107. 
noncommercial content that citizens otherwise would not seek out on their 
own, are very much in harmony with recent scholarship on the importance 
of affirmative government measures to enhance exposure diversity in 
today's atomized digital marketplace. Professor Ellen Goodman's work in 
particular underscores the need for proactive media policy to address actual 
consumption of valuable content instead of access The digital 
communications ecology has reversed the broadcast paradigm of scarce 
spectrum and abundant attention into one in which content is abundant but 
attention scarce. As a result, Professor Goodman argues that "[tlhe 
appropriate policy response" to the failure of the digital marketplace to 
provide local, democratic content "is proactive[] in that it seeks to expose 
people to content that they do not, at least initially, demand" and that 
"influence[s] demand, cultivating public tastes in ways that support 
democratic ideals."616 This is an especially important function of 
government in the digital realm insofar as the marketplace of ideas, when 
left to the devices of commercial actors alone, tends not only to privilege 
commercial expression but also to manipulate and form the audience's 
tastes and preferences for content.'" 
In the broadcast regime, the government's promotion of viewpoint, 
source, and content diversity by promulgating production-side regulations 
took for granted that its efforts would result in a diversity of exposure.618 
Because broadcast channels were limited, any affirmative interventions by 
government to promote local, public interest programming, or 
noncommercial fare on public stations, were assured of an audience of 
viewers and listeners who would seek out the programming or stumble 
upon it in surfing the dial to see "what's on." These serendipitous 
encounters with democratically valuable and noncommercial content are 
much rarer in the atomized, fkagmented Internet. The proposals in Part I11 
would promote online exposure diversity by boosting access, creating new 
common spaces online, and, most importantly, drawing localized attention 
to public interest, noncommercial content online that citizens otherwise 
may not seek on their own. In addition, they would help counteract the 
Internet's propensity to accelerate the deterioration of American civic 
engagement and communitarianism bemoaned by Professors Sandel and 
Putnam. 
615. See Goodman, supra note 58, at 364 ("If media policies are to effectuate proactive 
goals in the digital era, what is required is a new emphasis on content consumption, as 
opposed to mere content availability."). 
616. Id. at 364, 366. 
617. BPLKER, supra note 614, at 87-95. 
618. See Goodman, supra note 58, at 370 ("When public television broadcast a 
documentary or when commercial stations held political debates, a good number of viewers 
who did not initially demand the content would nonetheless stumble across it."). 
Initial overoptimism about the power of emerging communications 
technologies to transform the world is nothing new. Likewise, there is 
nothing novel about the concern that a new technology harms rather than 
helps society. In Plato's Phuedrrrs, Socrates expressed alarm at how the 
spread of literacy would undermine wisdom and the value of firsthand 
observation, allowing readers to appear "very knowledgeable when they 
are for the most part quite  he invention of the printing press 
in the fifteenth century led some to bemoan its effects on memory and 
intellect.""' And the advent of the recording industry in the late nineteenth 
century caused composer John Philip Sousa to warn that "talking machines 
are going to ruin the artistic development of music in this country" and 
cause the .'vocal chords [to] be eliminated by a process of evolution.""" 
In inore modem times, the power of broadcasting to provide a point of 
cornmon focus in homes across the nation instilled both awe at the 
medium's promise to transform democracy and fear at the power the 
medium gave the entities that controlled it to shape public tastes and the 
content of our discussion."" Today, as detailed in Part 11, the Internet is 
seen as both enhancing and harming democracy and society in significant 
ways. 
The modern state has played an important role in promoting the 
democratic and social benefits of emerging technologies while dampening 
their perceived harms. In broadcasting, the broadcast public interest 
standard has been government's affirmative effort, still underway, to 
"promote and realize the vast potentialities""3 of the powerful, pervasive, 
and central broadcast medium. It endeavored to realize broadcasting's 
potential as a democracy-enhancing instrument while mitigating its 
antidemocratic effects. As discussed in Part I, the broadcast regulatory 
619. PLATO, PHAEDRUS AND THE SEVENTH AND EIGHTH LETTERS 96 (Walter Hamilton 
trans., Penguin Classics 1973). Socrates feared that "because [readers] are filled with the 
conceit of wisdom instead of real wisdom they will be a burden to society." id at 96-97. 
620. See genenrll1: Nicholas Carr, Is Google Muking U.s Stzrpitl:?, ATLANTIC, July- 
Aug. 3008, at 56 (referencing Socrates and literacy, as well as the alarm caused by the 
arrival of the printing press). 
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S. 6330 and H.R. 19,853, to Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 
59th Cong. 24 (1906) (statement of John Philip Sousa). Mr. Sousa testitied, "When 1 was a 
boy.  . . in front of every house in the summer evenings you would find young people 
together singing the songs of the day or the old songs. Today you hear these infernal 
machines going night and day. We will not have a vocal chord left." Id. 
622. See BOLLINCER, supra note 12, at 63 (noting that American broadcasting regulation 
was premised both on the concern that broadcasters would "control the content of public 
discussion" and that the marketplace alone would be unable to keep that power in check). 
623. NBC, Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 217 (1943). 
regime has been far from a model of regulatory effectiveness. Although it 
has had some success at promoting universality of broadcast service, 
localism, competition, and diversity on the broadcast medium, command- 
and-control broadcast regulation has failed to deliver the electronic free 
marketplace of ideas envisioned by regulatory optimists at the dawn of 
broadcasting. 
The failure of the broadcast public interest standard to achieve its 
laudable and lofty objectives, however, should not argue against 
affirmative government interventions into the broadband realm to "promote 
and realize the vast potentialities" of the technology for civic republican 
and communitarian ends. Quite to the contrary, the current state of the 
Internet as a platform for expression and democratic engagement calls for 
significantly more, and not less, proactive government intervention. 
Whereas there is a scarcity of true democratic deliberation and localized 
public fora online, private censorship, fragmentation, and atomization of 
attention abound. Although the broadband realm has enabled millions to 
create and receive democratic and other forms of expression and 
information, broadband remains out of reach for many Americans, 
especially minority, rural, and economically disadvantaged communities. 
As a result, the digital divide has become a democratic divide, with 
Americans living in radically different information environments 
depending on their ability to access and use high-speed Internet service. 
Hannah Arendt wrote that "political freedom, generally speaking, means 
the right 90 be a participator in government,' or it means nothing."624 As 
the broadband realm becomes even more of a forum for democratic 
expression, political engagement, and self-governance, those without 
access to broadband will be without an opportunity for full political 
participation, In addition, as with broadcasting, the Internet-and 
especially broadband--offers significant economic, educational, and other 
benefits that make universality of access all the more important to the 
nation. 
The broadcast public interest standard failed to achieve its objectives 
fully, not because those objectives were invalid or because a proactive 
government role was inappropriate, but because the structural, 
constitutional, and technological particularities of the broadcast medium 
were incompatible with the standard's objectives. By contrast, the Internet 
presents the government with a unique opportunity to pursue and achieve 
the overarching objectives of the broadcast public interest standard without 
many of the significant constitutional, structural, and other impediments 
that bedeviled the broadcast standard. Broadband provides a technological 
platform that would accommodate, and is very much in need of, 
government intervention in support of localism, noncomrnercial fora, and 
democratic deliberation in a universally accessible, diverse, and 
competitive online marketplace of ideas. 
The proposals for a broadband public interest standard discussed in 
Part 111 would enable the federal governtnent to address, in a substantial 
way, the failure of the commercial marketplace to realize the democratic 
promise of broadband. The proposals recognize that, in today's converging 
media ecology, broadband Internet has emerged as a central medium for 
human interaction and engagement, rendering the Internet exceptionalism 
at the heart of the government's noninterventionist disposition obsolete and 
counterproductive. The United States needs a new affirmative orientation 
toward broadband that sees it as more than just another widget in a 
regulatorily unbridled commercial marketplace. A policy that valorizes 
broadband-as the government has valorized broadcasting since the 
1920s-is a vital tool for enhancing democracy; for enfranchising, 
engaging, and informing a diverse electorate; and for enriching civic life. 
Broadband can deliver the electronic free marketplace of ideas that was 
the elusive, and perhaps impossible, dream of the broadcast regulatory 
regime. But it will not be able to do so without the signiticant and 
proactive involvement of the federal government. The commercial 
marketplace alone will not deliver the democracy-enriching and ubiquitous 
electronic free marketplace of ideas we have long sought and that, finally, 
is within reach. 

